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SYNOPSIS 
The international presence in Kosovo is an example of full international 
administration. Its most important obligation is arguably to provide a safe and 
secure environment for all inhabitants, in which they can establish relations 
and structures for peaceful co-existence with the help of the international 
community. Both military and civilian agencies (KFOR and UNMIK) and many 
nations are involved in this project. However, history as well as research in 
international relations and organizational theory dictate an expectation that 
numerous and varied goals and preferences exist in such a scenario. This 
dissertation asks whether success criteria influence civil-military cooperation in 
the security sector of the international administration of Kosovo. 
An examination of KFOR and UNMIK with regards to their actual 
cooperation patterns in the security sector revealed conspicuous institutional 
differences. KFOR appears as a collection of organizational units between 
which there are command lines that cannot be used to issue proper orders due 
to national reluctance to relinquish control of their personnel. UNMIK appears 
more coherent institutionally, but lacks the resources and force to execute all 
their duties. The nature of security challenges and the resource situation have 
necessitated military engagement in executive policing, but KFOR and UNMIK 
are both reluctant due to institutional differences and preferences. KFOR and 
UNMIK seem to operate with partly the same success criteria – the UN 
mandate – and partly separate ones. The time horizon stands out as an 
unsorted issue, as KFOR looks to withdraw as soon as possible while UNMIK 
looks to stay until the situation is stable and self-sustainable. Due to these and 
other factors, security cooperation has to a significant degree assumed the 
form of ad hoc projects and solutions conducted on local and regional levels. 
Streamlined, uniform success criteria would probably offer enhanced economy 
and efficiency of joint efforts. On the other hand, it seems like the lack thereof 
may offer a desirable flexibility to effectuate rapid, tailored initiatives in 
response to sudden and unexpected challenges. 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AD   Administrative Department 
AOR   Area of Responsibility 
CCIU   Central Criminal Investigations Unit 
CIMIC  Civil-Military Cooperation 
CINCSOUTH Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe 
CivPol  Civilian Police 
COMKFOR   Commander of KFOR 
DSRSG  Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General 
EOD   Explosives Ordnance Division 
FFI   Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt 
FRY   Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
FYROM  Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
GO    Governmental Organizations 
GSZ   Ground Safety Zone 
HQ   Headquarters 
IIU   Internal Investigation Unit 
IOM   International Organization of Migration 
JOC   Joint Operation Center 
KFOR  Kosovo Force 
KLA   Kosovo Liberation Army  
KPC   Kosovo Protection Corps 
KPS   Kosovo Police Service 
MNB   Multi National Brigade 
MPU   Missing Persons Unit 
MTA   Military Technical Agreement 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NGO   Non-governmental Organization 
NUPI   Norsk utenrikspolitisk institutt 
OJG   Operation Joint Guardian 
OSCE  Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
PDSRSG Principal Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary 
General 
PSO   Peace Support Operation 
ROE   Rules of Engagement 
SACEUR  Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
SOP   Standard Operating Procedures 
SPU   Special Police Unit 
SRSG  Special Representative of the Secretary General 
TPIU   Trafficking and Prostitution Investigation Unit 
UCK   (Albanian for KLA) 
UCPMB (Albanian for) Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and 
Bujanovac 
UN   United Nations 
UNHCR  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
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UNMIK  United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force 
UNSC  United Nations Security Council 
UNSCR  United Nations Security Council Resolution 
UNSG  United Nations Secretary General 
UNTAC  United Nations Transitional Administration in Cambodia 
UNTAES  United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern  
   Slavonia 
UNTAET  United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
My academic interest in peace support operations came during a one-year job 
assignment in a peace observation operation in the West Bank of the Jordan 
River. Upon completion of that assignment I contacted a former teacher from a 
university graduate course, who has his daily work at the Norwegian Defense 
Research Establishment (FFI), to ask for his opinion on a graduate research 
project dealing with the effectiveness of peace support operations. As it were, 
the institute was at the time conducting a larger study of KFOR (the NATO 
Kosovo Force) and trying to establish a more comprehensive project on peace 
support operations. I was invited to join them as an in-house graduate student 
and asked to look into the specific subject of success criteria for peace support 
operations and civil-military cooperation in peacemaking. Apparently, no 
framework for evaluation applicable to every peace support operation has 
been consolidated, so generalizations regarding what elements make for 
successful peace operations have been extremely difficult to make. Such 
insight would have great potential value for decision-makers in a time where 
thresholds for peace making is ever lowering. 
The initial project envisaged for the present thesis was, accordingly, to 
investigate success criteria for peace support operations by examining cases 
and try to identify common denominators which could potentially form a basis 
for general success criteria. Gradually the topic was narrowed down to this: 
“Are success criteria at all relevant for the actual effectiveness of peace 
support operations?” 
 The precise problem selected for investigation is whether success 
criteria affect the civil-military cooperation in the security sector in Kosovo. The 
research questions selected to achieve greater insight into this problem are 
 
1) What are the success criteria that the KFOR and UNMIK respectively 
apply in their daily work for increased security in Kosovo? 
2) What is the nature of the cooperation between KFOR and UNMIK in 
the field of security? 
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3) Do the answers to questions 1 and 2 suggest that there is potential 
for improved cooperation between KFOR and UNMIK if their 
respective success criteria were to be streamlined and uniform? 
 
The Kosovo operation was in a way a pilot operation because 
humanitarian reasons provoked armed intervention. The operation is 
enormous in terms of geography and scope of responsibilities, as well as in 
terms of participating states and agencies. The United Nations mandate they 
operate under is unusually strong, and includes clear (however general) 
targets and an obligation for military and civilian agencies to cooperate. 
Access to open documentation on Kosovo is quite good. Civilian-military 
cooperation in peace support operations is an area of special interest. The 
international community has increasingly taken upon itself to actively intervene 
in armed conflict. The combined utilities of military strength and protection 
capacities (deterrence), and civilian reconstruction and reconciliation expertise 
(encouragement), have proven to be invaluable in this context. Coordination 
and joint efforts has been fraught with frictions, however, as military and 
civilian agencies have formerly been happily confined to separate and limited 
competencies.  
This thesis is structured as an examination of civil-military cooperation 
within one sector – security – in Kosovo. (Chapter 5: “Implementing KFOR-
UNMIK security cooperation”) The case study is conducted using methods 
which will be separately accounted for. (Chapter 2: “Research methods”) A 
short account of how success criteria and cooperation are treated in more 
general academic literature serves as an analytical framework. (Chapter 3: 
“Theoretical background”) A brief background on the development of peace 
support operations and the international community’s involvement in conflict 
resolution is also provided. (Chapter 4: “International intervention and 
Kosovo”). The findings are finally brought together and assessed with respect 
to the research questions. (Chapter 6: “Summary and conclusions”). 
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2 RESEARCH METHODS 
This chapter aims to draw attention to and point out potential implications of 
some of the research methods that have been employed in order to answer 
the problem formulations of the thesis. The first section is a short reminder of 
the research questions sought answered, and a reference for the definitions 
employed for the most central concepts. Secondly comes a description of the 
type of research project conducted, a single case study, along with reasons for 
this choice. Finally follows a presentation of the different sources the thesis is 
based upon and an assessment of their value and usefulness for the research 
project.  
 
2.1  Concepts in the research questions 
The questions the thesis aspires to answer are, as described in chapter 1, the 
following: 
 
• What are the success criteria that the KFOR and UNMIK respectively 
apply in their daily work for increased security in Kosovo? 
• What is the nature of the cooperation between KFOR and UNMIK in 
the field of security? 
• Do the answers to questions 1 and 2 suggest that there is potential 
for improved cooperation between KFOR and UNMIK if their 
respective success criteria were to be streamlined and uniform? 
 
Some of these concepts will be thoroughly treated in chapter 3, because 
they need to be understood on the background of theoretical arguments 
presented in that dedicated chapter. Some of the concepts are clarified in the 
empirical presentation of the case and study objects, because they need to be 
understood on the background of the factual situation and history. The 
intention of this section is merely to provide the reader with a “road map” for 
the analysis ahead and to sort out the meaning of the more trivial concepts in 
use. 
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The meaning of “success criteria” will be thoroughly discussed in 
chapter 3, both in terms of what they constitute for peace support operations 
and for organizations more generally speaking.   
Comprehensive descriptions of both KFOR and UNMIK will form the 
beginning of chapter 5 on the basis of a brief historical background of their 
formation given in chapter 4. 
The concept of “security” employed in the present context will be a very 
conservative one: “Physical security for human life and property”. This implies 
that actions taken to preserve such security are limited to securing territory 
and restoring law and order. A thorough discussion of the security concept and 
the chosen definition comes in chapter 4, where it naturally constitutes a part 
of the wider background description. 
“Cooperation” here refers to concerted actions between UNMIK and 
KFOR, between the civilian and military agencies, in order to ensure security.  
Throughout the text the term “civil-military cooperation” will be widely used in 
this meaning. This is not to be confused with the term “CIMIC”, which is often 
seen in literature about for example peace operations and conflict studies. 
“CIMIC” is a technical term which denotes liaison and public relations functions 
of military agencies toward civilian agencies and/or the general public. 
(Lindemann 2002: 61) The term “cooperation” will also be discussed in chapter 
3 with special regards to its meaning when it comes to organizational 
cooperation. 
 
2.2 The case study analysis 
The present thesis is a single case study. Characteristics of single case 
studies are that there is only one study object, but many variables. In political 
science, the case is frequently an ongoing phenomenon. A single case study 
in political science is, as a general rule, non-experimental.  
The fact that there is only one study object but several variables makes 
for a “deep”, not “broad” study. The analysis ideally produces thorough insight 
into the one case, but does not provide grounds for generalization. 
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Generalization requires a considerable body of comparable cases, the 
analyses of which point in the same direction with regards to a specified issue 
or problem. However, Yin (1994: 106) argues that single case studies can be 
very valuable, for example when a “pattern-matching logic” is applied. The 
idea of this logic is to compare an empirically registered pattern with a 
predicted one. If the patterns coincide, this can help strengthen the internal 
validity of the case study. The primary aim of a single case study is 
nevertheless enhanced understanding of that case, not primarily to gain a 
basis for making statements about the category of phenomena or processes 
the case belongs to. (Andersen 1990: 121-127) The single case in this 
dissertation is “civil-military cooperation in the security sector in Kosovo”, 
where “civil” is defined as “UNMIK”, and “military” is defined as “KFOR”. This 
appears immediately logical because UNMIK is a civilian agency with and 
KFOR a military one. “Cooperation” will, equally logical, be understood as their 
joint activities to promote security. Hence, the definitional validity of the 
concepts should be adequate, as there is a logical relation between concepts 
and contents. (Hellevik 1991: 42) The security concept utilized is one of a 
narrow definition strictly focused on physical security for people and property. 
It will be separately discussed in section 4.4. 
When a case is ongoing, it means it is not possible to analyze the case 
as an isolated phenomenon, because it has no end point. It can be very 
difficult to separate an ongoing case from its environment, which complicates a 
stringent analysis. Generally speaking, it is much harder to assume a “bird’s 
perspective” on something that is actually happening, as compared to finished 
processes where time has already provided answers. Categories become 
blurred. It is not obvious what are causes and what are consequences. Thus, it 
is tricky to work out an analytical framework and make correct, clear and 
exclusive distinctions between concepts, processes, milieu, agents, and 
results. That is not to say analysis of ongoing cases is a waste of time – 
speaking in terms of for example practical politics, such research can be very 
valuable as it normally does produce useful new knowledge about a problem. 
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The fuzzy edges of ongoing cases, again, bear most significance for the 
generalization potential. (Andersen 1990: 121-127) All of the mentioned 
circumstances can be said to apply to the case of the present thesis. There is 
no telling where Kosovo is heading, even in such a narrow field as security. A 
myriad of agents and preferences are involved in the many processes, and 
patterns are frustratingly diffuse. Kosovo is not a theoretical problem. The 
potential value of enhanced understanding of how civil-military security 
cooperation there can be improved, can hardly be overestimated. One issue is 
the enormous resources being spent for this purpose, and the potential for 
getting more security out of every dollar following better information about 
what works and what does not. A more pressing concern is of course the lives 
and times of the people of Kosovo, and how greatly they are affected by the 
difference between success and failure in this respect. Research can therefore 
be warranted despite the inherent analytical weaknesses connected with 
ongoing cases. 
That a case is non-experimental carry many of the same implications as 
ongoing cases. Basically, it means it is not possible to conduct contra-factual 
tests. Any development, process or phenomenon can only be analyzed as it is. 
Conditions and premises cannot be altered to check for alternative outcomes. 
This is relevant because single case studies often are explanatory and/or 
prescriptive. Their aim is frequently to suggest (a) course(s) of action 
preferable to others, based on knowledge about the features of the problem 
issue and wanted outcomes. When a case is non-experimental, all 
suggestions are necessarily based on assumptions. Consequences of courses 
of action not taken can never be known, and prescriptions can only be based 
on more or less well-founded expectations of specific consequences. (ibid: 
121-127) Again, the relevance for the Kosovo case is quite clear. Conditions, 
restraints and possibilities are given. Analysis trying to prescribe measures to 
produce specific results must be based on the actual nature of the problem. As 
the goal of the Kosovo operation is an altered situation on the ground, 
enhanced understanding can improve decision making simply because 
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information is the basis of decision making processes. In that scenario the 
single case study can be valuable even though it cannot produce absolute 
answers in the way that, say, natural sciences often can. The goal of this 
thesis is not to make recommendations regarding security in Kosovo, but 
rather to find out if and how success criteria affect security cooperation there. 
However, it would be unwise to exclude the possibility that findings will appear 
that can offer a contribution to the continuous debate about how improvement 
can be achieved in this sector. 
Finally, the problem formulations here come in the shape of questions, 
not hypotheses. The reason for this choice is simply that the candidate does 
not have a sufficiently clear idea about what may be the likely causes and 
consequences to conduct such a strict analysis and to form such precise 
assumptions. (Hellevik 1991: 38) For the same reason, no actual pattern-
matching will be attempted. This is an explorative study, the findings of which 
may provide a ground for further studies which could in turn possibly be 
targeted enough to be organized around hypotheses. 
 
2.3 Data sources 
The information upon which this dissertation is based is drawn from several 
sources. Most are open sources. However, one set of information, an interview 
catalogue, is the unpublished property of a Norwegian research institution. 
Access to the catalogue is restricted as of yet, and was granted the present 
candidate on condition of anonymity for informants/interview subjects. In 
addition to the interview catalogue, which is to be more closely described, the 
most prominent data sources have been official documents and reports, official 
websites, existing research presented in books, periodicals, and conference 
papers, and to a lesser degree news in print and broadcasting. 
The review of the case is based on documentation covering the period 
from June 1999 to October 2002. 
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2.3.1 Official documents 
The United Nations Security Council Resolution # 1244 (UNSCR 1244) is the 
document that states the mandate of the international intervention in Kosovo, 
and will be a constant point of reference in this dissertation. Section 5.1 
presents the contents of the Resolution, and the entire Resolution text is 
provided in Annex 1. 
The reports “pursuant to the UNSCR 1244” presented by the United 
Nations Secretary General (UNSG) to the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) approximately 3 times a year are a valuable source of information. 
The reports cover progress and problems faced by the Kosovo operation in 
specified time periods and start in the summer of 1999. They contain a general 
situation summary and describe the status of specific task areas compared 
with the goals set forth in the UNSCR 1244. Although the reports concentrate 
on the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) they contain significant 
details about operational cooperation between UNMIK and the NATO-led 
Kosovo Force (KFOR). 
The International Commission on Kosovo was a panel of international 
representatives who conducted an evaluation visit to Kosovo in 2000, and 
issued the so-called Kosovo Report based on their findings. The Report 
includes a solid background chapter, describing the historical and political 
events that led up to the 1999 intervention. The account of developments on 
the ground in Kosovo as well as in the international diplomacy proved a 
valuable source of information for chapter 4 of this thesis. 
In addition topic-specific reports have been used as reference. The 
UNMIK Police Annual Report of 2000 is a detailed account of organization and 
priorities in the Civilian Police sector. More recent editions have not been 
found. The OSCE Report “Kosovo/Kosova: As Seen, As Told” of December 
1999 extensively covers human rights violations committed in Kosovo from 
June to October 1999.  
Official documents and reports are generally seen to be reliable sources 
in that the information they present largely can be checked and verified.  To 
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the extent that a critical approach is warranted, this largely has to do with the 
problem of “non-information”. The question to be asked is “What has not been 
told?” Omission is a relevant problem regarding almost every source. In the 
case of Kosovo selective information is potentially an extra sensitive issue, 
considering that the recent conflict has given every interest group incentives to 
display certain facts and conceal others. This is such an obvious consideration 
that serious institutions like the UN and the OSCE can be expected to carefully 
assess the information they forward precisely to avoid strong biases. The fact 
that official documents from these organizations on the whole present the 
views of many involved interest groups, as well as contain criticism of the 
efforts made by themselves, strengthen the impression of balanced 
presentations. 
 
2.3.2 Official websites 
The websites consulted are first and foremost the official websites of the UN, 
KFOR and UNMIK. Websites have been used for two main purposes: One 
was to find documents and reports as described above. The other was to find 
facts about the organizations and their work.  
Self-presentations over the internet have the advantage of being 
regularly updated and immediately accessible. Any fact stated on an official 
website is public and can be checked and verified if wished. Self-presentations 
may of course be slightly biased in that they may emphasize achievements 
and successes and play down failures. This problem has actively been sought 
avoided in the present thesis by referring also to other, possibly more sober, 
sources whenever evaluation issues arose. 
 
2.3.3 Research 
Existing academic work on peace operations, success criteria, organizations, 
Kosovo, and the international operation in Kosovo forms the largest body of 
sources for the present dissertation.  
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Most of the contributions on peace operations were written in the latter 
years of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s. The reason for this is 
mainly that peacekeeping has changed dramatically since the fall of the Berlin 
Wall. Earlier research has simply lost much of its relevance because the 
practices studied largely are not in use anymore. There are some notable 
exceptions, especially within the more general approaches to peace 
operations. Articles in periodicals such as International Peacekeeping have 
been very useful, particularly for their recency. Conference papers have 
likewise been valuable, as they gather new and frequently custom-made 
contributions from researchers and practitioners in many fields to shed light on 
many sides of one issue area.  Research on peace operations have been used 
as sources for two aspects of the dissertation; for the empirical side, in the 
presentation of the Kosovo operation and its functions, and for the discussion 
of success criteria in peace operations. 
For the discussion of different aspects of organizations and generation 
of success criteria within them, three introductions to organizational theory 
form the basis. Three standard works would be an insufficient basis for a 
theoretical dissertation. In the present context, however, organizational theory 
merely acts in support of what is essentially a single case study. The 
theoretical aspects provide an explanatory background for the case, not 
theoretical assertions to be tested.  
 
2.3.4 Interviews 
The interviews mentioned above were conducted and compiled on a field trip 
in Kosovo, more precisely in KFOR, in August 2001 by Sven Kristian Nissen, 
then a Political Science graduate student on a scholarship from the Norwegian 
Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). Nissen used the interviews as a source 
in his own graduate thesis, but they were in fact conducted and made into a 
catalogue for the main purpose of constituting part of a larger KFOR database 
under NUPI auspices. The topics for the interviews were partly the daily 
workings of the KFOR operation, and partly the issue of Norwegian command 
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of that operation.1 The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured 
manner, however, and a significant amount of information can be found in the 
catalogue regarding issues also of civil-military cooperation, multinationality, 
and many other topics that the subjects considered central for how KFOR 
functioned. The catalogue is a unique source of insider opinions, analyses and 
evaluations of KFOR and the entire Kosovo operation. The 65 subjects had 
different positions in KFOR and some in civilian agencies in terms of both rank 
and tasks, and come from different nations. Their views offer a rare 
perspective on a military organization, which under normal circumstances 
usually never communicates to the public except in official press statements. 
The use of the interviews is, however, fraught with restrictions that 
possibly reduce their academic value. First of all, they are unpublished. 
Access was granted this candidate for the use in this dissertation, and very 
explicitly nothing else. Because of the sensitive nature of many of the issues, 
informants spoke under condition of anonymity. Therefore, all quotes refer to 
approximate position and agency. The final decisions regarding quotations 
have been made by research officials at NUPI, who are the owners of the 
information and responsible towards the informants. Secondly, it could be 
argued that field work should always be custom-made; that is, interviews 
conducted by somebody else for a different purpose than the research project 
in question should not, as a general rule, be used as a source. It is true that a 
critical view is appropriate whenever relying on somebody else’s data or 
research. In this case the interviews were conducted for the purpose of 
building a database on KFOR, not just for Nissen’s own thesis. It was always 
the intention to use them for several research purposes. They were formally 
conducted under the auspices of a well-renowned research institute. The 
KFOR Operational Analysis Unit was supporting this activity, and staff from the 
Unit who have their daily work at the Norwegian Defense Research 
Establishment have continued their involvement upon their return to Norway 
                                                 
1 Norwegian Lieutenant-General Skiaker from the NATO Command in Jåttå, Stavanger, was commander of 
KFOR 5 (COMKFOR) from April to October 2001. 
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ultimo 2001. The fact that the data are not yet publicly available is above all 
due to the sensitive nature of some of the contents and comments, particularly 
regarding military technicalities and national differences. Careful assessment 
is necessary before the database can be widely drawn upon.  
In this dissertation the interviews have largely been used for the purpose 
of highlighting points, for illustration, for reinforcing arguments, and so on. 
They do not compose a crucial basis for the argumentation or conclusions. As 
such they work well despite restrictions and weaknesses. Evaluative 
statements from KFOR are generally not available elsewhere, while UNMIK 
presents views in the reports to the UN Security Council. 
 
2.3.5 Assessment of the data sources 
The reliability of the data is generally considered to be good, because the 
sources are both reputable and the information verifiable. The question of data 
validity has to do with the coherence between definitional validity and data 
reliability. (Hellevik 1991: 43) Because many of the topics that have to be dealt 
with in the dissertation are of a sensitive political nature, it must be expected 
that available data carry a mark of discretion and diplomacy. This is true for a 
vast amount of research in international relations. As long as any findings and 
conclusions are considered with this factor closely in mind, the data material 
can in all likelihood be deemed sufficient for the dissertation purpose, if not 
exhaustive. 
 
2.3.6 The non-conducting of field work 
There are several reasons why field work has not been conducted for this 
project.  
First of all, the topic here is not Kosovo per se, but cooperation between 
two international organizations. Both organizations are large and well known 
and produce extensive information about themselves and what they do. While 
personal experience and first hand gathering of data certainly add a depth to 
analysis, it is this candidate’s conviction that publicly available data suffice for 
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the project at hand. Access to the interview catalogue discussed above offers 
valuable inside information and viewpoints of key personnel of the kind that 
field work can be expected to produce. Both of these arguments substantiate 
that the sources used constitute sufficient, although not perfect, evidence upon 
which it is possible to conduct the analysis in an academically sound manner. 
Practical objections also ruled out field work. An international operation like 
this is covered with restrictions as to what can be discussed with outsiders. 
The interview catalogue already available was compiled in cooperation with an 
Operational Analysis Unit organic to KFOR. There is every reason to believe 
that interviewees spoke more freely in that context than they would to an 
anonymous graduate student, and that access to high-ranking personnel was 
granted which could not otherwise have been counted on. 
For all of the above reasons it seemed a more useful and fruitful 
alternative to rely on available source material for this project, especially as 
careful assessments were convincing that such information would be sufficient 
for the research project.  
 
2.4 Summary 
The definitions and contents of the most central concepts that constitute the 
research topic are generally accounted for in chapters 3, 4 and 5. This choice 
allows for a more thorough discussion of each concept in its factual context.  
The chosen research format is the single case study. The subject is an 
ongoing, non-experimental phenomenon, and the aim of the analysis is above 
all enhanced understanding. Therefore the research topic is posed in the form 
of questions, not hypotheses. 
Research is largely based on open sources and readily available data, 
drawn from academic literature, official reports and documents, web sites, and 
to a lesser degree media. In addition, unpublished interviews with KFOR and 
some UNMIK personnel made anonymous are used to add valuable inside 
comments. Field work has not been conducted, both because it did not appear 
to be required for the task at hand, and for practical reasons. 
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3 THEORETICAL ASPECTS 
In this chapter a theoretical background will be given for the ensuing case 
analysis. As accounted for previously, theoretical propositions or proper 
hypotheses will not be propositioned. However, a review of existing research 
on the topics under investigation can be helpful in identifying important aspects 
and dimensions of a problem complex. Since the case is both one of 
international cooperation and institutional cooperation, it seems logical that 
relevant input can be found in the disciplines of both international relations and 
organizational theory. 
The background below is organized around some of the most central 
concepts in the problem formulations: success criteria in the context of 
international peace support operations (PSO); success criteria in an 
organizational context; and finally cooperation and change in an organizational 
context. The chapter 3 summary highlights the relevance of the presented 
theory for the case.  
 
3.1 Problems formulations 
The precise research questions to be investigated, are the following: 
 
• What are the success criteria that the KFOR and UNMIK respectively 
apply in their daily work for increased security in Kosovo? 
• What is the nature of the cooperation between KFOR and UNMIK in 
the field of security? 
• Do the answers to questions 1 and 2 suggest that there is potential 
for improved cooperation between KFOR and UNMIK if their 
respective success criteria were to be streamlined and uniform? 
 
This chapter approaches the central concepts in the problem 
formulations. First if all, what are “success criteria” in the context of peace 
support operations? How are they created and how are they being used? How 
does generation of success criteria come about in organizations? 
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Secondly, what does the literature say about “cooperation” in terms of having 
two distinct organizations working to some extent as one, to some extent as 
separates? The third question is speculative, contra factual, in that it asks for 
potential for change. What does the literature say about conditions for change 
in the operations of organizations? Hopefully the answers to these questions 
will also suggest how the terms may relate to each other, which in turn could 
be a useful guideline in the later discussion. 
 
3.2 Success criteria in international operations: 
There is a serious lack of theoretical work on the concept of “success criteria” 
for peace support operations. Extensive and repeated literature searches have 
not produced a single book and only one article (Fetherston, A. B.: 
“Peacekeeping, Conflict Resolution and Peace Building: A Reconsideration of 
Theoretical Frameworks”. International Peacekeeping, Spring 2000) dealing 
with success criteria per se. It seems a scientific search for general, universal 
success criteria that could be applied for the evaluation of every peace support 
operation has not really been undertaken. One reason may be the fact that the 
concept of peacemaking itself does not come in any standard framework, any 
definitive legitimization established in a legal text or other formal document. It 
has been developed and effectuated on an ad-hoc basis through the years, 
each operation and initiative tailor-made for the specific territory and conflict it 
was made to address. This circumstance makes generalization problematic, 
because from the outset there exists hardly any common denominators 
between the many and dramatically different operations. Indeed, the Brahimi 
Report of August 2000, recommending the UN’s future “strategic direction in 
peacekeeping operations”, isolates this as the most important challenge for 
future peace support operations: To reduce the haphazard character of UN 
interventions and bring more coherence to them to increase efficiency and 
success rates. (Strategic Survey 2000/2001: 45) 
There is, however, quite a bit of academic evaluation of peace support 
operations. In the past few years there has been extensive research on 
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peacekeeping, intervention and related subjects, which attempt to determine 
whether or not specific operations and initiatives can be defined as successful. 
The following section reviews some contributions representing the span of 
approaches taken. They illustrate some of the most widely used success 
criteria for peace support operations in the academic community. 
 
3.2.1 Success as mandate fulfillment: 
The mandate of a peace support operation states what the operation is 
supposed to be doing, like an advanced “job description”. In that sense it 
seems logical to hold achievements against mandate when evaluating an 
operation. It is indeed uncontroversial to propose that mandate fulfillment 
equals success. 
Gunnar Fermann wrote in 1992 that it is crucial to leave out the political 
element when evaluating peacekeeping. The nature of the final settlement and 
how it comes into existence is not the concern of any peacekeeping force, 
meaning military presence. International forces’ only task should be related to 
the physical and external security of the conflict-ridden territory. That implies 
that evaluation should be conducted detached from the situation inside that 
territory, detached from the situation of the local population. The argument is 
that military forces perform military tasks. Conflict resolution on a more 
penetrative scale is none of the military’s concern, and if the borders are 
secure, their job is well done. (Fermann 1992: 16) Obviously, Fermann wrote 
at a time when mandates usually only dictated to keeping fighters from each 
other’s throats. Presently the UN issues mandates that refer to total rebuilding 
of post-conflict societies. Mandates are still intended to be implemented partly 
or wholly by military personnel, however. This circumstance has raised a 
whole new set of questions and challenges regarding the military’s role and 
tasks, which may be crystallized into this: Military establishments are designed 
to make war and destroy. Now they are assigned to use its structures to make 
peace and rebuild. (Frantzen: 23.04.02)  
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Duane Bratt (1996) lists mandate performance as success criterion 
number one, and adds that it is a relatively straightforward procedure to 
establish whether fulfillment has taken place. He quickly goes on to remind the 
reader that mandate texts frequently are vague and open for interpretation 
both as to the scope and detail of any given mission (citing Paul Dielh’s 1993 
“International Peacekeeping”). Also, the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) has been known to issue mandates that both the UNSC members and 
everyone else knew would be undeliverable. One common reason for this 
phenomenon is that mandate texts are written not only for the benefit of the 
territory in conflict. They must also satisfy crucial UN member states – notably 
permanent members of the UNSC and any state that appears as a sponsor of 
the mission that is being launched. (Bratt 1996: 67) While mandate texts 
certainly can be problematic with regards to their potential for realization, they 
do nevertheless represent the will of the UNSC and as such must be 
considered.  
In much of the literature mandate performance is taken for granted as 
the primary success criterion for any mission, on the ground that the mandate 
is the “job description”. All of the case studies in “Beyond Traditional 
Peacekeeping” (1995), for example, use mandate performance as the first 
success criterion, without any real prior discussion of this analytical choice. 
Yasushi Akashi (1998) identifies “success” in peacekeeping with mandate 
performance with no further discussion, but takes a detour over the roles and 
responsibilities of the UN Security Council and the Secretary General. He is 
very explicitly stating that the UNSC is setting policy when issuing mandates, 
and that policy must have an objective that is clear, readily understood, and 
achievable. He goes on to say that once the goal is established, necessary 
means to achieve it must be identified and provided. All of this is the 
responsibility and duty of the UNSC. (Akashi 1998: 125-127)  
It is very difficult to find analyses that question the notion of mandate 
performance as a success criterion. Indeed, the present writer has only found 
one: Fetherston’s article which is accounted for below However, there is a lot 
 23
of literature that addresses problems with mandates when it comes to 
performance and success. Berdal (1995) points out two circumstances that 
make for undeliverable mandates in an article about UN peacekeeping in 
former Yugoslavia. Security Council mandates are always a product of political 
compromise that reflects competing interests of UN member states. As such, 
they do not, and most likely never will, satisfy a ground commander’s 
requirements for an “unambiguous mission statement”. (Berdal 1995: 234) 
Mandates are not formulated primarily with the conflict at hand and the specific 
challenges it poses in mind; they are formulated first and foremost in a way 
that will allow it to pass a UNSC vote. This means they frequently do not 
address root causes of the conflict. (ibid, 234) Secondly, mandates are often 
issued detached from any plan as to the commitment of resources. The result 
in such cases is that the mandate can be rendered undeliverable due to lack of 
finances, materials, personnel, and other economic resources. (ibid, 233) 
These challenges echo the conditions for success outlined by Akashi as 
quoted above; when there is no clear objective and resources are not 
provided, how can mandate performance/success be expected?  
These problems really consist of a lack of connection between the 
mandate and the realities of the conflict it addresses, the contents of which are 
usually known to those who issue mandates. In this light it can seem unfair 
and also incorrect to use mandate performance indiscriminately as a success 
criterion. On the other hand, given the above arguments it seems that the 
mandate text is as neutral a standard as can be achieved, against which to 
measure the success or failure of an initiative.   
 
3.2.2 Success as conflict resolution: 
In her article “Peacekeeping, Conflict Resolution and Peace Building: 
A Reconsideration of Theoretical Frameworks” of 2000, Fetherston deals with 
the discourse of international relations and conflict resolution theory itself. Her 
motivation is the “continuing inability of interventions to initiate long-term 
sustainable solutions to [current problems]” (that is, of peacekeeping and 
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conflict resolution). (191) She argues that insufficient theoretical work in this 
field greatly contributes to the very real problems of effectiveness and success 
in international operations (ibid). The lack of effectiveness and success here 
refers to the depressing fact that intervention rarely, if ever, has resulted in 
peaceful and happy post-conflict societies. There has been some conflict 
management, not much resolution. Fetherston attacks what she perceives as 
the dominating discourse of peacekeeping and conflict resolution. A discourse 
would here be the basic preconditions that lie at the base for any argument 
and any research, the notions that are taken for granted and not in themselves 
questioned in analysis. The author sees the reigning discourse in a modernity 
perspective, where rationality is the mover of the world. In conflict resolution 
this implies that peace support operations should promote the rationality of the 
belligerents. Rationality dictates that actors seek optimal correspondence 
between goals and means. With help they will realize that peaceful, 
cooperative problem solving is the best way to settle disputes. (ibid: 197) 
Fetherston rejects this idea as it precludes the existence of alternative truths 
and alternative rationality (ibid: 198), and also because it rests on a hegemonic 
worldview. In short she argues that theories on conflict resolution and 
peacekeeping that originate within the discourse ultimately may exacerbate 
the very problems they are intended to solve. This is because they are part of 
the power structures that produced the problems in the first place. One 
possible way to go to avoid this, says Fetherston, is to move beyond 
hegemony and structures. This would basically mean to start the post-conflict 
society from scratch in order to free the environment from the power relations 
and structures that were part of the conflict and build new relations, untainted 
by historical enmities. (ibid: 213) 
In a grand school debate this contribution would have to be placed 
within a constructivist perspective: the prescription is to make new 
preconditions. This dissertation does not aim to engage in the discussion of 
grand theories. While it may be possible to change the way we understand the 
world, and then act to change realities, this is not really a useful starting point 
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for the present research. Fetherston’s article is in this context mostly an 
interesting argument for understanding success in international operations as 
conflict resolution, reconciliation and rebuilding of amiable societal relations. 
Paul F. Diehl offers a comprehensive discussion of international 
peacekeeping in his 1993 “International Peacekeeping”. He also makes the 
case for looking at the actual situation on the ground when determining 
whether or not an operation has been a success. His point of departure is that 
peacekeeping operations should be judged on their ability to keep peace, that 
is, to prevent further violence in the territory. (Diehl 1993: 36) Secondly, the 
degree to which the operation contributes to conflict resolution must be 
considered, recognizing that peace does not merely mean “absence of war”. 
(ibid: 37) Containment of fighting is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition 
for conflict resolution. Belligerents may very well be happy with a stalemate 
rather than a lasting solution. (ibid: 38) Furthermore, a formal peace treaty is 
not necessarily the same as a lasting solution. These do not always represent 
real agreements between parties who have reached a compromise both sides 
believe is the best obtainable. (ibid: 39) According to Diehl, the ultimate sign of 
successful conflict resolution is the international presence having become 
superfluous. In 1993 this was not a widely shared understanding of what 
peacekeeping should do. Indeed, Diehl complains that “Peacekeeping 
operations under the United Nations generally have not adopted this mode of 
operation. The deployment of peacekeeping forces has often remained 
separate from any efforts at resolving the dispute” (ibid: 38) He adds that this 
must be kept in mind when evaluating them – most of them do not include 
conflict resolution strategies and aims. (ibid) Today, this picture has changed, 
as will be further illustrated below and in chapter 4.  
Duane Bratt (1996) also includes conflict resolution as one success 
criterion against which to measure peacekeeping operations, “[…] because it 
should be the ultimate aim of all UN efforts”. (Bratt 1996: 68) Like Diehl and 
Fetherston, Bratt makes a normative argument – conflict resolution should be 
a requirement for the success stamp. Bratt acknowledges that “absence of 
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war” not necessarily means “peace”, and lists conflict containment as a 
separate success criterion. He refers here to keeping the conflict from 
dragging in more parties, not just a stopping of violence on the ground. (Bratt 
1996: 69) He points out that in the end it is only the belligerents who can 
actually settle their differences, a fact which is often pushed aside in the public 
debate about the need to “do something to help”.  
Heldt (2002) singles out several factors that affect whether a peace 
support operation in intra-state conflicts successfully causes war termination 
and/or war prevention. He conducts a quantitative analysis where many 
factors are given numerical values. Some examples are duration of the 
mission, composition of the mission, degree of ethnic polarization, presence of 
democracy, economic situation, nature of the mandate, the presence of war 
immediately preceding mission deployment, and the causes of the conflict,. 
The results show that variation in the causes of conflict, with conflict over 
government assigned the value 0 and conflict over territory the value 1 
(defined as a binary variable), explains almost all the variation in “success”. 
The other 13 variables contribute insignificant variations compared to this one. 
Success becomes dramatically less likely when the source of conflict is a 
territorial issue.  (Heldt 2002: 120-126) Heldt emphasizes that the analysis is 
the first of its kind and the results must therefore be checked and checked 
again to determine scientific reliability. (ibid: 127) However, the results are a 
very interesting contribution to the debate on success in international 
operations. They indicate that conflict resolution may not be an entirely fair 
success criterion because this largely lies outside the peacekeepers’ influence 
sphere. As Heldt dryly comments; “Unfortunately, the sources of conflict are 
not easily manipulated in a more favourable direction.” (ibid: 124) 
All these contributions use the situation on the ground as a reference 
point. That means every mission must be evaluated as a unique case, 
something that greatly complicates generalization. At the same time it seems 
immediately logical that a success stamp cannot be awarded unless the 
conflict that called for a mission has been visibly alleviated. Theoretically valid 
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standards are crucial for social sciences. However, care must be taken so that 
science is not removed from the real world and renders itself meaningless to 
everyone but the researchers. Using mandate performance as the prime 
success criterion may be the theoretically more sound option. In cases of 
practically undeliverable mandates this is meaningless when evaluations go 
out to people and policy makers in the real world. Using conflict resolution as 
the standard seems more “right” in this sense, but then there is the problem of 
generalization. One possible way out of the “case-bind” could be to further 
explore ways to establish general standards for what is meant by “conflict 
resolution”, which could be applied irrespective of time and place.  
In this thesis, mandate fulfillment will be treated as the main success 
criterion, both because the agents themselves apply this as their main success 
criterion and in want of a better option (see above argumentation.). 
 
3.3 Generation of success criteria in organizations 
Above research in International Relations was reviewed for clarification on 
success criteria for peace support operations. International Relations theory is 
useful for explaining the processes that led to KFOR’s and UNMIK’s creation 
(see chapter 4), as well as the international community’s involvement in them 
and evaluation of them. However, KFOR and UNMIK operate as independent 
organizations on a daily basis. Mandate fulfillment is their common goal, and 
henceforth goal attainment will be understood as success criteria.  
In order to reach an enhanced understanding of the dynamics of 
organizations in terms of success and cooperation, a short introduction to 
organizational theory on goals and effectiveness is provided in the following.  
 
3.3.1 Goals for organizations 
Organizations may be defined as concerted actions to explicit ends. (Jacobsen 
and Thorsvik 2002: 12) The goal of the organization is the situation that the 
organization seeks to achieve with its activities. Such a situation may be an 
ideal state rather than a realistically attainable achievement, or it may be 
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something as definitive as the solution of a specific problem. An organization 
will normally also operate with a list of sub-goals; steps required in order to 
reach the final goal. Sub-goals frequently take the form of tasks delegated to 
different sections of the organization. Ideally, there is a clear connection 
between the goal and the sub-goals, and between goals and available means. 
Goals will support, not contradict, each other. Disposable means will be 
sufficient and suitable. Goals are important for organizations because they 
provide them with a purpose, and with criteria for evaluation – success criteria 
if one wills. (Jacobsen and Thorsvik 2002: 42-46) 
In reality, goals can be poorly fit to function both as providers of purpose 
and as success criteria. One common problem is unrealistic or diffuse time 
horizons. It is difficult to work in a goal-oriented and focused manner towards 
something that cannot possibly be reached. On the other hand, undefined 
timeframes may allow for necessary flexibility in the daily work. Some goals 
can never reach conclusion, because they refer to a continuous state. And 
when an organization reaches its ultimate goal, does it dissolve itself and 
cease to exist? Usually not – new goals are generated instead, indicating that 
once an organization is up and running its own survival becomes a goal in 
itself. Also, in the real world there is frequently ambiguous connections 
between goals and means, which can produce confusion both inside an 
organization and between the organization and its environment. Finally, an 
organization can, and frequently does, employ realistic and symbolic goals 
simultaneously. It is vital to see the difference between those categories when 
it comes to formulating success criteria. Symbolic goals are not necessarily 
useless even if they are unattainable. They can give legitimacy. Ideal states 
can be valuable as aims of perfection to strive for (ibid: 47-49). 
In addition, organizations are not unitary agents, but consist of groups 
and individuals. That implies that the official goals and sub-goals of an 
organization almost by definition will be accompanied, or even opposed, by the 
goals persons and groups within the organization hold for their own positions 
or efforts. This is a trivial, but significant element to keep in mind when 
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analyzing success criteria and organizations. (Jacobsen and Thorsvik 2002: 
49-52) 
 
3.3.2 The “goal model” 
The “goal model” of effectiveness for organizations, as presented by Richard 
H. Hall (1982), incorporates the above-mentioned aspects. It is simple, in that 
its definition of effectiveness refers to “the degree to which [an organization] 
realizes its goal”. It is complex, in that it recognizes that most organizations in 
fact have multiple and frequently conflicting goals. An analytically useful 
distinction is made between official goals and operational goals. The former 
category refers to general purposes of the organization, while the latter refers 
to the actual tasks performed by the organization. The operational goals are to 
be understood as steps towards the official, or ultimate, goal(s). At this point 
time comes into the equation: operational goals change with time, for three 
main reasons: First, organizations are in constant interaction with its 
environment, and will influence and be influenced by it. Second, organizations 
are not static, and so are subject to constant internal dynamics that may 
produce change. Third, the organization’s environment may cause indirect 
pressure, such as major shifts in the society’s values, an altered 
macroeconomic situation, etc., which may induce change. All of these factors 
contribute to make operational goals more fluid than official ones.  
(Hall 1982: 278-282) That in turn affects perceptions of goal achievements, or 
success.  
There are problems related to using the goal model for generalization 
purposes. The issue of multiple, contradicting goals is analytically difficult to 
handle. When it comes to outcome, the comparative standard by which 
effectiveness is measured, it can be difficult to single out what outcome is 
produced by what action in the organization – indeed if the outcome is 
produced by the organization at all, and not by external force(s). Inability to 
determine the nature of outcome makes evaluation very hard. Furthermore, 
goals can function simultaneously as incentives and as success criteria, both 
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as motivation factors inside the organization and as evaluation standards for 
internal or external reviewers. If the same, identical one concept acts in two 
very different roles at the same time, analysis is greatly complicated. Finally, 
evaluation is never neutral, and organizational effectiveness – or success – 
will therefore be subject to the eye of the beholder. (Hall 1982: 282-286) 
 
3.4 Cooperation and change in organizations 
Contributions from two different research fields of political science helped to 
illuminate some of the many factors that are at play when working out and 
applying success criteria for organizations in general and for international 
operations in particular. Now a brief backgrounder on the second central 
concept of the main problem formulation: cooperation, and its natural next step 
change. For that purpose, it could be useful to look to another school of 
organizational theory for a useful explanatory framework, namely 
Institutionalism.  
 
3.4.1 New Institutionalist Theory: 
According to the new institutionalist theory as explained by B. Guy Peters 
(1999), institutions are “collections of interrelated rules and routines that define 
appropriate actions in terms of relations between roles and situations”. (Peters 
1999: 28) In this perspective one could say that any institution may be 
described as formalized cooperation. Institutions are formed when actors 
realize that their individual goals can best and most easily be reached by 
pooling efforts with others. This type of institution is called “aggregative”; 
actors join on a contractual basis with the motivation of individual gain. (ibid: 
27) Typical examples include interest organizations, where members work 
together towards the same goal, which is to their individual benefit.  
Institutions consist of norms, rules and roles. Roles can be defined as 
“sets of behavioral expectations applied to positions”, where any actor’s 
actions are supposed to be determined by the expectations attached to the 
actor’s position in the institution. (ibid: 30) The actor will behave according to 
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these expectations as long as they serve his interests. Staying in line with 
other actors in the institution is often perceived as being in the best interest of 
the individual even when deviance is more lucrative in the short term, because 
the common goal may not be obtainable if the actor rejects institutional 
participation. The norms and structures of the institution will usually be derived 
from the society in which the institution originates, meaning members normally 
share basic values and norms for collective behavior from the outset. (Peters 
1999: 32) One weighty exception here is military organizations, which do not 
necessarily contain identical values and norms as the society they come from, 
but rather share uniquely military values and standards. (ibid: 32). 
Cooperation in this paradigm may be explained in a rationality framework. 
Aggregated efforts yield more benefits towards the common goal than each 
individual effort would have done, therefore it is rational for actors to work 
together. (ibid: 27) However, problems may rise if individual interpretations of 
rules, norms and roles obstruct uniformity. Not every rule and norm is written, 
nor is every written guideline unambiguous. (ibid; 30). Diverging perceptions 
on what the rules and routines are, can create cooperation problems and thus 
complicate the quest for the common goal. Change in an institution, according 
to New Institutionalism, is a product of events. When faced with unfamiliar 
challenges the institution will resort to its existing repertoire of responses. Only 
if and when these prove insufficient will the institution search for alternatives. 
Change in the institution’s environment is therefore, ultimately, the only thing 
that can produce change in the institution. (ibid; 33-34) 
 
3.5 Conclusions and summary: 
The aim of this chapter was to clarify the central theoretical concepts used in  
the three main problem formulations in order to ease the ensuing analysis.  
The two, or three, success criteria that kept reappearing in the review 
of literature on peace operations, were mandate performance and conflict 
resolution – the third possibly being conflict containment as a separate quality. 
However, these standards have come up not as a result of a critical, academic 
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discussion about how to define success criteria. These are "just" the standards 
that are most frequently used in actual evaluations of different operations. 
Most of the authors fret at the lack of neutral, theoretically sound success 
criteria that can be applied across the board. They do, however, recognize that 
there is a very pragmatic reason for this void in peacekeeping research: 
Different operations are simply so unique that comparing them very rarely 
reveals patterns that allow for generalizations on such a level. Also, it is not 
necessarily fair, or meaningful, to measure an operation against even the two 
very general criteria stated above. Mandates can be undeliverable, in which 
case failure is guaranteed. And belligerents who do not want a solution will not 
be receptive to any peace plan – in which case failure is guaranteed again. 
Both of these unfortunate circumstances are present in quite a few of the 
ongoing peacekeeping operations in the world today, and they frequently 
appear together.  
Regarding success criteria in organizations, it is convincingly argued 
that organizations display many contradictory considerations when formulating 
goals and evaluating success. The relevance for the present dissertation is 
clearly that multiple and conflicting success criteria must be expected across 
and between KFOR and UNMIK. Their official goal is identical, expressed in 
the mandate provided by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 
(UNSCR) 1244. The scope and size of each organization which will become 
evident in chapter 5, necessitates an expectation of numerous operational 
goals on the different organizational levels. The question ultimately to be 
answered is whether such a circumstance is present, and if so, whether it 
hampers cooperation.  
When it comes to cooperation, this can be understood as a concerted 
effort to work together towards (a) common goal(s). Agents in the 
institution/cooperation realize that they can gain more individually by pooling 
efforts and resources. This seems like a theoretically valid assumption 
regarding relations between KFOR and UNMIK, because they both work for 
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the realization of UNSCR 1244. However, divergent perceptions about rules, 
roles and routines may cause co-operation problems and confusion. 
Change in the theoretical framework of Institutionalism occurs when 
established routines fail to promote the aim of the institution, which means that 
we should expect efforts for improvements if and when it becomes clear that 
established cooperation patterns do not help the organizations to accomplish 
their mission. 
There are two institutions involved in the form of organizations, KFOR 
and UNMIK. It may be argued that they are also one institution, namely the 
“international presence in Kosovo working under the UNSCR 1244 mandate”. 
For analytical purposes we must look at UNMIK and KFOR respectively, and 
then together, because they are both two distinct organizations and one more 
loosely defined institution in the understanding of “formalized cooperation”. In 
chapter 5, descriptions of the organizations respectively and of their 
cooperation will be given as well as analyzed. 
Nations that make up the UN are agents, who created both 
organizations by issuing the mandate UNSCR 1244. The nations that make up 
the two organizations are agents. As KFOR/UNMIK participation is limited 
compared to the number of states that are members of the UN, the states that 
maintain membership in both places must be understood as agents on two 
levels; in the UN and in the organization. Indeed, many states are members of 
both UNMIK and KFOR, possibly making them three times agents! Finally, the 
persons who fill the positions of KFOR and UNMIK are agents that influence 
the institution(s). When it comes to nations and persons as agents, these 
levels will not be separately analyzed here. Such an undertaking would require 
vastly more space, time and indeed access to information and informants than 
is presently available. It would be extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, to 
identify national and individual perceptions and interpretations of the mandate 
given in UNSCR 1244. Suffice it here just to bring attention to the many levels, 
in order to keep in mind the many sides to the story that could potentially be 
found. 
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Two apparent challenges for such a complex institutional framework 
stand out. First, institutions normally build on shared values in its society of 
origin. For both KFOR and UNMIK it is true that the components of the 
organizations come from not one society, but many (in the sense of nations). 
Could this produce conflicting norms and expectations inside the 
organizations? If the theory corresponds with reality, this should be expected. 
Alternatively, it should at least be expected that agents have different 
understandings of the rules, roles and norms. Notably, this expectation is 
different from treating nations as agents for analytical purposes. Any variation 
in perceptions and interpretations within and between the organizations will be 
understood merely as such – while keeping in mind that such variations can be 
rooted in, among other factors, cultural traits. Second, KFOR is a military 
organization, UNMIK is a civilian one. According to Peters, military 
organizations often work with values and norms that are separate from their 
societies of origin. If this is true, we should also expect different or even 
conflicting norms to apply to the military and the civilian branches of the 
international presence in Kosovo.  
According to the theory change should occur if and when the normal 
procedures fail to deliver the intended results, and no existing procedures 
appear to be a good alternative. Then the institutions will acknowledge the 
need to change, and start developing new routines and possibly some new 
rules and roles as well. 
The link between the concepts is suggested in the problem formulations. 
Success criteria indicate what the goal of an international operation is. When 
many people and units are working together to achieve that goal, they better 
pull in the same direction. If they operate with different success criteria, a 
change towards streamlined, uniform ones should be a considerable 
advantage because the different parts of the institution would start to pull in the 
same direction to a greater degree. Already it seems likely that a maze of 
crosscutting institutional identities and loyalties will reveal itself in the 
upcoming analysis. This in turn may create a situation where many 
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interpretations of both the goal and the process by which to reach it exist side 
by side and maybe in conflict.  
With the theoretical concepts and expected patterns accounted for, it is 
time to turn to the substance of the problem complex.  
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4 INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION AND KOSOVO: 
Before venturing into a more thorough description of KFOR and UNMIK it 
seems appropriate to look at the legal aspects of international intervention and 
the historical background of the conflict in Kosovo. 
 
4.1 International law and intervention:  
To the extent that an effective international law exists, it is the United Nations 
charters. The United Nations Charter of 1945 is the basis of membership, 
declaring principles for inter-state relations, which by their signature every 
member state has obliged itself to adhere to and respect. Two core principles 
are state sovereignty and equality and non-intervention. That basically means 
that no state can intervene in the internal affairs of another state. These are 
the fundamental rules of states’ relations with each other, which establish that 
international law only applies to interstate problems. The two items can both 
be found in the Charter’s chapter II. (Fife 1996: 25) The same chapter states 
that the use of aggression and/or violence in international relations is 
forbidden, but there is an exception to this rule written in the preamble (§ 7): 
The use of force must not be applied except when this is in the common 
interest of the international community. This is further reiterated in article 51 of 
chapter VII, which establishes states’ right to self-defense. Thus the use of 
force is not outlawed under any and every circumstance. (ibid: 26) 
The Charter also establishes that the UN is responsible for ensuring 
international peace and security, and the Secretary General  (UNSG) and the 
Security Council are authorized to call upon the international community to act 
when peace is threatened or broken. The UNSC is free to employ any means 
it deems necessary to restore peace, including military action, and member 
states are called upon to provide the personnel and material resources the 
UNSC asks for. Chapter VII in the Charter is explicit on this point. That means 
the UNSC is legitimately obliged to intervene when, according to the definition 
of the UNSC, international peace is threatened or broken. Member states have 
accepted that the UN not only can, but must intervene in such a situation.  
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(Fife 1996: 28) Intervention may take place legally in one of two ways: By force 
and against the wishes of belligerents if their problem has been defined as 
threatening international peace according to Chapter VII; or with the consent of 
the belligerents. In the latter case operations will normally be based on 
Chapter VI, which establishes guidelines for the peaceful settlement of 
disputes with the active assistance of the UNSC. (ibid: 31)  
 Anne Julie Semb (2000) has argued that the principle of non-intervention 
has been considerably modified after the Cold War. She points to several 
cases of UN-authorized intervention in internal affairs of states on the grounds 
of gross human rights violations, state failure, or unlawfully constituted 
government. These instances probably represent a new understanding in the 
international community of what domestic circumstances can possibly 
constitute a “threat to international peace”.  Semb shows how interventions 
due to humanitarian disasters in particular may drag the UN into ever more 
interventions, because it is difficult to draw clear and immediately logical lines 
between “bad” and “unacceptable” human rights violations.  In addition, Semb 
argues that a softening of the non-intervention principle on normative grounds 
may lead to increasing accept for intervention that is not authorized by the UN 
as well. The 1999 intervention in Kosovo is, as shall be further demonstrated 
below, a case in point. (Semb 2000: 469-487) 
 
4.2 A brief history of United Nations intervention. 
Forceful intervention under Chapter VII has happened only on 6 occasions. 4 
of these occurred in the 1990s. Only one sanctioned military action, namely 
against Iraq in 1991. The rest imposed boycotts and embargoes on different 
goods. (Karns and Mingst 1998: 201) This is an important illustration of the 
dramatic changes the phenomenon of international intervention under UN 
auspices has undergone during the organization’s existence. 
In practice, the broad concept of peacekeeping has been the UN’s 
response to “threats to international peace”. It is not dealt with or even 
mentioned in the Charter. It has rather come into existence as a consequence 
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of developments on the ground. Not requiring UNSC unity or sanction, it is a 
creative tool for conflict resolution and has been designed on a case-to-case 
basis to apply to each conflict uniquely. (Karns and Mingst 1998: 202)  
 
4.2.1 Traditional peacekeeping: 
While the Cold War seriously hampered the UN’s possibilities for effectively 
dealing with international conflicts, UN peacekeeping emerged as a tool in 
conflict resolution that did not threaten regional superpower interests. Most 
missions during the Cold War mainly did cease fire monitoring, borderline 
supervision, and different observation/verification tasks, all with the active 
approval of the conflicting parties. (ibid; 206-7) Traditional peacekeeping was 
based on three principles:  
1) Consent by participants in the conflict;  
2) Impartiality by peacekeepers;  
3) Use of force by peacekeepers in self-defense only.  
These principles, or guidelines, place several restrictions on how the 
peacekeepers work. They are to be considered guests in the Area of 
Responsibility (AOR), and they must treat conflicting parties evenhandedly and 
as partners. The principles of consent and impartiality deny the production and 
use of secret intelligence; all activities and information of the force must be 
available for anyone who’s interested. The use of force, even in self-defense, 
remains highly controversial in this paradigm. Attacks on peacekeepers raise 
serious questions about the conflicting parties’ consent. Any response raises 
questions about the peacekeepers’ neutrality, as any blow necessarily is 
directed against at least one party. Such considerations bar a peacekeeping 
force from operating along normal military standards. (Bierman and Vadset 
1998: 16-17) 
 
4.2.2 “New” peacekeeping: 
The warming climate between superpowers in the end of the 1980’s meant an 
expansion of peacekeeping activities, something the UN generally handled 
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well. (Karns and Mingst 1998: 209) When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, the world 
really believed that the UN finally could stand out as the strong actor for world 
peace that it was intended to be from the start but had been denied by 
superpower struggle. 
However, conflicts actually proliferated rather than died. In want of 
superpower pressure, the world experienced explosions of many regional, 
smaller conflicts. Frequently they were based on ethnic and/or religious 
affinities, resulting in independence or autonomy struggle of peoples within 
already existing states. (ibid: 210) The UN was now called upon to address 
intrastate conflicts, a new undertaking altogether.  This challenge implied a 
dramatic increase in the scope of peacekeeping activities, to be renamed 
peacemaking or peace building.  From monitoring a borderline between 
conflicting states to rebuilding war-torn societies and states there is a long 
way. As became apparent; experience in the former task does not 
automatically prepare for the latter. (ibid: 211-12) 
 
4.2.3 Categories of Peace Support Operations: 
The term “Peace Support Operations” (PSO) refers to every type of UN-
sanctioned intervention with at least a military element. (Whitman and 
Bartholomew 1995: 172). Two sub-categories may be named under this 
inclusive term: One is traditional peacekeeping, where mandates are limited to 
essentially military tasks such as borderline observation and cease fire 
monitoring. The other is wider peacekeeping. Such mandates may include 
rebuilding and strengthening of institutions, human rights monitoring, 
promotion of economic and social development, and military units may be 
called upon to act as a support apparatus to a civilian mission. (ibid: 172-3). 
Further subdivisions may, according to Doyle (1999) include the 
following categories, sorted by degree of societal penetration and use of force: 
Peacekeeping has traditionally consisted mainly of placing a force as a 
buffer in a border area between formerly warring parties, typically two states, 
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and the supervision of a cease-fire/truce. This has mostly been a 
military/civilian blend. 
Peacebuilding targets the civilian society. Various reconciliation and 
reconstruction projects are central, such as facilitating communication and 
contact, helping with elections, rebuilding infrastructure, distribution of aid, and 
the like. These missions tend to be civilian, often with a significant contribution 
and participation from non-government organizations (NGO), sometimes with 
UN military support guarantees in case of a deteriorating security situation. 
Peacemaking is a military/civilian initiative that tends to aim at both 
territorial control and societal reconstruction, where tasks are clearly assigned 
to either the military OR the civilian branch of the mission. This is the so-called 
“gray zone” type of intervention, or third generation peacekeeping, which is a 
fairly new concept. It is largely the result of the new willingness to intervene in 
conflicts that were until recently seen as domestic affairs. One key feature has 
been that military personnel has taken responsibility for civilian police duties in 
the absence of either a functioning local police force that enjoys popular 
legitimacy, or enough international police officers. 
Peace enforcement is a purely military intervention mandated by a Ch. 
VII resolution. It aims at separating conflicting parties, restoring territorial 
control and frequently also forceful disarmament of belligerents.  
International administration is when the international community acting 
under UN resolution(s) has assumed full responsibility for a territory as a 
transitional arrangement. The end state for such a dramatic intervention, 
where the local population and/or the host state is deprived of authority for its 
own society, has always been a final settlement which all conflicting parties 
commit to and which is in line with international law and human rights 
standards. International administration may range from mere supervision over 
a process ran by the parties, to direct governance – possibly with an element 
of consultation with the parties. The latter is the category under which 
KFOR/UNMIK falls. The Kosovo undertaking is only the fifth case of full 
international administration, the others being UNTAES in Eastern Slavonia, 
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UNTAC in Cambodia, the international effort in Bosnia, and UNTAET in East 
Timor. (Caplan 2002: 13-16) 
 
The legal aspect is the same for all categories. Intervention is only 
legitimate following a UNSCR claiming threat to or breach of international 
peace. The appliance of Chapter VII to intrastate conflict in reality means that 
there has been a change in practice: Before, no internal affairs were branded 
threats to international security. The new direction means that the state 
sovereignty and non-intervention principles are being watered out, as Semb 
(2000) quoted above argues. The tradition of the UN to work on a case to case 
basis, inventing tools as it goes and as needed, also means that pretty much 
any state and any type of conflict can fall under this new definition of threats to 
international peace according almost to chance. There are no guidelines; it is 
up to the UNSC and the Secretary General to decide from occasion to 
occasion. This offers flexibility that is often needed, but also insecurity and 
possibilities for abuse.  
On top of it all UN peace-building initiatives in the 1990’s have been 
marred by some ugly failures, among which the massacre in Srebrenica in 
1993 is an infamous one. Such spectacular failures have raised serious 
questions about the utility of this type of conflict resolution.  
While the UNSC in the 1990ies has passed several resolutions over 
conflicts referring to Ch. VII, these have more often than not been followed up 
by less than lukewarm practical commitment. Member states have consistently 
offered inadequate and insufficient human, financial and material resources for 
UN operations, seriously undermining UN credibility. (Bierman and Vadset 
1998: 20-21)   
 
4.3 The Kosovo conflict and the legal status of international intervention 
there. 
The Bosnia experience is seen by many as a reason why international actors 
resorted to armed intervention as early as they did when similar problems 
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surfaced in Kosovo. Kosovo is a province in the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY, or Yugoslavia) that enjoyed considerable autonomy until 
1989, when president Slobodan Milosevic brought it under direct control of 
Belgrade.  Its population consists of a majority of Kosovo Albanian Muslims 
and a minority of Serb orthodox Christians. The change of status of Kosovo 
led to a privileged position for Serbs on the expense of Albanians, in the eyes 
of the latter. Albanians charged an independence struggle, seeking to break 
free from Yugoslavia to form their own state. Violent conflict between 
(Albanian) independence fighters and (Serb) Yugoslav police and paramilitary 
forces erupted, widely involving attacks also on civilians. Repeated attempts 
by the international community fronted by NATO to help the parties reach a 
peaceful, mediated solution, failed. Meanwhile refugees were flooding out of 
Kosovo reporting human rights abuses conspicuously sounding like organized 
ethnic cleansing by Serbs against Kosovo Albanians. The UNSC issued 
increasingly sharp resolutions calling upon the parties to stop the atrocities. 
UNSCR 1199 of September 1998 demands a cease-fire, which NATO sent its 
envoy Richard Holbrooke to Belgrade to secure compliance with. He had no 
success. UNSCR 1203 of October 1998 then affirms that the ongoing situation 
constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region, acts under Chapter VII, 
and goes on to list a number of demands to be met by Yugoslavia. It does not 
actually call for armed intervention in the case of non-compliance. 
(www.kforonline.org; www.unmikonline.org: March 2002) 
The 1999 NATO air raids against Yugoslavia over Kosovo is a 
problematic issue legally speaking: NATO interpreted the UNSCR 1203 as a 
green light for intervention. (www.kforonline.org: March 2002) However, the 
issue of military action was never brought up in the UNSC – it would not have 
passed the Russian vote and probably not the Chinese one. The UNSC never 
disowned the NATO actions either. That would not have passed the American 
and British votes. The air strikes were not sanctioned and not condemned. 
Thus the military activities that paved the way for Yugoslavia’s surrender were 
not unequivocally supported by international law.  
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On June 9th 1999 the so-called Military Technical Agreement (MTA) 
was signed between the Kosovo International Security Force KFOR, and the 
governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of 
Serbia. The Agreement outlines conditions for all Yugoslav forces’ withdrawal 
from Kosovo and a mandate for KFOR operations in Kosovo. UNSCR 1244 
was adopted unanimously on June 10th.2 The same day NATO’s North Atlantic 
Council authorized the deployment of KFOR troops, an operation named 
“Operation Joint Guardian”. The actual deployment started on June 12th. (The 
Kosovo Report 2000: 101-102) The presence of KFOR and the United Nations 
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in Kosovo enjoys a clear mandate in UNSCR 
1244 of June 1999, based on Chapter VII. The legality of the international 
presence in Kosovo is thus formally not disputed, except by the Former 
Yugoslav Republic, which claims the restoration of its rightful sovereignty as a 
state. (Entire section based on The Kosovo Report, 2000) 
 
4.4 The concept of security 
In the world of international relations – politically as well as academically - 
there seems to be a general consensus on the centrality of security for people 
and states, although there are widely different views as to what security means 
precisely.  
Peace support operations normally are called upon to “establish a 
secure and stable environment” as a primary task (Dziedzic 1998: 7). That is 
the most important argument for selecting security as the focus of analysis in 
the present dissertation. As shall be argued below, re-establishing and 
maintaining security was without much doubt the single most important 
concern of the international presence as well as the population of Kosovo in 
the wake of the conflict. (Lindeman 2002: 92) The question remains, however, 
which security concept to employ. 
                                                 
2 A fuller description of UNSCR 1244 and its implications is provided in section 5.1. The complete resolution 
text can be found in Annex #1 
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In his critique of the security concept debate, Baldwin (1997), makes a 
case for customizing the security concept according to the actual topic of 
research. Quoting Buzan (1991), he points out that it makes little sense to 
speak about security without a reference object. The question “Security for 
whom?” must be answered, and the answer will always depend on what the 
research topic is. For each case it is true that the values that need to be 
secured differ, the degree of security sought varies, sources of threats to 
security are many, costs are inescapable and varying, and time matters. 
Based on this argumentation, a contextual security concept will be employed 
in this thesis. “Security” will be defined based on the actual situation in 
Kosovo.  
At the time of international intervention (June 1999) the situation in 
Kosovo was one of practical anarchy, as no sovereign existed that was in 
charge of territorial security and law and order.3 “Security” will therefore 
henceforth refer to actions taken to protect the physical safety of human life 
and property. Physical security is arguably a necessary prerequisite for the 
establishment of other possible forms of security. In practice, such actions will 
mean dimensions of the securing of territory and restoration of law and order. 
This choice is further supported by the fact that the UN repeatedly has stated 
that re-establishment of physical security is a prerequisite for post-conflict 
peace building and economic development, and thus necessary for general 
mission success. (See for example UNDP/DPKO 2001: 2) 
In a post-conflict territory characterized by anarchy, many other 
dimensions of security are relevant and worthy of analysis. For example, no 
separate discussion of judicial security is included, although this aspect would 
of course have been of interest for an analysis of security per se. It has been 
omitted because judicial security in Kosovo is the responsibility of the OSCE, 
not UNMIK or KFOR. It is regrettable but necessary to limit the topic of the 
present investigation, keeping in mind that this choice does leave out 
dimensions of interest for the problem complex. 
                                                 
3 See section 4.2 for a more comprehensive background on the Kosovo conflict to back this assertion. 
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4.5 The issue of international responsibility for security. 
“The restoration of a secure environment” is normally an important part of a 
peace support operation’s mandate, meaning at a minimum the cessation of 
violence. When intervention is carried out within a state rather than between 
states, that refers to internal security as well as external/border security. 
(Dziedzic 1998: 7) Security within a state consists of police and judicial 
structures. Law enforcement is, by definition, the prerogative of the state. In 
the aftermath of an internal conflict, however, it will overwhelmingly be the 
case that police and judicial structures have broken down. Another common 
scenario is that these structures were biased and extensively lacked legitimacy 
in the public prior to and during the conflict. It is also often the case that 
security forces actively have taken part in the conflict. Finally, all of these 
concerns can, and frequently do, apply at the same time. As the UN 
increasingly has come to deal with internal conflict, the need to address law 
enforcement issues has become apparent. The restoration of a secure 
environment is simply not possible as long as law enforcement in the civilian 
domain is not happening, especially considering that post-conflict territories 
frequently are plagued by continued inter-group violence, proliferation of arms, 
organized crime, and similar serious challenges to public safety and order. 
(Hansen 2002: 31) The principle of state sovereignty has historically caused 
great reluctance in the international community to take on responsibility for 
tasks that so unambiguously lie within state privileges. Developments on the 
ground in several operations during the 1990ies, for example in Haiti and 
Cambodia, pushed UN personnel into law enforcement without a clear 
mandate and legal basis for this. (ibid: 26-27) When the Kosovo operation was 
launched, executive policing was explicitly included in the mandate (UNSCR 
1244) for the first time in the history of UN peacekeeping. Serb security forces 
had previously been in charge of internal security in Kosovo. Since they were 
withdrawn under the Military Technical Agreement between NATO and the 
Former Republic of Yugoslavia in June 1999, no local law enforcer existed. In 
addition, those security forces had been branded war criminals by the 
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international community, which ruled out any collaboration with them even 
under monitoring. (ibid: 30)     
Assuming full responsibility for internal and external security in a post-
conflict area requires the deployment of personnel with adequate competence. 
Law enforcement calls for policing capabilities, just as border defense calls for 
military capabilities. Soldiers and police officers have different training and 
experience and cannot substitute each other in the field. On the contrary, they 
need each other’s support to solve their own tasks. The UN regularly deploys 
elements of civilian police to peace operations, so-called CivPol elements. It 
has repeatedly proved to be a problem, however, that deployment of civilian 
police takes much longer time than military deployment. While most countries 
have mobile military units ready for deployment anywhere on very short notice, 
national police services do not have surplus personnel that can be deployed 
for international operations. Officers must be asked and recruited, and 
countries must be certain that personnel can be spared without their own 
public security being compromised. The time lag between the arrival of military 
personnel and that of police personnel in the theatre is commonly referred to 
as the deployment gap. The main problem with this gap is that for its 
duration, there is no institution that naturally and legitimately can take 
responsibility for internal security in the post-conflict area. As a consequence, 
soldiers have been forced to perform public security and order tasks in several 
operations. (Dziedzic1998: 4-7).  
Once both the military and the CivPol elements of an operation are in 
place, it is expected that security task allocation follows the pattern of most 
states: The military is to be in charge of external security, and the police of 
internal security. However, operations are often faced with security challenges 
that fall between the categories of external aggression and regular crime. 
Post-conflict societies can be extremely volatile, weapons widely available, 
and thresholds for resorting to violence low. Problems like serious organized 
crime and violent public riots have been prevalent in most loci for international 
intervention the last 10 years. Challenges of this in-between category are 
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commonly referred to as the enforcement gap. The gap typically poses the 
question of legitimate use of force. While soldiers certainly have the firepower 
to meet such challenges, they are trained to meet other soldiers like enemies, 
not civilians, who in peacekeeping actually are the soldiers’ protégées. CivPol 
units commonly lack manpower, equipment and the mandate to meet serious 
civil disturbances. As a result, no unit is charged with solving such security 
problems. This hampers the maintenance of basic law and order. Another 
problem arises if public disturbances take the form of organized, violent 
resistance to the peace agreement. Such resistance is by definition seen as a 
threat to the security and requires intervention. However, forceful quelling of 
opposition can very easily be perceived by the locals as bias, compromising 
UN ideals of impartiality. (Dziedzic 1998: 9-12) 
In Kosovo the international community acknowledged the need to 
assume full responsibility for law enforcement. The problems of the 
deployment and enforcement gaps were recognized when the mandate was 
issued. Division of labor was arranged accordingly. As will be more closely 
accounted for below, the civilian and military elements of the operation are 
bound by mandate to cooperate and coordinate activities to the establishment 
of a secure environment. The mandate does not provide meticulous guidelines 
as to how cooperation is to be conducted and how results are to be evaluated. 
These facts form the basis for the questions posed and attempted answered 
by the present thesis. 
 
4.6 Chapter summary 
Peace Support Operations under UN auspices have come into being as a 
response to international conflict, which could not be addressed with reference 
to the UN Charter during the Cold War. After the Cold War the UN has 
increasingly been called upon to deal with intrastate conflicts, as these have 
been perceived to constitute a threat to international peace. A peace operation 
is generally defined according to the degree of use of force and societal 
penetration in the conflict area. The armed intervention in Kosovo in 1999 was 
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not unequivocally mandated in international law, but the international 
administration of Kosovo that followed enjoys a clear mandate formulated in 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (June 1999). 
The security definition employed in this dissertation is narrow and strictly 
concentrated on physical security for human life and property, in line with how 
KFOR and UNMIK view security tasks. In post-conflict environments 
international agencies have increasingly been forced to assume law and order 
responsibilities. Military units have become involved in this fundamentally 
civilian arena because international police have been slow to deploy and 
because the crime scenes have been severe. 
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5 IMPLEMENTING KFOR-UNMIK SECURITY COOPERATION. 
This chapter aims to describe and analyze the security cooperation of KFOR 
and UNMIK with regards to the three research questions posed initially. 
Section 5.1 is a presentation of the mandate, UNSCR 1244, which is the 
legitimization of the international presence in Kosovo and a continuous point of 
reference throughout the thesis.4  
Section 5.2 is a presentation of the institutional features of security 
cooperation in Kosovo. The KFOR organization will be described in terms of its 
territorial distribution into 5 Multi National Brigades (MNBs)5, and special units 
that exist independent of the brigade structure. To the extent that brigade 
goals can be identified (primarily mission statements) this will be mentioned. A 
summary of main features of KFOR’s security structure with regards to the 
problem formulations of the thesis and significance for the analysis follows. 
The UNMIK organization will then be described, but not in its entirety. UNMIK 
has responsibilities in several areas other than security, and the subject here 
is its security institutions. The leadership structure is common to the entire 
UNMIK. The security institutions by and large sort under the so-called Pillar I 
(out of four), the Police and Justice sector. The UN Police is the dominant 
security institution here, and will be described with regards to its geographical 
distribution and special units.  To the extent that goals can be identified, this 
will be mentioned. National contributions to UNMIK are not an issue. States 
contribute a pool of funds and personnel to the UN, which in turn uses the 
resources to put together the UNMIK organization. A summary of UNMIK 
characteristics with regards the problem formulations of the thesis and 
significance for the analysis follows. 
Section 5.2 finishes up with a description and appreciation of 
institutional security cooperation between KFOR and UNMIK. The main aim of 
the section is to show organizational characteristics, the approach of KFOR 
                                                 
4 The Resolution text is in its entirety included in Annex #1 
 
5 Correct as of the time of writing, April 2002. By April 2003 KFOR had restructured into 4 MNBs. 
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and UNMIK respectively to security work, as well as the areas where they 
overlap. Division and coordination of labor and tasks is one significant aspect 
here, likewise any difference in outlook and visions of the ultimate goal for the 
mission as a whole.  
Section 5.3 focuses on operational features of security cooperation, the 
actual KFOR-UNMIK cooperation in the field. The section is sub-divided along 
functional lines. External, internal and the so-called “gray zone” security 
categories are reviewed separately for the sake of textual order. The section 
finishes up with a summary description and appreciation of operational 
cooperation. 
Section 5.4 is a discussion of special elements of significance for the 
civil-military security cooperation in Kosovo. The subjects here are civil-military 
collaboration in law enforcement, intelligence, and multi-nationality and 
national agendas. 
A chapter summary (5.5) finally recapitulates the most important findings 
and relates them to the initial research questions.  
A conscious choice has been made to conduct the analysis in a weave 
with the empirical presentation. The fact that this is an ongoing case facilitated, 
indeed necessitated, that decision. Separate case and discussion chapters 
would produce an artificial separation of facts, and would not offer the desired 
advantage of textual order and clarity. The section summaries are intended to 
provide the analytical guideline throughout the chapter. Throughout, 
references will also be made to topics presented and discussed in chapter 3 
on theoretical background in order to keep track of the main argumentation. 
The review is based on documentation covering the period from June 
1999 to October 2002. Kosovo is an environment in rapid development, so it is 
vital to emphasize that information given in this paper is correct at the time of 
writing, but may have changed at the time of reading. The enormous scope of 
the Kosovo operation has forced the candidate to make a selection of 
institutions, structures and security tasks/issue areas to base the dissertation 
upon. The choices reflect the most prominent factors in the subject complex as 
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they appear in the diverse documentation material employed, while any 
selection necessarily means a regrettable loss of detail. Any conclusions must 
be considered with these limits in mind. 
 
5.1 The mandate of KFOR and UNMIK. UNSCR 1244. 
The tasks and powers of KFOR and UNMIK are stipulated in the mandate, 
provided by UNSCR 1244. The UN Secretary-General is charged with 
establishing an international interim administration for Kosovo “[….] under 
which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while 
establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-
governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all 
inhabitants in Kosovo […..] pending a political solution”. 
This resolution firmly places the international presence in Kosovo within 
the new tradition of extended peacekeeping. It can be convincingly argued that 
Kosovo is in reality placed under transitional administration, with international 
management of every aspect of the daily running of the territory (Caplan 
2002). The final political status of Kosovo is importantly and explicitly left out of 
UNSCR 1244.  No official discussions have been initiated regarding this 
issue6. Meanwhile, Kosovo remains a province of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia.  
It can be convincingly argued that “success” in the present context 
means “mandate fulfillment”. It does not mean “conflict resolution”, because 
the underlying cause of the violent conflict – independence struggle and 
suppression – is not being addressed. Despite the practical shortcomings and 
analytical problems of seeing mandate fulfillment as success discussed in 
chapter 3, the Kosovo case leaves few alternatives. No end state is prescribed 
or even envisaged, and both KFOR and UNMIK quote the mandate directly 
when they describe mission goals, as will become apparent.  
                                                 
6 September 2002 
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Mission success must be understood as the achievement of the 
(ambitious) goal “…to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all 
inhabitants in Kosovo […..] pending a political solution”. To get there, several 
steps must be taken and completed. Restoration of security is widely 
understood to be crucial in this context, maybe the single one most important 
step. Operational success criteria can be expected to exist on all levels of an 
organization, and it is the intention to map central operational success criteria 
for the different efforts in the security sector throughout the present chapter. 
Success criteria are not necessarily uniform across an organization or 
between an organization and its environment. The legitimacy of this assertion 
was broadly argued in chapter 3. On that basis, differences can be expected in 
goal formulations, mission statements and other expressions of aims across 
the institutions to be examined. These will be interpreted as success criteria. 
Cooperation between UNMIK and KFOR is a precondition for mission 
success as well as an obligation for both parties. This was asserted in the 
report of the UN Secretary General to the Security Council immediately 
pursuant to the UNSCR 1244: “It is imperative that UNMIK and the 
international security presence coordinate their activities closely to ensure that 
both the military and the civilian presences operate in a mutually supportive 
manner towards the same goals, as required by paragraphs 6 and 9 (f) of 
resolution 1244 (1999)”.  (S/1999/672, II 7) 
The resolution makes a distinction between the “security presence” and 
the “civilian presence” when it comes to assignment of tasks. As it were, the 
“security presence” has come to mean KFOR and the “civilian presence” 
UNMIK. Both organizations interpret the UNSCR 1244 as their mandate. The 
mandate delegates to the “security presence” the following security related 
tasks: 
• Deter renewed hostilities and if need be enforce a cease-fire; 
• Demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation Army KLA and other armed Kosovo 
Albanian groups;  
• Monitor borders;  
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• Ensure the safe return of refugees and displaced persons;  
• Conduct de-mining until civilian units are ready to take over this duty; 
• Maintain public order until civilian units are ready to take over this duty; 
• Ensure the freedom of movement for itself and other international actors. 
Out of the central tasks delegated to the “civilian presence”, the 
following three are directly related to security: 
• Maintain civilian law and order.  
• Protect and promote human rights; 
• Assure the safe and unimpeded return of refugees and displaced persons. 
There is an overlap of duties in the arenas of law enforcement and 
return of refugees. Law enforcement is referred to as “maintaining public 
order” for the security presence, and as “maintaining civilian law and order” for 
the civilian presence. The security presence is supposed to cease its public 
order function as soon as the appropriate civilian capabilities are in place. As 
will become clear, it is in the law enforcement area that most of the 
KFOR/UNMIK security cooperation is taking place.7  
 
5.2 Institutions: KFOR  
The KFOR administration of Kosovo is divided into 5 regions, with one brigade 
to each region.8 Each brigade has its own headquarters, one NATO member 
lead nation that supplies the brigade commander, and its own chain of 
command. More than 30 states participate in the international military 
presence in Kosovo9. 22 of the KFOR nations contribute a total of just 5% of 
the manpower.  80% of the force is European, and overwhelmingly NATO 
nationalities. (Wilson 2002: 40; Lutz 2002: 56) The five nations that each leads 
a brigade dominate KFOR in sheer volume, both in terms of number of 
personnel and other resources. They are Great Britain, Italy, France, 
Germany, and the United States of America, and together they form the so-
                                                 
7 See section 4.3 for a discussion of police versus military law enforcement capabilities in the context of peace 
operations. 
8 A Kosovo map is provided in annex # 2  
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called Quint Group. Their voices in decision-making carry more weight than 
those of smaller contributors. Different nations contribute troops, equipment 
and logistics to different regions.  Most of them do duty in only one region. 
Every nation contributes according to their resources, so each state does not 
always perform every task in the mandate. Every regional command operates 
along a so-called “mission statement”, the overriding goal for the brigade’s 
daily work. All brigades quote the following items in their mission statements: 
To establish and maintain a secure environment, to assist UNMIK's mission in 
order to promote peace and stability in Kosovo, and to implement the Military 
Technical Agreement10. In addition, each brigade has different region-specific 
challenges. (http://www.nato.int/kfor : April 2002)  
Central command is performed by NATO, and the main KFOR 
headquarters (HQ) in Pristina has the overall responsibility for the operation. 
The command, under the abbreviation COMKFOR, changes roughly every 6 
months and rotates between commanders from different NATO states. 
COMKFOR reports to the NATO Southern Europe headquarters in Naples, 
Italy (CINCSOUTH), which in turn is subordinate to the Supreme Allied 
Commander in Europe (SACEUR) in Shape, Belgium. KFOR HQ employs 
some 600 personnel from the following nations: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, United 
Kingdom, and the United States11.  
More details on KFOR are provided in Annex #3. 
 
5.2.1 Multi National Brigade Centre: 
Multinational Brigade Centre (MNB(C)) is deployed in the central and 
northeastern region of Kosovo. The area has a population of approximately 
                                                 
10 The MTA is accounted for in section 4.3 
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700,000. In the northeast there is a boundary with Serbia12 and the Brigade 
has responsibility for 3 boundary-crossing points. Multinational Brigade Centre 
has its headquarters in Pristina. It is led by the United Kingdom. Other nations 
in MNB(C) are the Czech Republic, Finland, Latvia, Norway, Russia, Slovakia, 
and Sweden. The MNB (C) makes no separate mission statement except the 
common goals mentioned above. The MNB (C) runs a Multinational Police 
Company (MNP) , but it has not been possible to identify practical 
contributions by this specific unit in actual operations. (http://www.nato.int/kfor: 
April 2002) 
 
5.2.2 Multi National Brigade North:     
MNB (N) is deployed in the northern region of Kosovo and has its 
headquarters in Mitrovica13. In addition to the items all brigades have in their 
mission statements, MNB (N) includes provision of humanitarian assistance in 
support of UNHCR efforts; basic law and order enforcement and gradual 
transfer of this function to the designated civilian agency; establishment and 
support to the resumption of core civil functions. The MNB (N) CIMIC section 
also supplies medical services and transports food and goods to isolated 
villages14. This region is the most ethnically divided in Kosovo, and also the 
center of economic activity. The total population is about 260.000, with 
approximately 200.000 Albanians and 60.000 Serbs (1400 persons from other 
ethnic groups). The MNB (N) is led by France. Other participating nations are 
Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, Morocco, Russia, and the United Arab 
Emirates. (KFOR homepages, http://www.nato.int/kfor: April 2002) 
 
5.2.3 Multi National Brigade East:     
The MNB(E) comprises around 5300 personnel and has its headquarters in 
Urosveac. Its mission statement is uniquely detailed. In addition to the 
                                                 
12 Formally, Kosovo and Serbia are both provinces in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, so there is no 
international border between them. 
13 A separate discussion of the situation in Mitrovica is provided in section 5.4.2 
14 ”Civilian-Military” in this context refers to the military establishment’s liaison personnel towards the civilian 
society, as explained in section 2.1 
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common items, it includes to conduct peace support operations in its AOR; to 
transfer responsibility to appropriate civil organizations and eventually to local 
civilian leadership - enabling KFOR forces to withdraw. MNB (E) states 
KFOR’s departure as a goal in itself. Main tasks to meet the mission statement 
goals are the following: ensuring the provisions of the MTA are fulfilled; 
providing humanitarian assistance by helping the UNHCR; public law and 
order enforcement in a transition period; and establishing and supporting 
central civil functions. MNB(E) is led by the United States. Other participating 
nations are Greece, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine. (KFOR 
homepages, http://www.nato.int/kfor: April 2002) 
 
5.2.4 Multi National Brigade West: 
The MNB (W) is located in Pec. It is led by Italy, and otherwise composed of 
contributions from Argentina, Portugal, and Spain. The MNB(W) merely 
subscribes to the general KFOR Mission Statement. Their main tasks are 
peace agreement implementation, border control, maintaining public law and 
order, ensuring the freedom of movement for KFOR and civilian, assistance to 
reconstruction and humanitarian assistance. (KFOR homepages, 
http://www.nato.int/kfor: April 2002) 
 
5.2.5 Multi National Brigade South: 
The MNB(S) has its headquarters in Prizren. It is led by Germany and 
counts 7109 personnel. Its Mission Statement includes force protection15; 
securing the borders with Albania and Macedonia; demilitarization of civilians, 
assisting  UNMIK in the fight against crime through its Military Police unit; and 
assisting GOs and NGOs in reconstruction projects through its CIMIC unit16. 
Other participating nations are Austria, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Russia, 
                                                 
15 That is, protection of their own forces. 
16 ”Civilian-Military” in this context refers to the military establishment’s liaison personnel towards the civilian 
society, as explained in section 2.1 
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Slovakia, Switzerland, and Turkey. (KFOR homepages, 
http://www.nato.int/kfor: April 2002) 
 
5.2.6 Specialized Units: 
Employed in the entire KFOR AOR is a special police corps called the 
Multinational Specialized Unit, which is stationed in Pristina and consists of 
330 police officers with military capabilities from Italy, France and Estonia, 
dominated by Italian officers. They are drawn from these countries’ own 
establishments of police with military status (Carabinieri, Gendarmerie, and the 
Estonian Army). They have special responsibilities for organized crime, 
terrorism, and riot control, in addition to intelligence (in general and on 
organized crime in particular), patrolling, and regular police/public law and 
order assignments. The MSU possesses specialized investigative tools and 
resources fit for their special tasks. They are deployed unevenly in Kosovo 
according to each territory’s security- and public order needs. See section 
5.5.1 for a more detailed discussion of the role of police with military status in 
the international operation in Kosovo. 
The Greek Force Support Unit counts 1514 personnel stationed in 
Kosovo Polje. It has no AOR and offers support services to KFOR units. In 
addition it is widely used for civil security purposes such as escorts for 
convoys and on public trains and buses in Kosovo, regular patrolling and law 
and order tasks, traffic supervision etc. No reference has been found to this 
unit in operations accounts. (KFOR homepages, http://www.nato.int/kfor: April 
2002) 
 
5.2.7 Central KFOR features  
Two KFOR characteristics stand out as particularly relevant for the three 
research questions sought answered by this dissertation: One is the multitude 
of layers in the KFOR organization, and the other is the vague nature of 
success criteria (understood as Mission Statements) within KFOR. 
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First, the distribution of KFOR in 5 more or less self-sustained regions 
plus special units with no region-specific location, suggests that KFOR in fact 
consists of multiple organizations. In a military context that also means 
multiple command structures. There is the Central Command in KFOR HQ 
subordinate to NATO’s command structure, then there is the central command 
for each regional brigade. Each national contingent also has their own internal 
command structure where the top commander receives instructions from the 
capital. Special units have their separate command structures in addition to 
the national structures.The multiple layers of KFOR pose a number of practical 
impediments to concerted efforts, thus to coordination both inside KFOR and 
between KFOR and UNMIK. As demonstrated by Otterlei (2002: 66-72), most 
of these hindrances have to do with nationality. Troops are the property of their 
state, selected and equipped by their governments. That in reality means that 
when push comes to shove they are under national command; COMKFOR 
cannot dispose of KFOR troops according to his judgment of the situation, 
despite being supreme commander of the operation. National restrictions vary, 
so coordinated moves must be negotiated. It has also proved extremely 
difficult to overcome the region-bind for operational purposes; most nations 
understand any territory outside their region as out-of-AOR, making it virtually 
impossible to move units between regions at the discretion of COMKFOR. 
Also, equipment is national property and is not always inter-compatible, which 
further complicates concerted action. As this chapter proceeds, it will become 
clear that multi-nationality is an issue for many aspects of the international 
operation. A separate discussion of the multi-nationality factor is conducted in 
section 5.5.3.  
As mentioned in section 3.4.1, military organizations tend to share 
similar and uniquely military values and standards, while civilian organizations 
usually are much more culture-bound by the values and standards of the 
society they originate from. In the present context this suggests that the 
multiplicity of the KFOR organization does not necessarily hamper efficiency 
as  interpretations of the mandate/Mission Statements/success criteria could 
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be largely the same across the different layers of KFOR. The available 
information does not provide sufficient evidence to say whether this is indeed 
the case. What is clear, is that there are practical problems in connection with 
KFOR multinationality and structure. 
Second, the Mission Statements, which here will be understood as goals 
for the brigades and units and thus success criteria17, on one side is quoted to 
be the UNSCR 1244. More specifically, KFOR sees its obligation in that 
context to be the maintaining of a safe and secure environment in which 
UNMIK can deliver the rest of the mandate. Open sources do not reveal any 
definition of such a situation, so the actual contents of this goal is not clear. 
Secondary, the brigades have tasks to accomplish, which are challenges 
specific to their regions. The degree of explicitness varies, as is clear from the 
above account. For analytical purposes it is very difficult to relate to success 
criteria this vague. However, the examination above suggests the 
simultaneous existence of a “super-goal” of a more symbolic and unspecified 
nature (a safe and secure environment), and explicit sub-goals in the 
formulation of tasks. This corresponds with the views of Jacobsen and 
Thorsvik (section 3.3.1) on definition of goals in organizations. It also 
reconfirms the assertions made regarding mandate fulfillment as a prime 
success criterion made in sections 3.2.1 and 5.1. Furthermore, the mission 
statements do indicate a common perception of KFOR’s ultimate goal(s) 
across the organization(s). It is, however, not possible to discern whether a 
common understanding of the contents of the goal/s exists across KFOR. 
Finally, it is absolutely vital to point out that an ultimate goal for KFOR is 
withdrawal. This was unambiguously stated by British Major General Wilson, 
who was Chief of Staff in KFOR 5, in a Symposium held in Oslo in January 
2002. (Wilson 2002, quoted in FFI Report 2002/01551) and is also stated on 
the MNB (E) homepage on the KFOR website. This is by the military 
establishment taken to be a logical consequence of the mission of establishing 
a safe and secure environment. It is not an explicit provision in the UNSCR 
                                                 
17 Refer discussion of generation of success criteria in section 3.3 
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1244. The implications of this exit orientation will be further discussed in 
section 5.3.5, as KFOR deems that a safe and secure environment and 
subsequent withdrawal in theory can happen before the entire UNSCR 1244 
has been realized. 
  
5.3 Institutions: UNMIK 
The UNMIK works within four main task areas, referred to as “the Pillars”: 
Pillar I is police and justice. Pillar II is civil administration. Both of these are 
entirely the UN’s responsibility. Pillar III is institution building, meaning political 
institutions, delegated to the OSCE. Pillar IV is economic reconstruction, 
delegated to the EU.18 This structure was established in May 2001 
(S/2001/565, III E).  
The dominant task of UNMIK presently19 has to do with security, first 
and foremost police and justice.20 The following description of UNMIK will deal 
with Pillar I, law and order. The introduction to UNMIK starts with a very brief 
summary of  the leadership structure, as this has some significance for the 
institutionalized relations between KFOR and UNMIK. Then comes a 
description of the UNMIK Police organization, which for all practical means 
constitutes Pillar I. It is divided into regions and functional units. The section 
ends with a summary of main points regarding UNMIK institutions.  
A central project in UNSCR 1244 is the establishment of domestic 
capacities in civil administration including law enforcement. The two 
institutions Kosovo Police Service (KPS) and Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) 
are nascent domestic security structures in that project. They have no 
independent security responsibilities yet and are not integral parts of either 
KFOR or UNMIK. Therefore they will not be separately discussed in this 
                                                 
18 The EU and the OSCE are in charge mainly of economic reconstruction and development, and institution 
building respectively. In addition there is a plethora of other actors: NGOs, state agencies etc. working within 
smaller fields of competence. These will not feature in this dissertation. 
19 Mid-2002 
20 This interlocks with Pillar III/OSCE efforts in building domestic capacities in independent, unbiased police 
and justice apparatuses. As argued in section 4.4, there is regrettably no room for a separate discussion of this 
subject. 
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dissertation21. The same is true for the many local consultation bodies that 
exist. Return of refugees is a job that has been taken over by the International 
Organization of Migration (IOM). Therefore, this question will not be separately 
dealt with. The task of de-mining is also delegated to a separate agency and is 
therefore omitted from further discussion.  
More UNMIK details are provided in Annex #4. 
 
5.3.1 UNMIK leadership: 
UNSCR 1244 vests all legislative and executive powers over the people and 
territory of Kosovo in UNMIK. All powers in Kosovo are formally in the hands of 
the SRSG. Notably, UNMIK has no direct authority over KFOR. UNMIK must 
respect the law of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia insofar as it does not run 
contrary to the UNSCR 1244, internationally recognized human rights 
standards, regulations issued by the Special Representative of the Secretary 
General (SRSG), or the general mandate of the UNMIK. (S/1999/779, IV 36) 
 The SRSG is appointed by the United Nations Secretary General (UNSG) 
and answers directly to him/ her, who in turn keeps the Security Council 
(UNSC) updated on the situation in Kosovo. The SRSG is assisted by a 
Principal Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (PDSRSG) 
(S/2000/177, II D; http:www.unmikonline.org/departments.htm: June 2002) 
Each Pillar is headed by a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary 
General (DSRSG) who answers directly to the SRSG. The SRSG, the 
PDSRSG and the DSRSGs together form the Executive Committee that meets 
on a daily basis and functions as a valuable coordination mechanism. 
(S/1999/1250 II D) Administrative Departments  run the different public 
services according to their respective competencies. The ADs are headed by 
one UNMIK representative and one local, positions being allocated to reflect 
the ethnic composition of Kosovo. (UNMIK DPI 2000: 4)  
                                                 
21 Except by way of mentioning their participation in specific operations, if relevant. 
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Major changes are continuously taking place in the administration of 
Kosovo and the organization of UNMIK in the wake of successful Kosovo-wide 
elections in November 2001.  
 
5.3.2 Pillar I: Police and Justice. UNMIK Police 
The UNMIK Police and Justice Pillar (I) is led by a Deputy Special  
Representative. This area is a reserved function of the UNMIK after the 
Kosovo Assembly elections of November 2001, which led to a significant 
transfer of responsibilities to institutions of self-government.  
The UNMIK Police is without a doubt the biggest enterprise within Pillar 
I. The Police is led by a Police Commissioner. In his office there are Special 
Advisors for Politics, Human Rights, and Special Police Units/Border Police, as 
well as assistants and a Press Office. Under his direct command are the 
Operations, Administration, and Planning & Development departments, each 
led by a Deputy Commissioner.  
Operations handle the actual policing and is the only one to be reviewed 
here. On the central level it has 4 planning offices in the capacities of Policy & 
Planning, Special Operations, Investigations, and Operations MHQ. It’s divided 
into 5 regions, the same ones as KFOR: Pristina, Gnjilane, Prizren, Pec, and 
Mitrovica, with a total of 34 police stations. In addition there is a Special Police 
Unit (not identical with the KFOR MSU) and a Border Police Unit. Currently 48 
nations contribute personnel to UNMIK Police, totaling 4582 officers.22 
(S/2002/436 Annex V)  
Pristina is the capital of Kosovo and UNMIK Police here has functioned 
as the model for the other regional police centers. It also functions as the 
control center for all police stations throughout Kosovo.The main challenges of 
HQ Pristina are organized crime, ethnic intimidation including house evictions 
and occupations, and overcrowding due to the huge influx of people from the 
rural districts after the conflict of ‘98-’99. (UNMIK Police Annual Report 2000: 
14) Mitrovica is the most troubled region of Kosovo. Problems include 
                                                 
22 Figures correct as of April 22nd, 2002. 
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clashes, riots, ordinary crimes, and attacks on UNMIK, KFOR and the local 
Kosovo Police Service (KPS) personnel. Due to the security situation, UNMIK 
Police has not yet taken over policing primacy here23. Investigations are 
entirely UNMIK’s responsibility, while overall security remains KFOR 
responsibility.24 (UNMIK Police Annual Report 2000: 15-16; S/2002/436 III B). 
Pec borders with Albania and was a hotspot during the war. Pec was a center 
for UCK in the days of conflict and remains a region of stronger-than-usual 
political activism. Demonstrations and politically motivated crime occur with 
regularity and pose region-specific problems in the general security 
situation.The main security challenge now, is smuggling of goods from Albania 
and Montenegro.  (UNMIK Police Annual Report 2000: 16-17) The presently 
biggest security/criminality problem in Prizren is illegal prostitution and 
trafficking of women. Special investigation units targeting this problem were 
formed and have been effective. (ibid: 17-18) Gnjilane, borders on the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(FYROM). Minority protection has been a central task for UNMIK Police in this 
region, and kidnapping for ransom has also been a region-specific problem. 
(ibid: 19-20) 
 
Specialized investigative units: 
The Central Criminal Investigation Unit (CCIU) was established already in 
June1999 and is a homicide investigation unit. In addition to homicides 
committed inside Kosovo, it investigates homicides (and other serious crimes) 
committed prior to the deployment of UNMIK, war crimes committed in 1998 
and 1999, and any case assigned to it by the Police Commissioner. (UNMIK 
Police Annual Report 2000: 21-22) Missing Persons Unit (MPU) was formed 
in November 1999 and investigates all missing person cases in Kosovo that 
started prior to, during or after the conflict. It has offices in Pristina and the 
Serb village of Gracanica. (ibid: 22) Trafficking and Prostitution 
                                                 
23 Autumn 2002 
24 See section 5.4.2 for a comprehensive account of Mitrovica 
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Investigation Unit (TPIU) was formed in the autumn of 2000 to meet a major 
and growing problem of trafficking in women mainly from different Eastern 
European countries to Kosovo. (UNMIK Police Annual Report 2000: 23) The 
Forensic Unit secures and analyzes physical proof in the following sections: 
Crime Scene Section, Crime Laboratory, Document Examination Section, 
Fingerprint Section, and Ballistic Section. 19 (ibid: 24) Internal Investigations 
Unit (IIU) investigates complaints against UNMIK police officers. It sorts under 
the administrative department, not Operations. (ibid: 25) 
 
Special Operational Units: 
The Special Police Units (SPU) is a police force that consists of 6 national 
contingents of self-sufficient police officers with military status and capabilities.  
The role of a separate public order agency is affirmed in report S/1999/779 (VI 
2 62), and specifically includes area security and support and protection for 
UNMIK Police. They are capable of rapid deployment to high-risk situations. In 
Kosovo they deal with, inter alia, public disorder/riot control and protection of 
UNMIK Police and Border Police and facilities. The SPUs are formally 
subordinated the UNMIK Police Commissioner and bound by UNMIK Police 
rules and codes of conduct, while daily command is executed within the 
national units. (UNMIK Police Annual Report 2000) The Border Police are in 
charge of law enforcement and ensuring compliance with immigration laws at 
5 border crossing points towards Albania, the Former Yugoslav republic of 
Macedonia and Montenegro, and Pristina airport.25 KFOR patrols the 
borderline between checkpoints. (ibid: 12-13) Protection Units were 
established in recognition of a need for special protection, “body guarding” 
services of VIP persons as well as persons in exposed positions. (ibid: 27) 
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5.3.3 Central UNMIK features. 
When it comes to UNMIK organizational features of special relevance for the 
research questions, the following items stand out. One is an organizational 
structure which is different from that of KFOR. The other is an apparent lack of  
goals and sub-goals/success criteria which are more explicit than the general 
aim of mandate fulfillment. 
First, UNMIK is a unified, civil organization under the leadership of the 
Special Representative of the UN Secretary General. The hierarchy of UNMIK 
Police is unambiguous. Personnel in UNMIK are recruited as employees to an 
organization, they do not come in bulk as national contingents. Therefore, 
there are formally no conflicting command structures. The exception is the 
SPUs, which come as national contingents.  
Second, the development of UNMIK in general and UNMIK Police in 
particular speaks of an organization that responds to its environment and the 
challenges and needs it presents. UNMIK has shifted focus of efforts as 
developments on the ground produced new problems and alleviated others. 
The division of the police into issue-specific units as well as into regional units 
seems to respond to developments on the ground. These features fit quite well 
with Hall’s “goal model” (section 3.3.2), which emphasizes the dynamic 
interaction between an organization and its environment when it comes to 
definiton of operational goals. 
It is worth mentioning that no formal organizational chart exists for 
UNMIK as a whole. The reason for this is supposedly that the drawing of such 
a chart would have to suggest that some positions are superior to others in 
terms of rank and authority. Such an illustration could cause huge problems 
with sponsor states, as nations tend to apply considerable weight to getting 
their own people in high-ranking positions in UN organizations and operations. 
(Vachter: August 2002). This is a piece of non-information which speaks 
volumes about the importance of nationality also in UNMIK. 
                                                                                                                                                        
25 As Kosovo is formally a legitimate part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the line separating the 
provinces of Kosovo and Serbia today is an administrative boundary. 
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UNMIK as an agent naturally presents the deliverance of UNSCR 1244 
as its mission. UNMIK Police further employs as a mission statement different 
law and order tasks which are listed as UNMIK responsibilities in the UNSCR 
1244. Regional police districts work for the general securing of civil law and 
order, while the division into issue-specific police units may function as mission 
statements in their own right. The fact that a UNSCR is normally quite diffuse 
in its formulations has already been discussed. The consequences when a 
resolution is used as  goal formulation accordingly seem to be fairly floating 
ideas about what needs to be done. The first UNMIK DRSG Bernard Kouchner 
once famously said that he read the UNSCR 1244 twice every morning, but 
was never able to figure out what exactly UNMIK was supposed to be doing. 
The lack of a defined end state further reduces the value of UNSCR 1244 as a 
separate “success criteria”. Jacobsen and Thorsvik (section 3.3.1) singled out 
diffuse or non-existing timeframes as a particularly common problem for 
organizational efficiency in terms of goal orientation and attainment. 
 
5.3.4 Success criteria of KFOR and UNMIK 
The first research question posed initially was “What are the success criteria 
KFOR and UNMIK respectively apply?” The presentation of the institutions 
above have provided some answers. 
The fact that both organizations state deliverance of UNSCR 1244 – 
mandate fulfillment – as their ultimate goal/success criterion, is dominant. The 
inherent weakness in understanding mandate fulfillment as a success criterion 
was discussed in chapter 3, and has been illustrated in the first part of chapter 
5. UNSCR 1244 is formulated in very general terms and does not even contain 
a vision of an end state for Kosovo. KFOR and UNMIK are deployed to create 
an undefined situation.  
KFOR has focussed on “establishing a safe and secure environment” as 
its most important success criterion within the framework of UNSCR 1244. It is 
implicitly and explicitly implied that when KFOR maintains security, UNMIK can 
concentrate on all the other elements in the mandate. 
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UNMIK has not singled out a more precise success criterion for itself 
within the mandate. It has delegated many of the tasks in UNSCR 1244 to 
other international GOs and NGOs, and even some to local bodies. In practice 
UNMIK is operational primarily in policing/public order, and has the final 
authority in matters pertaining to the local political and legal development. 
Down the ranks in each organization success criteria or sub-goals can 
above all be identified as designated units for specific tasks or issue areas, 
such as the specialized investigative units in the UNMIK Police or the KFOR 
Multinational Special Units. These organizational features can probably best 
be understood as perceived necessary steps to reach mandate fulfillment. 
Frustratingly, a close examination of KFOR and UNMIK did not reveal 
unambiguous, explicit lists of success criteria held in each organization. The 
mandate text, the “safe and secure environment”, and tasks of special priority 
are the general elements quoted throughout which seem to be the closest one 
can get based on the available source material employed here. 
 
5.3.5 Institutional cooperation 
At the command level coordination has been institutionalized almost from the 
start. In addition to frequent and regular meetings between COMKFOR and 
SRSG, there is direct, top-level coordination on security and police issues. 
KFOR participates in the Security panels of Pillar I, and one of the deputy 
commanders in the KFOR Command Group is charged with Civil Affairs. 
(Lindemann 2002: 96) The following figure (taken from Otterlei 2002: 69) 
shows established relations between KFOR and UNMIK, NATO and UN, and 
the contributing nations: 
 
 68
RS
GFSU
MNBs
BNs
Pillar 1 
MSU Pillar 2 
Pillar 3 
Pillar 4 
MC
N
A
TI
O
N
S
N
A
TI
O
N
S
COMKFOR Rear
NAC
CINCSOUTH
SACEUR
COMKFOR
CG/QUINT
SRSG
UN SG
UNSC
OSCE
EU
 
Figure:  Command relationships within which COMKFOR and SRSG operate 
 
By the first quarter of 2000 the liaison institution functioned satisfactory. 
Monitoring and analysis of the security situation based on information brought 
into the UNMIK Situation Center from military liaison officers throughout 
Kosovo, including KFOR headquarters, was well established. (S/2000/177, II D 
36) Close liaison has been ensured through frequent meetings between SRSG 
and COMKFOR. UNMIK has dispatched military liaison officers to KFOR HQ 
and Brigade commands and KFOR has sent command level staff to UNMIK. 
The purpose is to facilitate planning, coordination and information sharing. 
(Wentz 2002: 319) In an interview in August 2001, one UNMIK senior official 
highlighted several aspects of the KFOR/UNMIK cooperation. On the positive 
side, he emphasized that with 2-3 weekly meetings on HQ level, the 
institutionalized cooperation was much better than in many previous PSOs, for 
example UNPROFOR (Bosnia) and and UNTAC (Cambodia). However, much 
of the beneficial climate between the organizations was attributed to the fact 
that the COMKFOR and the SRSG in office in 2001 got along well on a 
personal level. They were both Scandinavian, and both had a low key, informal 
and practical way of discussing and dealing with problems and challenges.  
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The approach itself was less important than the fact that both leaders shared 
it. Cultural differences between decision-makers in meetings had previously 
complicated cooperation patterns. The importance of this dimension is virtually 
impossible to estimate without thorough interviews with personnel. 
There has not been a clear, agreed vision, plan and strategy for how to 
deliver on UNSCR 1244. An assessment of the various mission statements 
encountered in the above, illustrate this. As elaborated upon in section 3.3.1, 
there can be and frequently is some distance between main goal and sub-
goals. In the present context that would constitute the distance between 
mandate and statements, and the reality of a mission. But, as was also 
argued, ideals have purposes too, significant among which is aims to strive for. 
The mission statements quoted here therefore carry an important message 
about vision.  
KFOR is quite superficial in its general mission statement. KFOR’s job is 
to establish a safe and secure environment that allows UNMIK to establish 
adequate civil structures for peaceful coexistence and self-government. 
(http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/objectives.htm: Oct 16th 2002) The statement 
says a lot about how KFOR sees the role division. KFOR has responsibility for 
a secure environment, and that is it. UNMIK has responsibility for reconciliation 
and reconstruction and everything else – KFOR will offer assistance, primarily 
in matters that have to do with security.  
UNMIK does not have a separate mission statement; the entire 
Resolution is their mission statement and reconciliation is its focal point. The 
mission statement for Pillar I Police and Justice is, however, more specific 
than KFOR’s mission statement (which refers to the security situation). It 
points out several specific tasks, such as consolidating law and order 
structures. Here is a clear difference in levels. Reconciliation is an ultimate 
goal, while sound law and order structures a sub-goal necessary for the 
achievement of the larger project. 
In theory, KFOR’s mission of a safe and secure environment could be 
accomplished sooner than UNMIK’s mission of comprehensive reconstruction 
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of inter alia law and order structures. In that case, KFOR could withdraw. 
Withdrawal is, after all, the final goal of KFOR. However, effective and 
functional civil structures of the kind envisaged in UNSCR 1244 and entrusted 
to UNMIK to build, depend on a minimum level of interethnic tolerance. 
Security for all persons and communities is probably a minimum prerequisite 
for such tolerance to come about. Hence, KFOR and UNMIK are not only 
obliged to cooperate by mandate. They are also forced to do so because of 
the situation on the ground. Very simplified it could be said that KFOR is exit 
oriented, while UNMIK is end state oriented, meaning that KFOR ultimately 
works to make itself superfluous and UNMIK towards a lasting solution for 
Kosovo. But neither can succeed if the other fails. Inherent in the final goals 
duality lie differences in institutional approach to the Problem, as well as 
different time scopes. The military organization is, almost by definition, result 
oriented. Resources and decision-making processes all focus on reaching 
objectives quickly. The civil organization, on the other hand, is above all 
process oriented. Their task is creation, management, and implementation of a 
certain development, something that has a much longer timeframe and much 
more diffuse objectives and benchmarks. Cooperation and coordination in 
concrete issue areas between organizations of such different outlooks is 
almost destined to be fraught with friction. (Lindeman 2002: 104)  
 KFOR eventually provided guidelines for civil-military cooperation within 
many categories. The guidelines are broad and general, do not incorporate 
plans for coordinating and synchronizing activities, and do not specify 
measures of effectiveness or envisaged end states. Objectives for the civil-
military cooperation are not articulated. The fact that no end state is formulated 
for Kosovo means no overall strategic plan exists, something that has 
exacerbated problems in conducting coordinated, goal oriented efforts26. 
(Wentz 2002: 332-334) UNMIK has lacked authority for directing and 
synchronizing civil-military activities. (ibid) 
                                                 
26 Based on experiences of MNB (E) 
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While a military organization such as KFOR can act swiftly due to its 
structure, discipline, command lines and training, civil bureaucracies are slow 
in the making. As KFOR was responsible for everything until UNMIK was 
capable of taking over, this led to a “mission creep” – raised expectations of 
perpetuate military involvement in such law and order tasks that were clearly 
supposed to be transferred to the CivPol unit. KFOR was not keen on acting 
as police, and the slowness with which UNMIK Police were deployed and 
equipped caused resentment. (Wentz 2002: 322-323)  This deployment gap27 
produced overlapping security institutions in the law enforcement and public 
order sectors. The most obvious example is the parallel institutions MSU and 
SPU. While the mandate requires both KFOR and UNMIK to be involved in 
these sectors in an initial phase, it does not specify how cooperation should be 
organized, or how/under what conditions the transfer of security tasks from 
KFOR to UNMIK should take place. A separate discussion of the dilemmas 
presented by involving military components in civilian law enforcement is given 
in section 5.5.1. 
KFOR is a military organization charged with accomplishing a political 
mission. The lack of clearly formulated goals has been a source of continuous 
frustration with the military establishment in Kosovo. (Interview with one senior 
official in COMKFOR’s office, August 2001). For the UN apparatus, on the 
other hand, a process oriented approach to problem solving is much more the 
order of the day.  
Peter’s presentation of “New Institutionalism” (section 3.4.1) 
emphasized sources of institutional cooperation problems which correspond 
quite well with elements which have revealed themselves above. Diverging 
norms, rules and roles have manifested themselves in the inherent differences 
between military and civilian institutions. Different outlook and processes have 
come in the way for optimal cooperation even as both organizations formally 
agree on the goals. 
 
                                                 
27 Explained in section 4.5 
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5.3.6 Main points in “Institutions”: 
KFOR is a military institution based on NATO with supporting non-NATO 
states. Organized into 5 regional brigades composed of national military 
elements, and in addition regionally independent special military units, it is in 
many ways a collection of several organizations. Multiple command structures 
and national restrictions create practical problems in terms of organizational 
unity and efficiency. Mission statements by KFOR HQ, brigade HQs and – 
where found – national contingents indicate a fairly universal idea of what 
KFOR’s ultimate goal is: Establish a safe and secure environment stipulated in 
UNSCR 1244, in which UNMIK can deliver the rest of the mandate pertaining 
to the society at large. Sub-goals take the form of tasks to achieve a safe and 
secure environment. 
 UNMIK as an organization is more unified in terms of organizational 
structure. A proper hierarchy rules out multiple command lines and loyalties. 
Both UNMIK in general and UNMIK Police in particular have proved to 
respond in a meaningful way to the challenges presented them by the 
environment, and have changed their structures according to developments on 
the ground. Mandate fulfillment in general is the goal of UNMIK, while a 
specific agency such as the UNMIK Police has a task list and an 
organizational structure which reflects sub-goals in terms of accomplishing 
increased security. 
 Institutional cooperation between KFOR and UNMIK is formally fairly well 
established and quite tight. However, they do not share a common vision of 
what the aim of their cooperation within security is. Duplicate agencies exist. 
General outlook and approach to the security problems differ. These 
divergences can by and large be attributed to institutional characteristics  
which mark the difference between military and civil organizations. Result-
orientation as opposed to process-orientation is one crucial dimension here. 
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5.4 Operations. 
This section will focus on KFOR-UNMIK operational cooperation based on 
functional characteristics of joint efforts in the field. For the purpose of greater 
textual order the security sector is divided into external and internal security, 
and the so-called “gray zone”.  
External security refers to territorial security. Since 1999 when Yugoslav 
military and police units withdrew (July) and disarmament of former 
combatants was successfully completed by KFOR (September), the only 
remaining external security task that KFOR and UNMIK cooperate on is border 
security. (S/1999/1250, II B 10)  
Internal security refers to all tasks that have to do with maintaining 
civilian law and order. The issues to be dealt with in this category are policing, 
illegal weapons, ethnic violence against persons, and the situation in Mitrovica. 
The gray zone category encompasses security challenges which could 
potentially have destabilizing effects on the security situation in Kosovo due to 
its fragile post-conflict status. An eruption of violence in Kosovo could revert 
the region to a civil war-like state, which is why crimes that could provoke such 
a situation must be treated as existential. Existential threats call for military 
action, but crime is commonly a police responsibility. This ambiguity places the 
following issues in a “gray zone” category: organized crime, 
terrorism/insurgencies/non-compliance, and public order.  
In Kosovo, the various threats to security do not necessarily fit neatly 
into a single one of these categories. Ethnic violence can take the form of riots 
just as well as murder or intimidation. Border offences can end up in 
insurgencies or be part of a smuggling network, or simply be individual cases 
of fake travel documents. Any categorization of threats to security is made for 
the sake of organizing the text, keeping in mind the artificial and sometimes 
imprecise nature of such a division. The discussion does naturally not 
represent an exhaustive list of security threats present in Kosovo, but merely a 
selection of the categories which in the literature appear to be the most serious 
ones. 
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5.4.1 External security 
Border control is now the primary element of external security in Kosovo. 
When referring to Yugoslavia in this section, the term Serbia will be used 
because Kosovo and Serbia are both provinces within the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and the borderline is not an international border. A strip of land 
between Kosovo and Serbia called the Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) is a 
designated buffer territory.  
UNMIK Border Police and KFOR share responsibility for border 
supervision and enforcement. UNMIK Border Police and Customs Service are 
responsible for law enforcement at 5 border-crossing points: General Jankovic 
and Globocica in the south-east, Vrbnica and Cafa Prushit in the west, and 
Pristina airport in the central. Note that “law enforcement” here refers mainly to 
investigative authority. The UNMIK Border Police enjoy the support of the 
Ukrainian Special Police Unit with its corps of dogs trained to detect 
explosives, weapons and drugs. KFOR is responsible for the borders between 
the crossing points, as well as providing reinforcement for UNMIK at Pristina 
airport. (UNMIK Police Annual Report 2000: 12-13) KFOR is still ultimately 
responsible for security and obliged to provide military backup when needed. 
Transfer of full responsibility for border-crossings security to UNMIK Police is 
to be completed by the end of January 2003. (S/2002/436, III B 30) 
During the first quarter of 2000 there were incidents of armed clashes 
and refugee flows in the border region between southern Serbia and eastern 
Kosovo. The border was challenged by Yugoslav police as well as armed, 
uniformed Albanians believed to be natives of the Albanian-dominated area on 
the Serb side of the border. There were several incidents of fire exchange 
involving Serb police, unidentified uniformed Albanians and UN personnel. The 
upsurge in violence was linked to the emergence inside Serbia of an armed 
Albanian group called “Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac” 
(UCPMB) and increased Yugoslav security presence. Civilian Albanians, 
fearing for their personal security, started to escape into Kosovo. KFOR 
responded with several raids against the UCPMB located inside Kosovo. 
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UNMIK and KFOR jointly increased monitoring and surveillance in the area, 
considered by both as extremely volatile at the time. The situation appeared to 
calm down throughout 2000. (S/2000/ 538, II B 24; S/2000/177, II B 25)  
Instability in Southern Serbia and in the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia threatens the security situation in Kosovo. KFOR and UNMIK work 
jointly but in different ways to reduce the volatility and its potentially adverse 
effects on Kosovo. KFOR maintains the Ground Safety Zone between Kosovo 
and Serbia, continuously pursuing Albanians suspected for or caught in the act 
of armed opposition in the border region. UNMIK has backed this initiative by 
declaring illegal any border crossing at locations other than proper border 
crossing points. The new legislation was a necessary precondition for some 
more law and order in the border regions. However, it did not create the 
desired change in the mindset of the population, which ultimately is the factor 
that will cement its actual establishment.  
UNMIK also contributes to regional stabilization through close 
cooperation with neighboring states.  
(S/2001/565, II C 9-11; Lutz 2002: 53) 
 
5.4.2 Internal security 
The central duty within this area is law and order enforcement. Roughly said, 
that includes investigation, prosecution and prevention of crime, and 
maintaining public order. Prosecution and other judicial aspects in Kosovo is a 
matter of UNMIK-OSCE cooperation and will not be discussed.  
Policing is arguably the core of maintaining internal security. This 
section starts with a short account of civil-military cooperation in policing as it 
has emerged in Kosovo.28 Illegal weapons and ethnically motivated violence 
against persons and property will then be treated. The last section in “Internal 
security” is the situation in the town of Mitrovica, which is so particular and 
serious that a separate discussion of it is called for. 
                                                 
28 A general discussion of civil-military law enforcement cooperation in peace support operations is provided in 
section 5.5.1. 
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Policing 
The international administration is responsible for law and order in Kosovo 
until local structures for law enforcement which are conducive to international 
law and human rights have been established and consolidated.  
In an initial phase KFOR had to carry out civilian policing duties for the 
time that it took UNMIK Police to reach operational capacity. Duties have since 
been transferred step by step. From the end of 1999 KFOR and UNMIK Police 
cooperated on tracking and maintaining criminal statistics. Both agencies had 
at this time also established routines for the gathering of incriminating 
evidence which could be presented in courts (S/1999/1250, IV C 64 and V C 
84). Towards the end of 2002, KFOR has retained primacy in Mitrovica, 
although with active participation by UNMIK Police in daily patrolling and 
investigation. In line with the intentions of UNSCR 1244, UNMIK Police has in 
turn transferred certain policing responsibilities to the local Kosovo Police 
Service, which by late 2002 conducts independent police work in confined 
areas and disciplines under UNMIK supervision. (S/2002/436, III B 31)  
By mid-2000, the UN Secretary General reported that 15-20% of UNMIK 
Police personnel were at any given time required to perform non-police 
security related tasks. He also made it clear that joint operations with KFOR 
were necessary to bolster police ranks with military personnel and resources. 
(S/2000/538, III 33-34) UNMIK seems to emphasize the concerted efforts to 
enhance security, the common cause of KFOR and UNMIK, in its periodical 
reports to the UNSG and the UNSC and in reports and evaluations presented 
to the public over web. KFOR takes every opportunity to point out that their 
responsibility is a safe and secure environment and that they have a 
conservative interpretation of that concept, leaving policing, reconciliation, 
reconstruction etc. all to UNMIK. Interviews with key personnel in KFOR 
conducted in August 2001 further reinforce that impression. One American 
senior officer working in Intelligence within KFOR HQ simply stated as a 
matter of fact, that “the military can do its job, but it’s up to the UN to bring law 
and order to Kosovo”. The dilemma for KFOR is that a safe and secure 
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environment very much depends on effective policing, a domain KFOR wishes 
to leave entirely to UNMIK. Effective policing in turn depends on radically 
improved interethnic relations, which the OSCE and the EU attempt to achieve 
through institution building, economic reconstruction and education. Success 
in this respect is heavily reliant on the active support of the local population. 
Local support has showed a tendency to appear or disappear in parallel with 
an improved or deteriorated security situation. So, security depends on 
effective policing, which depends on interethnic tolerance, which depends on 
security – and there goes the circle. 
 
Illegal weapons 
The proliferation of weapons due to the conflict, combined with a general state 
of fear and lawlessness, has been a persistent major threat to stability and 
security in Kosovo. The seizure of weapons has therefore been a high priority 
and a task where KFOR and UNMIK have routinely cooperated.  
During the fall of 1999 more than 10.000 weapons were confiscated, 
ranging in caliber from pistols to anti-tank weapons, from former KLA fighters, 
citizens of all ethnic groups, and departing Yugoslav forces. (S/2000/177, II B 
25) Joint search and seize operations between KFOR and UNMIK Police are 
mentioned in almost every report from the Secretary General to the Security 
Council from the beginning of 2000 to September 2002. Operations take the 
form of house searches and checkpoints with vehicle searches. Smuggling of 
weapons into Kosovo remains a problem, and joint border monitoring and 
checks have produced significant arms confiscation. Amnesties have been 
declared twice (most recently in March 2002) to encourage people to turn in 
any weapons, which then have been destroyed. (S/2002/436, III B 27)  
Continuous Albanian resistance in the border region towards southern 
Serbia, the Ground Safety Zone, has provided a considerable market for 
smuggled weapons, landmines, and ammunition with consequent KFOR 
seizures and arrests. A truckload of weapons destined for this area was 
discovered and confiscated in Pec in May 2001. (S/2001/565, II C 9) 
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Between May and October 2001, confiscation throughout Kosovo 
amounted to 1100 rifles/pistols, almost 1700 grenades, 1100 anti-tank 
weapons and nearly 170.000 rounds of ammunition. 1000 persons were 
detained for unlawful possession of arms. (S/2001/926, II B 8) In December 
2001 the largest joint weapons search operation to that date was launched by 
KFOR and UNMIK Police, in which all 5 brigades were involved. This and 
other joint search operations have proved to be valuable in the sense that they 
contribute to greatly improving operational cooperation. (S/2002/62, V 22) 
 
Ethnic violence 
This section will account for joint efforts targeting ethnically motivated crimes 
against persons and private property. Planned and organized acts of violence 
against groups or institutions, ethnically motivated public disorder, and similar 
larger scale security threats will be dealt with in section 5.4.4.  
When the international presence entered Kosovo, their intervention was 
largely motivated by intolerable ethnic violence largely against Albanians in 
that territory. As Serb security forces withdrew from Kosovo, the tide turned. 
The OSCE reported ruthless vengeance campaigns committed by Kosovo 
Albanians against Kosovo Serbs and other minorities during the summer of 
1999 (OSCE: As Seen, As Told, 2000). The ethnic groups in Kosovo were not 
separated by boundaries, security zones or residing in isolated enclaves, they 
were uneasily mixed throughout the land.  The population was also not war-
weary. Tackling crime, preventing ethnic violence and diffusing, or at least 
keeping a lid on, ethnic tensions were therefore pivotal security concerns from 
the start. (Wentz 2002: 320) July 2002 is the first time the UNSG reports that 
the security situation for minorities “seems to have improved” (S/2002/779, IV 
A 23) 
As early as July 1999, KFOR and UNMIK brought together leaders of 
the Albanian and Serb communities in Kosovo in order to agree on concrete 
measures to be taken to enhance security for all inhabitants in Kosovo. The 
meeting produced a joint statement on cooperation for security. (S/1999/779, 
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III 26) By September, calls for tolerance and non-violence had not yet 
significantly reduced either the number or the ferocity of attacks against 
minorities. KFOR was nevertheless praised for its progress in providing a 
secure environment assisted by some 1100 UNMIK Police officers – while it 
was acknowledged that twice the effort was needed at a minimum to provide 
acceptable security for minorities. The international community was urged to 
mobilize and deploy the mandated number of civilian police quickly to this end. 
(S/1999/987, II 4, VII 46)  
Throughout the rest of the year 1999, minorities all over Kosovo 
continued to suffer attacks in many forms: killings, arson, abductions, illegal 
arrests and detentions, unlawful seizure of property including eviction, 
beatings, threats and harassment. The freedom of movement for minorities 
was seriously restricted due to this situation. KFOR and UNMIK coordinated 
several measures to alleviate the situation, including installment of house 
alarms, and establishment of protected shuttle bus services. Of special 
concern was the emergence of an apparent trend of organized criminal 
elements to use juveniles to commit such crimes. Due to the lack of juvenile 
courts and detention facilities juveniles were not prosecuted at the time, 
producing de facto impunity for underage offenders. (S/1999/1250, II C 15-18 
and III B 25-26)  
Again a repeated call was made to the international community to 
rapidly send more police officers to Kosovo, despite the fact that KFOR and 
UNMIK Police had doubled their security efforts since September. Already 
some months after intervention took place, the UN Secretary General was 
forced to face a lack of international commitment to Kosovo in terms of 
resources allocations. Simultaneously, the UNSG had to face an apparent lack 
of commitment to the peace process by significant numbers of people in 
Kosovo. This, of course, exacerbated the resource problem. (ibid, VII 110-111) 
February 2000 was violent. Between the 1st and the 19th UNMIK Police 
and KFOR reported at least 36 separate incidents of violence against Serbs, 
including grenade attacks, arson, and murder. Destruction and/or seizure of 
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property remained a problem with victims in all ethnic groups, as did inhibited 
access to vital public services such as food aid, health care, and shelter. 
KFOR and UNMIK met the heightened threats with targeted deployment 
including armed guard of residences, installment of reinforced doors and 
windows in residences, guarded bus lines, improved distribution of 
commodities, improved access to satellite and mobile phones in isolated 
ethnic enclaves, and increased UNMIK presence in minority areas. The UN 
Secretary General emphasized that neither the people nor the leaders of 
Kosovo demonstrated the necessary commitment to promote inter-ethnic 
tolerance, even less reconciliation. (S/2000/177, IV A 58-59 and XII 153) The 
concern was repeated some months later. (S/2000/538, XI 123) 
The joint efforts did not appear to have an immediate ameliorating 
effect, as minorities, and Serbs in particular, continued to suffer from crime to 
a disproportionate degree throughout 2000. Arson, assault, and murder were 
the most prevalent crimes, in that order. Access to public services and aid 
remained limited for minorities due to the security situation, despite the efforts 
of the UNMIK Police, KFOR and different aid agencies to reverse this 
development. UNMIK Police and KFOR jointly started a special minority 
protection project in Pristina in order to provide immediate physical security as 
well as to ensure long-term security through city development projects. 
(S/2000/538, III A 39-44) 
During the first half of 2001 violence against Serbs in particular was so 
severe that it prompted temporary suspension of bus lines and train services, 
which in turn further hampered this group’s freedom of movement. 
(S/2001/565, II B 6) Both were resumed towards the end of 2001, but then 
under full UNMIK responsibility. They had formerly been operated by UNHCR, 
with KFOR protection under certain circumstances. (S/2001/926, II B 7) 
After the first Kosovo-wide elections in November 2001 the level of 
serious crime against minorities finally decreased somewhat. Minor incidents 
were nonetheless rife, including a number of cases of stone throwing by 
juveniles against minority targets (persons and property). (S/2002/62, V 21) 
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The decline continued through the first half year of 2002. By July economic 
gain seemed to be the most prevalent motif for criminal activity, as opposed to 
previously ethnic animosity. However, the UN Secretary General has pointed 
out that while the concerted initiatives by KFOR and UNMIK Police certainly 
have had a positive effect, a significant part of the explanation is greater 
segregation due to many members of minorities having left Kosovo or staying 
in enclaves. (S/2002/436, III B 21; S/2002/779, IV A 21) After a visit in August 
2001, the UNDP confirms the impression that it is in fact ethnic segregation 
consolidated by default that is the main reason for the reduction in ethnic 
violence. (UNDP/DPKO 2001: 15) 
 
Mitrovica 
The divided town of Mitrovica in North Kosovo (KFOR sector MNB(N)) is one 
of few towns in Kosovo where groups of different ethnic origins still co-exist in 
substantial numbers. The Serb and the Albanian parts of town are separated 
physically by the Ibar River. A small bridge crossing the river has become a 
focal point of tension and a political headache, as it represents, de facto, an 
ethnic segregation. The level of ethnic violence is exceptionally high, 
acceptance of the international presence’s authority exceptionally low.29 
(UNMIK Police Annual Report 2000: 15) Due to these circumstances, KFOR is 
still in charge of the security situation at large in Mitrovica, although law 
enforcement and public order is now carried out in regulated cooperation with 
UNMIK Police in the daily life.  
The MNB (N) is under French command. Initially, the brigade command 
was left to handle the many problems of Mitrovica alone.The French chose to 
place an armed checkpoint on the bridge over the Ibar, complete with razor 
wire and tanks, in order to keep Albanians and Serbs on each side from 
fighting. The result was that the city for all practical means became divided, 
which is contrary to the spirit and letter of the UNSCR 1244. KFOR proved 
                                                 
29 The incidents of ethnic violence in Mitrovica are too many to account for in detail, so only landmark events 
will be described with their consequences. 
 82
unable to protect Albanians resident in the North of the city as well Serbs in 
the South, which reinforced the feeling of division and undermined public 
confidence in the international presence. (Perito 2002: 14) 
In February 2000 serious violence took place over the course of several 
days. Displaying characteristics of urban warfare, it included an initial grenade 
attack on a civilian target, exchange of gunfire as well as sniper fire, and 
confrontation between Albanian demonstrators and KFOR forces where tear 
gas was dispersed to stop the crowd from entering the Serb part of town. The 
Serb population openly advocates ethnic segregation of the town, firmly 
believing this alone can guarantee their security. The Albanian inhabitants are 
vehemently opposed to such an idea. It also runs counter to UNSCR 1244, 
which rules out altering any aspect of territorial status in Kosovo.  The SRSG 
is determined to establish unitary self-governing institutions in Mitrovica just as 
in the rest of Kosovo. (S/2000/177, II B 21-23) 
In April 2000 the first UNMIK Special Police Unit, from Pakistan, arrived 
in theatre, ready to take responsibility for public order, riot control, and similar 
challenges. They were deployed directly to Mitrovica. However, KFOR has 
primacy of every law and order task in Mitrovica. It was free to choose its 
course of action in the many incidents of public riots that took place in the 
spring and summer of 2000, and it relied on itself. The Pakistani SPU was 
never called upon by KFOR to perform the duties they were designated for, 
and in one incident in June the SPU was forcefully prevented by French KFOR 
from responding to a call for backup from UNMIK Police in North Mitrovica. 
The fact that the French has a unit of Gendarmes, police with military status, 
within their contingent has made it possible for French KFOR to meet public 
order challenges in a meaningful way. The Gendarmes are specially trained 
for such duty and routinely engage in it in France. Additionally, French KFOR 
and Gendarmes have complete language and equipment compatibility, which 
makes operational coordination in heated situations a matter of routine. It 
could potentially pose many and serious complications to coordinate 
operations with the Pakistani SPU due to these practical issues. Other 
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suggested reasons for non-cooperation with the SPU are that the French were 
worried about the human rights record of Pakistani security forces, and that it 
would fuel rather than calm the situation to send in a unit of Moslems against 
the Orthodox Christian Serbs. (Perito 2002: 17-18)  
By the end of 2000, an improvement in the general security situation in 
Mitrovica is recorded. The credit for this is given to a joint KFOR/UNMIK 
strategy to broaden the control over northern Kosovo. (S/2000/1196, II B19)  
The following winter (Jan./Feb. 2001) Mitrovica saw a re-emergence of 
violence instigated by Kosovo Albanian youth, directed at the Northern side of 
town as well as against KFOR and UNMIK Police vehicles. UNMIK and KFOR 
consequently persuaded Kosovo Albanian leaders to issue a declaration 
calling for increased KFOR/UNMIK Police/KPS presence and adherence to the 
principles of peaceful and constructive coexistence. The Serb community 
promptly issued a statement of non-concurrence to the declaration. 
(S/2001/218, II B 6) In March this disobedience was expressed by violent 
demonstrations against UNMIK Police following the arrest of 3 Serbs, in which 
21 UNMIK Police officers were injured and several UNMIK Police houses and 
vehicles damaged. UNMIK Police suspended patrols in North Mitrovica in the 
wake of these events, which seemed orchestrated to drive UNMIK out of that 
area. Patrols resumed in May, reinforced by KFOR troops. UNMIK and KFOR 
authority was further challenged in North Mitrovica and surroundings by illegal 
blockades of critical roads, apparently erected by rivaling Serb leaders. The 
blockades were dismantled in mid-May. (S/2001/565, II B 8) Towards the end 
of 2001 the situation appeared stabilized, although on a tense level.  
A joint strategy for Mitrovica was endorsed at a meeting in the North 
Atlantic Council (NATO) in June 2001, at which both COMKFOR and the 
SRSG were present. It was decided that Kosovo Albanian leaders and Serb 
leaders in Belgrade (in Yugoslavia proper) be involved in the strategy through 
dialogue. (S/2001/926, E 4) 
The Serb community has remained opposed to the international 
authorities. It has established at least one parallel security structure, the so-
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called “Bridge Watchers”, to serve the Serbs in north Mitrovica. The Bridge 
Watchers are in clear violation of the UNSCR 1244 because the resolution 
grants law enforcement powers to the international presence alone. (Perito 
2002: 14-15) UNMIK Police and KFOR have met The Bridge Watchers with 
concerted and robust measures. Examples of joint efforts are increased 
community policing, search and arrest operations, and public information 
campaigns. Much of the reported violence committed by Serbs was directed at 
UNMIK and KFOR personnel, as opposed to civilian inhabitants, and ranges 
from grenade attacks to demonstrations. (S/2002/62, V 23) By April 2002 the 
Bridge Watchers were still active and enjoyed considerable popular support 
among Serbs in Mitrovica, despite the continued coordinated efforts of KFOR 
and UNMIK to break down parallel security structures and simultaneously 
meet the security needs of the Serb population. At this time KFOR support 
was still required in order for UNMIK Police to perform their duties in north 
Mitrovica. (S/2002/436, III B 24) 
Riots in February 2000 put the relations between UNMIK and KFOR to a 
severe test. Responsibility for security ultimately rested with a 250-man 
infantry battalion of French KFOR soldiers, while there were 65 UNMIK Police 
officers deployed to patrol both sides of the river. During the riots there were 
several occasions when KFOR failed to respond to UNMIK Police calls for 
reinforcement. In one incident one CivPol officer and a group of French 
paratroopers attempted to reach a group of Albanians trapped in the Northern 
part of town. The CivPol officer was knocked down by the mob, whereupon the 
French retreated to cover instead of coming to his rescue. Eventually some 
Danish KFOR troops got him and the Albanians out. The episode created 
many hard feelings between UNMIK Police and the French KFOR. The 
already negative attitude in the Albanian population in Mitrovica towards the 
French hardened. They were convinced a historical affinity existed between 
the French and the Serbs, something that did not enhance the Albanians’ 
feeling of security under French protection. No formal explanation of the 
French priorities in this situation has been given, but the episode does 
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illustrate the centrality of national commands within KFOR. (Perito 2002: 16) 
No higher command was authorized to order the French to change their 
course of action, despite the fact that the brigades formally are under the 
command of the KFOR Headquarters and COMKFOR.  
Mitrovica in many ways illustrate the hub around which political 
developments in Kosovo spin: a fundamental lack of support from the different 
ethnic communities to the explicit goal of the international presence, namely 
peaceful, multi-ethnic coexistence within Yugoslavia. One officer at the KFOR 
HQ Joint Operation Center (JOC) pointed out that Mitrovica wrongly has been 
portrayed as a military problem. It is not. Militarily it would arguably be quite 
easy to deploy a unit of suitable force strength to establish order and 
demonstrate that local warfare will not be tolerated. But Mitrovica is a political 
problem, one that is too delicate and important to be handled on KFOR 
brigade level. (Interview, August 2001). Politically, there is, as of yet, no visible 
will to discuss the final status of Mitrovica, which really is the heart of the 
problems in this city. 
 
5.4.3 Gray zone security challenges 
As mentioned above, some security challenges in Kosovo (and in PSOs in 
general) are so serious that they in fact pose potentially existential threats to 
an area and/or a society. In such situations good arguments exist for involving 
military forces in law and order tasks, although this is strictly the domain of 
civilian police under normal circumstances. For Kosovo, there are two main 
arguments. One is the lack of adequate functional and judicial capacity within 
the civilian law enforcement agencies. The other is the clear link between 
armed resistance groups inside and in the border regions to Kosovo, and 
perpetrators of organized crime, ethnic violence and general extremism. 
(Otterlei 2002: 9)  
KFOR started their mission with a focus on external threats to the 
Kosovo territory, but were soon forced to act beyond that for a meaningful 
security situation to appear at all attainable. Two years on, elements formerly 
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constituting an external threat (guerillas) had become an integral part of 
criminal networks operating not only in Kosovo but in the whole Balkan region. 
Their activities are a blend of ethnic violence, political extremism, smuggling, 
and trafficking, and so they pose a threat simultaneously to internal and 
external security for which KFOR initially was not intended or equipped. These 
gray zone security challenges thus pose maybe the most obvious and also the 
most serious arenas for security cooperation between KFOR and UNMIK. 
(Lindeman 2002: 102)  
 
Organized crime 
Already in late 1999 the UN Secretary General directed the attention of the 
Security Council to the problem of organized crime in Kosovo, noting the 
apparent consolidation of networks operating in smuggling, extortion, 
gambling, human trafficking, drugs, and establishing illegal security structures. 
All of this is further seen to undermine the goals of stabilization and 
establishment of rule of law set forth by the UN in UNSCR 1244. 
(S/1999/1250, II C 19). 
In early 2000 human trafficking and forced prostitution were recognized 
as serious threats to security and not least human rights, although neither was 
a crime according to Kosovo law. Legislative review to remedy this 
shortcoming only started in 2000. (S/2000/538, VI B 49). These crimes were 
targeted by joint KFOR/UNMIK counter-actions from the start. Several raids 
against suspected brothels were conducted in joint operations, and shelter for 
female victims was established under KFOR security. Victims were largely 
foreign women who had been kidnapped and smuggled into Kosovo, but a 
disturbing increase in the abduction of local girls and women was also noted at 
this time.  (S/2000/177, IV B 61) Throughout the year, joint operations were 
conducted, culminating with major operations in November in which several 
persons were arrested for trafficking of women (among other things) in Kosovo 
Polje and Pristina. (S/2000/1196, II B 18) UNMIK Police established a 
designated unit for tackling trafficking in women and forced prostitution at this 
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same time, which proved quite successful from the start. (S/2001/218, III D 34) 
In January 2001 the new law30 (UNMIK regulation) on trafficking came into 
effect, and by the end of 2001 teams from the Trafficking and Prostitution 
Investigation Unit were in place in each of the five regions in Kosovo. (UNMIK 
Police Annual Report 2000: 23) 
Joint operations against organized crime evolved to become a 
cornerstone for both UNMIK Police and KFOR law enforcement efforts 
throughout the year 2000. In October and November major operations were 
carried out that resulted in the arrest of 3 Serbs, 27 Albanians, and several 
other persons of unspecified ethnic origin, and seizure of large quantities of 
weapons including bomb making equipment, unaccounted-for cash, and 
drugs. (S/2000/1196, II B 18)   
KFOR conducted a unilateral operation called “Eagle” aimed at stopping 
smuggling. During KFOR 5 (2001) a working group called Task Force Eagle 2 
was formed to look at ways to improve cooperation against smuggling. A large, 
joint vehicle search operation called “Groundhog”, which incorporated all 
MNBs and UNMIK Police, was launched Kosovo-wide and coordinated by 
KFOR’s Joint Operation Center (JOC). One of the benefits sought was the 
possibility to monitor and pursue if necessary vehicles checked in one sector 
into another sector, something that normally was difficult due to different 
KFOR commands in different sectors. The operation revealed several 
weaknesses in the overall security system. First, there was no consensus in 
the field as to what a “search operation” meant. Different units from different 
nations had different views regarding how thorough a search is, how to set up 
and run checkpoints, and so on. The non-existence of Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOP) for such operations was a tangible problem. Secondly, 
there were language problems seriously hampering cooperation and 
coordination and slowing every reaction. This reduced both efficiency and 
impact, as smugglers in Kosovo are well organized. Scouts equipped with 
mobile phones were able to locate and report checkpoint sites and to move 
                                                 
30 Pending a political solution, UNMIK is authorized to issue regulations that have the force of law in Kosovo. 
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traffic around these faster than the international personnel got around to 
relocating. (Interview with an officer at KFOR HQ Joint Operation Centre, 
August 21st 2001) Operation Groundhog did demonstrate the usefulness of 
sharing information, however. Significant amounts of weapons were 
discovered and seized with the support of a joint database allowing for 
monitoring and tracking of suspected persons and vehicles throughout Kosovo 
and the region at large. (Lutz 2002: 55) The importance of shared intelligence 
is elaborated upon in section 5.5.2.  
 
Terrorism, insurgencies, non-compliance 
Organized, armed opposition to the international administration of Kosovo has 
been a serious challenge to the re-establishment of law and order in the 
province. Former combatants of the KLA have repeatedly been involved. 
Initially, resistance was met by KFOR troops as part of the demilitarization of 
KLA. When that process was declared completed in September 1999, 
insurgencies became a law and order problem and not a demilitarization issue. 
UNMIK Police claims that acts of terrorism are a sporadic phenomenon in 
Kosovo. Such acts are directed both at minorities in order to make them flee 
Kosovo, and at moderate political figures and symbols in order to reverse the 
reconstruction and reconciliation process. They tend to be highly motivated 
and carefully planned, and therefore difficult to investigate. The greatest 
obstacle for investigators is, however, non-cooperation on the part of the 
public, whose members display great reluctance to come forward with 
information. (UNMIK Police Annual Report 2000: 35) 
During the late fall of 1999 there were several serious incidents of non-
compliance with UNSCR 1244 by former KLA members. Involvement in 
criminal activity, keeping of weapons arsenals, and attempts to act illegally as 
law enforcement officials are some examples. To counter such developments 
and make clear to all that non-compliance would be firmly and swiftly dealt 
with, UNMIK and KFOR worked together but in separate competencies. 
UNMIK Police arrested several suspected perpetrators and KFOR conducted 
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a series of raids on former KLA assembly areas and offices. Joint efforts were 
conducted at both the political and operational levels to address issues of 
illegal law enforcement, detention facilities and police stations. (S/1999/1250, 
II A 12-14 and IV C 64) 
A bomb attack in central Pristina killed one prominent Yugoslav civil 
servant on April 18th 2001. Joint UNMIK Police and KFOR investigations led to 
the arrest of one person only 2 days later. (S/2001/565, II B 6)  
Meanwhile, a growing trend of non-compliance was evident in the 
increase in aggressive behavior and attacks on international security 
personnel all over the territory. The trend seemed to go on unabated 
throughout the year. (S/2001/565, II B 7; S/2001/926, II B 10) Violence against 
KFOR and UNMIK Police continued to increase in 2002. (S/2002/436, III B 23) 
In order to strengthen the work against terrorism and organized crime, 
UNMIK established 5 special units in the end of 2001. One, the Sensitive 
Information and Operations Unit, caters to UNMIK Police and KFOR by 
providing expertise on organized crime and terrorism and by processing 
sensitive information into evidence that can be presented in the courtroom. 
(S/2002/62, VI A 26) 
 
Public order issues – ethnically and/or politically motivated organized 
violence 
The main threat to public order in Kosovo remains ethnic antagonisms. 
Section 5.4.2 treated ethnically motivated crimes against persons, and in the 
following the turn has come to ethnically motivated violence on a scale that 
threatens societal structures.  
Immediately upon the withdrawal of Serb security forces from Kosovo in 
1999, a wave of violence against Kosovo Serbs committed by Kosovo 
Albanians practically emptied parts of Kosovo of Serbs. Atrocities included 
murder, arson, looting, kidnapping, and unlawful expropriation of property, and 
KFOR in its early days proved unable to effectively counter the developments. 
(S/1999/779, II A 6)  
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With the arrival of UNMIK CivPol officers and consolidation of KFOR 
presence, the international administration assumed a firmer grip on the 
situation as work to restore order and security progressed. UNMIK set up a 
shuttle bus service between enclaves inhabited by ethnic minorities to facilitate 
a degree of freedom of movement for non-Albanians in October 1999, together 
with KFOR who provided security (armed escort). The service was temporarily 
suspended after an attack on a convoy of some 127 Serbs on October 27th. 
Another joint initiative to provide security for minorities conducted this fall was 
installation in homes of emergency calling devices, reinforcement of doors, 
and the establishment of a hotline to and between UNMIK Police and KFOR. 
(S/1999/1250, III B 25-26)  
In March 2000 the UN noted that the security situation for minorities had 
not improved. In February a rocket attack on a bus carrying 49 Serbs killed 2 
and injured 3. The bus belonged to UNHCR and was escorted by 2 KFOR 
vehicles. The incident spurred the Mitrovica violence of February 2000 
described in section 5.4.2. Following the riots in Mitrovica there was an 
increase in grenade and arson attacks on Serb enclaves in Kosovo in general. 
(S/2000/177, II B 20, 21, 24)  
An increase in what seemed to be orchestrated violence against Serbs 
during the spring of 2000 prompted a continued focus on and enhanced 
UNMIK/KFOR cooperation in public order. Expanded response to incidents, 
more joint operations, better communication and tactical coordination – all in 
the field – were among the most important measures, especially in the 
Mitrovica region. (S/2000/538, II B 21-23)  
Towards the end of 2000 KFOR and UNMIK Police all over Kosovo 
cooperated in the management of public events security to counter political 
violence, pivotal in this period because of the local elections held in November. 
A Political Violence Task Force was established staffed with UNMIK Police 
and KFOR officers all over Kosovo, to coordinate activities between the two 
organizations on local, regional, and central levels. The most common security 
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responses were provision of military/police patrols and personal protection of 
highly-at-risk individuals. (S/2000/1196, II B 16).  
Cooperation in special security measures for threatened minority 
communities was also effectuated. UN Special Police Units have provided 
support to both UNMIK Police and KFOR. They proved to be especially suited 
to conduct weapons search & seize operations jointly with KFOR due to their 
dual police-military capabilities. In the west and southeast the security situation 
for minorities prompted joint UNMIK Police/KFOR patrols and the 
establishment of a common hotline, which both appeared to have a positive 
effect. (S/2000/1196, III 28-31 and VI 37) The municipal elections went ahead 
peacefully, preceded by only insignificant violence, although violence picked 
up again following the elections. (ibid, XI 107) Prior to the Kosovo general 
election in November 2001, the Political Violence Task Force was revived 
following several criminal incidents that appeared to be politically motivated, 
including an assassination attempt on a local politician. (S/2001/926, II B 9) 
In March 2001 the UNSG reiterated that ethnic/political violence remains 
a real threat to the fulfillment of the entire mandate. Mitrovica was still a source 
of instability not only to itself, but to surrounding areas as well. In December 
2000/January/February 2001 orchestrated riots by ethnic groups took place on 
many locations. UNMIK Police and KFOR were not only jointly acting to stem 
the riots but were indeed targets of the violence in their own right. In the 
Prizren and Pristina regions several mortar and explosives attacks on Serb 
civilian, cultural, and religious targets as well as a school bus occurred despite 
concerted and coordinated KFOR/UNMIK Police measures to stop such 
violence. An attack on a Serb bus under KFOR escort in February 
exacerbated local feelings that the international presence provides inadequate 
protection for everyone but Albanians. The bus attack was, however, followed 
by unusually efficient and well-coordinated joint actions by KFOR and UNMIK 
Police to provide emergency medical services and prevent any follow-up 
violence. (S/2001/218, II B 6-10)  
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Meanwhile, minority communities in general continued to rely on joint 
UNMIK/KFOR protection for security in the conduct of basic daily activities and 
needs, from freedom of movement and access to public utilities to supply of 
some commodities and protection from attacks. (ibid, II E 18) Heavy police and 
KFOR presence was deployed to the Gnjilane region following an upsurge in 
violence against Serbs in January/February 2002. Curfews and searches of 
buildings and vehicles were implemented to curb the harassment. 
(S/2002/436, III B 22) From April to July 2002 no organized, ethnically 
motivated violence was reported and the general security situation for 
minorities seemed to have improved. Random attacks were indeed carried out, 
but previous periods were characterized by apparently systematic attacks. 
Based on this positive trend, KFOR and UNMIK started planning the transfer 
of further responsibilities from KFOR to UNMIK Police. (S/2002/779, IV A 23) 
 
5.4.4 Operational cooperation 
The above account shows three dominant features of KFOR/UNMIK 
cooperation in the security sector: One: The missions of KFOR and UNMIK 
are intertwined. The establishment of a safe and secure environment and the 
re-establishment of law and order are jobs that go hand in hand. Two: In 
practice, cooperation seems to be predominantly a matter of task division, not 
joint operations. And three: Where actual cooperation is taking place, it is 
overwhelmingly carried out based on the day-to-day challenges met in the 
field. It has evolved and changed according to developments in the theatre. 
Civil-military cooperation is taking place by default, rather than design. 
(Lindeman 2002: 104-105) 
As pointed out in section 5.4.2, a safe and secure environment depends 
on effective and successful policing. This makes for uneasy inter-dependency 
between competencies of the military KFOR and the civilian UNMIK. One 
officer at the KFOR HQ Joint Operations Center had this comment: “KFOR is 
committed to a “safe and secure environment”. It understands that this will go 
on until a political solution is found. What we need is a far more efficient police. 
 93
Nations don’t want their soldiers involved in fighting organized crime, which is 
understandable. That is police business. But on the other hand, this is all 
mixed together, and we cannot create a safe an secure environment without 
confronting organized crime in one way or the other.”  (August 2001) 
Reports and interviews all point to KFOR being in possession of more 
security personnel and more resources than UNMIK Police. KFOR’s 
reluctance to contribute personnel and resources with reference to mission 
creep has been reported to create resentment in UNMIK Police. As one senior 
UNMIK official articulated it: “KFOR has the resources but won’t get involved, 
so UNMIK has to ask for support for many tasks and materials to do their job”  
(Interview, August 2001). As a result, KFOR has come to provide backup for 
UNMIK Police under two circumstances. One is in situations where KFOR still 
retains primacy according to the mandate. The other is in situations where 
success for a given police operation is perceived as a precondition for the 
safety of KFOR troops in the area, or for success for any KFOR assignment in 
the area. Mitrovica is a good example of a working cooperative relationship 
between KFOR and UNMIK on a day-to-day basis, one where KFOR both 
retains primacy and recognizes that its own mission depends on effective 
policing. KFOR quite explicitly does not want to conduct policing, but has 
plenty of evidence that UNMIK Police does not possess the capabilities 
Mitrovica requires. Thus, KFOR has assumed an operational support role, 
which it fills comparatively well.  
Incentives are still strong to demonstrate a clear separation between 
UNMIK and KFOR, however. Community policing is a central concept in 
UNMIK Police daily operations, meaning a low-key approach where public 
relations and gaining public trust are some of the most important tools in 
tackling crime. (UNMIK Police Annual Report 2000: 29) For KFOR, 
maintaining the contrasting image of professional soldiery is equally important. 
One officer who served in Mitrovica had this comment on the concept of 
“social patrolling”, patrolling just to show presence and be in contact with 
locals: “Soc Pat – what is that, I’m just asking. We’re trying to stick with our 
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soldier identity. We don’t put our guns down and become police officers. We 
are very conscious about that”. (Interview, August 2001) A senior officer at the 
KFOR HQ, working for the Joint Implementation Committee, goes further. He 
asserts that proper soldiers are the only international personnel that enjoys 
any credibility at all among the local population, precisely due to their highly 
visible arms and tough way of conducting duty: “An Albanian just may accept 
to be detained by KFOR, because they respect us. But they do not respect 
UNMIK Police. And in no way the KPS – like,  “who do they think they are?”. 
Kosovo Albanians will never arrest their own kind, that is a complete illusion. 
[….] People respect force of arms.” (August 2001)  
Practical security cooperation is a matter of duty (adopted as a principle 
in UNSCR1244), and a matter of necessity, but apparently a difficult concept 
for the agents to get a holistic grasp of. As seen previously, they are provided 
with no specific guidelines in the mandate. Therefore, task division according 
to normal separation between military and civilian tasks seems to be followed 
as far as possible. Joint operations are organized in response to specific 
problems and limited in time and scope. This modus operandi overall 
constitute a security cooperation pattern dictated by developments on the 
ground, not by design and targeted intention. 
 
5.4.5 Main points in “Operations”: 
From the above account it is possible to identify at least two important issues 
within operations that have an impact on UNMIK-KFOR cooperation. One is 
the nature of the actual security challenges in Kosovo, and the other is the 
actual division and coordination of tasks between the agencies. 
It appears that the most serious security challenges that Kosovo faces, 
which KFOR and UNMIK must address, are persistent ethnic violence, non-
compliance to the peace agreement by segments in Kosovo society, and 
organized crime in several areas.  
UNSCR 1244 makes clear that it is the intention of the international 
community that Kosovo remains multi-ethnic and that it should move toward 
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ever increasing and consolidation of interethnic tolerance. The situation in 
Kosovo does not offer good prospects for the departure of the international 
presence anytime soon. KFOR has focused on erecting security structures to 
keep people off each other’s throats, while UNMIK has conducted a broad 
effort in virtually everything it does to encourage and enforce multi-ethnicity in 
the rebuilt Kosovo. The establishment of an unbiased, reliable law 
enforcement sector is a pivotal part of that effort. Non-compliance refers to the 
segments of Kosovo society that actively oppose the UNSCR 1244 and 
therefore refuse to cooperate with the international presence. Aspirations of 
national independence is the most common reason for non-compliance, which 
of course is a barrier to successful implementation of the UNSCR 1244. 
Resistance struggle also threatens security whenever it takes the form of 
actual fighting. It is significant that the many Kosovar political groups and 
agents that do work together with the international presence, ultimately hold 
independence ambitions too. They have opted to cooperate instead of fighting, 
so represent an optimistic trend of politics by dialogue. It should cause 
concern in the international community that large parts of Kosovo’s people do 
not support the solution envisaged for Kosovo in the UNSCR 1244. The crucial 
question is “What will happen when NATO and the UN leave?” – the answer to 
which few dare to speculate. 
Organized crime with economic motivations has emerged as a prime 
security challenge. The Balkans has become perhaps the largest transit area 
in Europe for human trade, above all in the sense of sex slaves. The brutal 
nature of organized crime is in itself a potential security threat to people in 
Kosovo. With a tangible increase in kidnapping and trading of Kosovar girls the 
security situation has further deteriorated.  
When it comes to division and coordination of tasks between UNMIK 
and KFOR within security, the UNSCR 1244 prescribes a gradual transfer from 
full KFOR to full UNMIK responsibility. The actual situation in this respect is 
that transfer of powers has reached different stages in different task areas. 
Mitrovica is still KFOR’s responsibility, although joint operations with UNMIK 
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Police now are the order of the day. Criminal investigation, on the other hand, 
is more or less completely in the hands of UNMIK.  
The above description of operations shows two dominant features of 
task distribution: For one, it has largely been conducted on the basis of 
developments on the ground. The situation, not a plan or scheme worked out 
in headquarters, has determined the time, pace and circumstances for transfer 
of powers. Second, joint operations have most often taken place when one of 
the agencies has requested the assistance of the other. Only on rare 
occasions have operations been carried out on a truly common basis, where 
both agencies have participated on equal footing in all stages of planning and 
implementation. “Groundhog” is one such notable exception. Both of these 
features speak of a significant element of ad hoc in the implementation of 
UNSCR 1244. The resolution is notoriously vague regarding the “hows” and 
“whens” of civil-military cooperation, a feature which has manifested itself in 
the actual conduct of cooperation. This is not necessarily bad, as flexibility can 
be a crucial asset in the unpredictable environment of a post-conflict territory. 
However, a more target oriented approach could be more cost-efficient and 
provide operations with a focus and a purpose greater than getting through the 
present day. 
 
5.5 Issues of special concern in KFOR-UNMIK security cooperation 
The above review of institutional and operational KFOR-UNMIK security 
cooperation highlighted some issue areas that call for separate discussions. In 
this section the following subjects will be more closely scrutinized: The 
involvement of military personnel in law enforcement; the problem of 
intelligence in civil-military cooperation; and aspects of multi-nationality. 
 
5.5.1 Civil-military cooperation in law enforcement 
Using military personnel for policing duties in PSOs is a practice that has 
evolved almost by default, as a response to developments on the ground in 
the different theatres of intervention. The Kosovo operation represents the first 
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attempt by the international community to recognize the need for reinforced 
law and order capacity in a post-conflict environment by way of mandating 
civilian-military cooperation in policing and security. By placing law and order 
responsibility on KFOR until UNMIK Police was ready to take over, 
significantly not specifying a time at which such capacity should be in place, 
the UNSC sought to overcome the problems of the deployment and 
enforcement gaps illustrated in section 4.5.  
Alice Hills analyzes some important aspects of civilian-military 
cooperation in policing and security in International Peacekeeping (Vol. 8 No. 
3) Autumn 2001. The reason why the military becomes involved in law and 
order maintenance in the first place, is usually a combination of several 
factors. Non-compliance with the peace process on the part of one or more 
belligerent/s, a general state of lawlessness, and CivPol weakness in the face 
of severe violence and instability are the most prominent ones. The military 
tends to be reluctant to engage in civilian policing. This is partly because their 
personnel are not specifically trained for it, but more importantly because the 
military is a coercive resource of the last resort and cannot be seen to fail. 
Police personnel, on the other hand, tend to be suspicious of military 
involvement in policing for a number of reasons. Lack of training in 
investigation techniques and different operations approaches are two 
prominent ones. Nevertheless, the military is usually acknowledged as a 
necessary evil in a phase of an operation. Reinforcement in terms of security 
backup and logistics is generally both necessary and welcome. The issue of 
meaningful cooperation then becomes first and foremost a question of 
establishing a functional partnership. The process leading up to that rests on 
three “critical parameters” in the words of Hills: the nature of police work, 
points of interface, and national perspectives.  
What constitutes police work is difficult to define and varies greatly 
between countries. For PSOs, however, it is generally true that police work is 
artificial and selective. It is artificial because the foreign police forces are 
fundamentally alien to the population. They also lack the local knowledge they 
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would normally rely on when policing at home. Multi-nationality reinforces 
artificiality. In addition, in PSOs the international police are assigned tasks not 
normally within their duties, such as election monitoring, local forces 
supervision, etc.  It is selective because a range of concerns determines 
exactly what situations will produce intervention by whom. Specific problems, 
national restrictions, vested interests and fear of mission creep31 are central 
examples. As a result, civil-military cooperation tends to be a practical, 
situation-bound business – not a product of high-level strategic considerations, 
planning and institutional coordination. As the above examination has 
demonstrated, this is indeed the case in Kosovo.  
Points of interface are the situations where the police lack capabilities to 
deal with a security threat that is not territorial. Riot control is a typical 
example. In Kosovo, special units of police with military status have been 
deployed to cover this ground, an issue that will be dealt with below.  
National perspectives play perhaps a greater role than many would like 
to admit. As mentioned before, what constitutes police work varies between 
countries. So does the nature of relations between police and military forces, 
and the professional standards they abide by. Therefore, views on appropriate 
task division, cooperation, professional conduct etc., tend to vary between 
national contingents in the field as well as between decision-makers of 
different nationalities. Military contingents in PSOs remain under national 
command for all practical purposes. As a rule, they arrive in theatre with plenty 
of national restrictions and a nation specific training background. Police 
officers are much less affected by national restrictions, as they are commonly 
employed by the UN and not the home government. Nevertheless, training and 
experience do vary greatly between officers of different nations. The 
importance of multi-nationality will be elaborated upon in section 5.5.3.  
All of the concerns Hills brings up are represented in Kosovo. Mitrovica 
is a prime example of the challenges pointed out by Hills.  
                                                 
31 A situation where a mission ends up taking responsibilities not specifically assigned to it, based on 
developments on the ground rather than decision. 
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The special units of police with military status deployed both to KFOR 
and UNMIK is a determined attempt to fill the conceptual space between civil 
and military security agents and address security challenges that do not fit into 
their respective regular responsibilities. (Larsen 2002: 18) Public disorder was 
acknowledged by the UN as an especially difficult security challenge in post-
conflict territories for the first time in UNSCR 1244. Accordingly, special units 
with a combination of police and military capabilities were assigned to respond 
to the heightened threat level that public disorder represents.  
KFOR’s Multinational Special Unit (MSU), is an integrated part of KFOR 
and abides by KFOR Rules of Engagement (ROE). They have been deployed 
when and where needed in a police capacity, but possess specialized skills 
and resources in crowd control, anti-terrorism, and organized crime.  
It took a considerable amount of time for the UN to deploy the UNMIK 
Special Police Units (SPU). By the time the SPUs were completely deployed, 
the immediate public order threat was largely quelled in Kosovo by an 
assertive KFOR presence and growing and consolidated UNMIK Police 
presence. (Perito 2002: 23) In the incidents of civil disorder and ethnic 
violence that have taken place, the SPUs were generally not used.  Where 
UNMIK has primacy of law and order, UNMIK Police has been reluctant to 
deploy SPUs for several reasons. The police command was from Northern 
Europe and America, societies with no culture for police forces with military 
status. The SPUs largely come from non-European countries. There has been 
considerable scepticism regarding their methods, because such forces usually 
are empowered to resort to force when they themselves deem necessary in 
order to accomplish whatever mission they are on. (Larsen 2002: 29, 32) 
There have been concerns that SPUs could resort to disproportionate violence 
against civilian crowds, potentially provoking questions as to the legitimacy of 
the entire international operation.  KFOR was not very interested in utilizing the 
resources of the SPUs in their areas of primacy, preferring instead to use the 
MSUs, which are organic to KFOR. (Perito 2002: 21-22) On the ground, the 
SPUs have ended up performing a range of security related duties that have 
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nothing to do with crowd control. UNMIK Police, not knowing quite what to do 
with the SPUs when they arrived, took the opportunity to free their own ranks 
from duties not related to law enforcement and investigation, especially 
various assignments of stationary and mobile guard duty. One exception is 
joint weapons search operations with KFOR, where SPUs often serve for 
UNMIK Police. (ibid: 21-24)  
 
5.5.2 The problem of intelligence 
Accurate information has emerged as maybe the single most important asset 
of agents in any conflict situation. Intelligence, especially military but also 
criminal, is therefore, as a general rule, national property. Even within NATO 
there is no such thing as an agency for intelligence sharing. (Otterlei 2002: 69) 
Information is exchanged on a request-basis, if at all. This is true also in 
multinational peace support operations.  
COMKFOR does not possess the necessary tools to produce 
intelligence which is consistent with operational needs. The national military 
components gather intelligence and may or may not share with military 
components of other countries. The Intelligence Unit in KFOR HQ is largely a 
forum for contact and exchange of information, as well as an arena where 
COMKFOR can communicate to the nations his priorities in the intelligence 
field. It is not an independent body that gathers intelligence for the benefit of 
the mission. (ibid: 69) That means national priorities determine what 
intelligence is produced, which creates duplication in some areas and voids in 
others. It also means national considerations determine what information 
becomes available for mission planning. (ibid: 11) Sharing military intelligence 
with civilian agencies is generally met with great reluctance by the military 
establishment, out of security considerations. 
In Kosovo this circumstance has greatly complicated cooperation in the 
security sector. Military intelligence is, as a general rule, not released to either 
police or the judicial system. The result is that on several occasions known 
culprits have gone free of prosecution, because information that could have 
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been presented as evidence in court is not accessible for the criminal 
investigation authorities. (Interviews with one official working for COMKFOR, 
and one high-ranking officer at KFOR HQ Intelligence Department; August 
2001).  
In addition, national constraints on intelligence sharing for security 
reasons can, in fact, increase rather than reduce security risks for personnel. 
Nations possessing separate bits of information may, taken together, have 
information crucial for operations. If they don’t share, efficiency is greatly 
reduced and forces can even be unnecessarily endangered. The joint 
UNMIK/KFOR Operation Groundhog described in section 5.4.2 was a pilot 
project in terms of meaningful intelligence sharing. Information from UNMIK 
and KFOR was combined in a database that enables effective monitoring and 
tracking of persons and vehicles (suspected of weapons trafficking) in the 
province as well as in the region, to facilitate interdiction by police or military 
units as appropriate. The large amount of weapons and ammunition 
confiscated during Groundhog speak of the potential benefits that intelligence 
sharing represents for efficient civil-military security cooperation. (Lutz 2002: 
54-55) 
 
5.5.3 Multinationality and National Agendas 
The questions of national agendas, priorities, restrictions, and allowances pop 
up more or less on every level of KFOR and UNMIK organizations 
respectively, and in their cooperation. Analyses and interviews speak volumes 
of small and greater obstacles – and, by all means, opportunities - created by 
the fact that anywhere between 40 and 80 nations contribute people and 
resources to the joint operation. Meanwhile, KFOR and UNMIK official 
presentations of themselves on the web and elsewhere make hardly any 
mention of nationality issues, except in general statements praising the 
consensus represented by such an extensive multi-nationality in the operation. 
This discrepancy alone indicates the sensitive nature of the issue. In the 
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following some central points as to how national agendas have affected 
UNMIK/KFOR cooperation will be made. 
On the macro level there is, on one hand, institutionalized and tight 
coordination mechanisms between KFOR and UNMIK. On the other hand, 
COMKFOR is in no position to commit either manpower or resources to joint 
initiatives. This is because each national contingent is bound by its specific set 
of national constraints on the use of the troops and abides by its national 
commander – who receives his final orders from the home capital. (Otterlei 
2002: 11)  
In an interview, an UNMIK senior official (August 2001) repeatedly 
referred to the problem of national agendas, or restrictions. KFOR contingents 
cannot be deployed or moved according to need without permission from its 
capital. Many times commanders in the field have been prevented from issuing 
the appropriate orders pending a go-ahead from home. Another aspect of 
multi-nationality was that contingents from different countries had different 
training and different professional cultures. There can be, and frequently is, 
very diverging views regarding task distribution for example between police 
and military forces in different states, and regarding what are proper 
responses to different problems. Additionally, the composition of qualifications 
and competence of the personnel did not correspond with needs in the field, 
but with whatever the headquarters in the capitals decided to send. The result 
for UNMIK Police was, for example, that there could be 4000 excellent traffic 
police in the field, and none with forensics expertise or even competence. For 
the military a consistent problem has been that personnel sent to fill positions 
within intelligence have no previous experience or training in intelligence. In 
KFOR 5 (2001), as many as 34% of the staff in the Intelligence Unit had never 
previously worked with intelligence or received prior training in this. The 
mission has been forced to provide on-the-job training, for which there is no 
program and no resources in the organization. (Wilson 2002: 38)  
In reality, operational cooperation can be organized on brigade level at 
the most, because KFOR is strictly organized around brigade fixation. Each 
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KFOR national contingent arrives in peace operations with their own 
equipment. Even within NATO states do not have compatible military 
equipment and communications systems. UNMIK employs and pays its 
international staff on an individual basis, which means personnel are ultimately 
loyal to UNMIK – not the home government. This is true also for police 
personnel, even if national bureaucracies naturally assist UNMIK in the 
recruitment process. The SPUs are in a different position, however, since they 
are organized as military units. The consequence for cooperation is obviously 
that it is extremely complicated to institutionalize it operationally. Any joint 
operation requires clearance from numerous agencies within and outside of 
Kosovo. The practical solution has been to conduct operational cooperation 
basically on a local level, and mostly on a case-by-case basis. 
On the micro level language remains a huge obstacle for cooperation, 
indeed for the individual organizations. Although English proficiency is a 
required qualification for international personnel in Kosovo, states do not 
always find they have enough adequate English speaking personnel to offer 
and end up sending staff that in fact cannot use English as a working 
language. The SPUs are exempt from the English proficiency requirement that 
applies to all other UNMIK personnel. 
 
5.6 The nature of KFOR – UNMIK security cooperation 
The second research question posed initially was “What is the nature of 
KFOR-UNMIK security cooperation?” 
Based on the above examination of cooperation patterns on the 
institutional and operational levels, it appears the dominant characteristics are 
task division and reactiveness. KFOR and UNMIK have largely cooperated by 
concentrating on separate, but mutually supportive tasks. Back-up has been 
the most common form for assistance when this has been called for by one 
part, and joint operations have been exceptional but generally effective. Efforts 
have been concentrated in issue areas which have first proved themselves to 
be especially threatening to the security situation. Prevention and preemptive 
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action seem to be less prevalent and to a much lower degree subject for active 
KFOR-UNMIK cooperation. Flexibility and concern for the daily changing 
environment appear as central features of KFOR and UNMIK security 
cooperation. 
 
5.7 Chapter summary 
The above examination identified several features of the KFOR and UNMIK 
organizations as well as their interaction that influence security cooperation. 
KFOR stands out as a composition of many organizations, each with 
their own set of goals and sub-goals and SOPs – although the ideals and aims 
tend to be very similar and never in direct conflict. Its military nature implies 
clear command lines. Its multi-national composition means the supreme 
commander does not in reality dispose of the national units. UNMIK appears 
as a more unified organization. Its civilian nature implies openness and soft 
approaches. Its multi-national composition rules out unambiguous command 
lines, as this would have drawn unwanted national attention to the distribution 
of senior positions in the system. The differences inherent in a military versus 
a civilian establishment appear to contribute to hamper effective cooperation. 
Priorities and procedures differ, as do perspectives of time and scope of 
operations. There is a difference between exit and end state orientations. 
Specifically, KFOR maintains a strict focus on ensuring a “safe and secure 
environment” while UNMIK aims to “re-establish civilian law and order”. While 
it is obvious that these two to a huge extent go hand in hand and depend on 
each other, it is nevertheless true that KFOR’s mission could be accomplished 
sooner than UNMIK’s and thus allow for KFOR withdrawal. In the general 
absence of violence, the work to rebuild comprehensive executive and judicial 
law enforcement structures could carry on without military back-up. This 
scenario is, however, hypothetical as of yet. 
Operationally, security cooperation bears the characteristics of being 
carried out somewhat reluctantly as a matter of duty and necessity, on an ad 
hoc basis rather than by routine, and preferably by way of task division and 
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coordination rather than by joint initiatives. On the operational level, the civil-
military dimension comes strongly into play when it comes to the intelligence 
sector. The military establishment craves discretion, but the civilian 
establishment needs to bring intelligence into the open in court processes. The 
result is that intelligence from the military generally is not shared, even when 
it’s crucial for effective policing and prosecution. 
In addition to procedural and institutional differences between KFOR 
and UNMIK, some other issues pose obstacles to cooperation. The question of 
involving military units in law enforcement is fraught with dilemmas. While the 
security situation may call for heavier engagement than ordinary police forces 
can normally provide, it is nevertheless controversial to apply military 
capabilities in the civilian crime scene. It could call into question the legitimacy 
of an entire peace support operation. The question of multi-nationality causes 
a host of restraints and obstacles to coordination. It is an especially delicate 
problem because it has to do with states’ roles in the international system. The 
task at hand is virtually never decisive for role and resource distribution in a 
peace support operation. 
Nevertheless, to be fair it must be said that civil-military security 
cooperation in Kosovo is more comprehensive and more functional than what 
has been the case in many previous peace support operations. In addition, 
there can be no doubt that the security situation in Kosovo has dramatically 
improved following the efforts of the international presence.  
On this background it is now time to consider whether success criteria 
have any influence on civil-military security cooperation in Kosovo, and 
whether this examination has provided any insights that may point to fresh 
paths to further enhance cooperation. 
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6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The project of this thesis has been to investigate the following questions: 
What  are the success criteria applied by KFOR and UNMIK? 
What is the nature of the KFOR/UNMIK cooperation in the field of security? 
Do the answers to those two questions suggest potential for improvement of 
the cooperation should streamlined, uniform success criteria exist? 
So far the dissertation has concentrated on many factors that contribute 
to answering the two first questions, providing the basis upon which this 
chapter aims to answer the third. Before turning to that, a summary of the 
findings and their implications for the research questions is appropriate. 
Finally, a critical assessment will be given of the value of the thesis in the 
larger context. 
 
6.1 What is the nature of KFOR/UNMIK security cooperation? 
Chapter 5 emphasized the difference between institutionalized and operational 
security cooperation for the KFOR/UNMIK relation. 
On the command level, there is a tight and well-organized pattern of 
cooperation and coordination. This is represented by regular meetings 
between COMKFOR and SRSG, as well as an active participation by officers 
from each organization in offices, councils, and boards of the other 
organization – especially in the security sector. The general perception seems 
to be that cooperation on this level works satisfactory. 
On the operational level, practical cooperation tends to be a product of 
day-to-day concerns and necessities. Most joint operations are planned and 
conducted on brigade level and below, thus pertaining to a region, town, 
neighborhood or other limited geographic locus. Joint operations are also 
overwhelmingly reactive, that is, planned and conducted for the purpose of 
solving a problem, responding to a challenge, or meeting a need – they are 
rarely preventive and/or have a long-term perspective. It must be assumed 
that this model works well, as most operations are branded successful in terms 
of accomplishing the mission for each situation. 
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Between the command and operational level there should be, according 
to most common organization models, lines of command or at least guidelines. 
The intentions set forth for the mission as a whole should, ideally, be 
communicated to the operational instances which should in turn direct their 
efforts primarily towards those targets. Such an intermediate level would be 
where doctrines, perhaps some general SOPs, and success criteria more 
specific and situation-bound than those proposed in the mandate, would be 
found. A critical assessment of the international operation in Kosovo suggests, 
however, that this level is virtually non-existent. Why this apparent void in the 
organizational pyramid? The findings suggest that national agendas is a factor 
that figures high on the list of reasons why coordination and cooperation are 
conducted in a sub-optimal way, despite ambitions to the contrary across the 
operation and the capitals. Political influence on the international arena, 
volume of contributions, domestic agendas, and national priorities vis-à-vis 
other states are all elements that count in this equation. For example, it is 
obvious that the Quint in reality can control KFOR activities much more than 
COMKFOR and the HQ, although the Quint is formally subordinated 
COMKFOR in the KFOR organization. The implication is, of course, that 
whatever is discussed and agreed upon at the highest level between 
COMKFOR and the SRSG must be in accordance with Quint consensus. 
Consequently, it is hoped that each brigade commander nation is able to 
persuade the other states in its sector to participate, if and when decisions are 
made as to joint operations or altered organizational structures.   
Another factor that seems to complicate cooperation and coordination, is 
a factual difference in military and civilian working methods and agendas. In 
this case it is especially an issue for policing. The question of military 
contributions to law enforcement, and intelligence sharing illustrate this. 
Military instances regularly refuse to provide intelligence that is often the only, 
and crucial, evidence against a suspect to police and prosecutors, thus 
preventing judicial authorities to take him or her to court and make a conviction 
within the due process of law. Instead military units have opted to keep known 
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criminals under confinements outside of judicial processes and defined the 
practice as “maintaining a safe and secure environment.” Civilian observers 
have interpreted these circumstances as proof that the military has no 
business engaging in law enforcement. Military sources reply they would like 
nothing better than to give up law enforcement, but that the inadequate 
resources of the civilian agency leave them no choice as long as they are 
responsible for maintaining security. Good arguments back each of these 
positions, but do not reconcile them. 
 
6.2 Are success criteria relevant for the cooperation? 
To a certain extent; yes.  
It is significant that the civilian and military wings of the operation work 
under one, identical mandate. Both declare its mission goal to be mandate 
fulfillment. That is indeed the reason why this dissertation has seen mandate 
fulfillment as a central success criterion, despite the inherent weaknesses of 
such an approach discussed in chapter 3.  
It is also significant, however, to look at the content of each 
organization’s understanding of when the mandate is delivered. UNMIK says 
the aim is peace, reconciliation and a functioning civil society in which all 
people of Kosovo can live together under a comprehensive regime of 
autonomy within the context of Yugoslavia. KFOR says their aim is to 
withdraw, to make itself superfluous. This will be a reality when KFOR has 
restored security to such a degree that UNMIK is able to function properly for 
the establishment of all other requirements of UNSCR 1244.  
The statements point to two important aspects of success criteria and 
cooperation: KFOR and UNMIK do acknowledge their common purpose and 
duty, but they have different perspectives on the “hows” and “whens”. UNMIK 
is process oriented. While financial concerns do force UNMIK to make tangible 
progress in order not to wear out donor motivation, their time perspective is 
unfixed. They are in Kosovo for the long run. KFOR is result oriented. 
Constantly referring to “such a time when forces withdrawal can be 
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effectuated”, KFOR sends a strong signal that their time frame is not, a priori, 
unfixed. Theoretically speaking, KFOR departure time could conceivably come 
before UNMIK has accomplished all of its civil society and rebuilding tasks. If 
the security situation is adequate both for UNMIK and for the citizens of 
Kosovo, KFOR has delivered and rendered itself unemployed. In practice, 
however, that is not a realistic scenario, and it is certainly not within immediate 
reach considering the persistent security problems all over Kosovo. The 
difficulties posed by this discrepancy are further exacerbated by the fact that 
the mandate does not envisage an end state for Kosovo. That leaves 
everyone in Kosovo without a definite reference point in time and development 
for where efforts are heading. 
The difference in outlook and time frames represented by these 
diverging success perceptions hamper cooperation in at least one 
considerable respect. It can make the partners reluctant to enter a committed 
relationship on the operational level, and the findings do indeed suggest that 
this is the case. The ad hoc, reactive nature of almost all joint operations more 
than indicate an unwillingness to institutionalize cooperation on the ground. 
The military wants to avoid any obligations that could possibly make UNMIK 
and Kosovo more dependent on their presence and thus delay KFOR’s exit. 
The civilian agencies are more ambiguous, recognizing their greater 
dependency on military backup while wishing to conduct more of the security 
work independently.  
When it comes to operational success criteria, the meaning of which 
was explained in chapter 3, it has proved very difficult to find statements. Lists 
of responsibilities do exist, but they are generally just extracts of parts of the 
UNSCR 1244. For joint operations, success criteria seem to simply be the 
accomplishment of the given task, such as “seizing illegal weapons”, or 
“arresting contraband”. In these situations units and persons from both 
operations work together as one and for the same, concrete goal.  
KFOR and UNMIK appear to have partly the same and partly separate 
success criteria, but at no point do the differences seem to be in direct conflict. 
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The mandate and each organization’s interpretation of it do facilitate 
cooperation. The differences in outlook and priorities create some obstacles.  
 
6.3 Can success criteria be a factor in enhancing civil-military 
cooperation in Kosovo? 
Given the above summary, the answer would be a very cautious “yes”.  
More identical and explicit aims, both in the short and the long run, 
should produce incentives for more institutionalized, operational cooperation in 
areas of common interests. That in turn would ensure increased economy of 
effort – more security out of every dollar, so to speak – as many aspects of 
operations would be pre-established and ready to run. A common SOP 
generally saves much time and resources in planning and deployment. 
On the other hand, there are elements that arguably cause more serious 
obstacles to civil-military cooperation than do non-identical success criteria. 
Prominent among these are national agendas and restrictions, and deep-
seated differences between military and civilian approaches to the same tasks. 
These are purely practical problems that could be solved if given the 
appropriate attention and effort by nations and organizations.  When such an 
effort does not materialize, one must assume that other considerations have a 
higher priority with the many agents involved. Numerous other interests are 
given weight as well, sometimes more weight than the requirements of the 
conflict in question. 
 
6.4 Critical assessment of the value of the dissertation  
The meaning of common success criteria have appeared to have less 
influence on KFOR-UNMIK security cooperation than elements like national 
agendas and diverging working methods and priorities.  
The importance of nationality has been extensively documented in 
evaluations and analyses of peace operations, and is by now a somewhat 
trivial point to make. Likewise are differences between military and civilian 
agencies well mapped and analyzed. In many ways is this dissertation 
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therefore merely one more call for greater coherence between sponsors and 
between agents, and for a shift of focus from self to problem in peace 
operations. The problems of national agendas and differences in civilian and 
military problem-solving approaches loom large in most evaluations and 
analyses of most peace support operations. It must be assumed that they are 
well known to both decision-makers and field personnel. When very little 
seems to be done to overcome these problems, it is an indication that politics 
get in the way of practicalities. Very rarely do states let the needs of the 
collective take precedence over national priorities. In this paradigm it may be 
valuable to further consider the potential operational benefits of standardized 
sets of goals and success criteria, even if improvements in other areas 
perhaps would make a greater difference. Such other areas may be no-go 
territory for political reasons. If this is indeed the case, then decision-makers 
would be wise to look into ways of enhancing operations which can be 
followed. 
On the other hand, the findings indicate that a lack of standardized 
success criteria may actually be an asset. Where civilian-military cooperation 
is comprehensively employed on an operational level, results tend to be good 
and solid. In this perspective ambiguity and general formulations seem to allow 
greater flexibility down the ranks. The different levels of the operation thus 
possess more freedom to act quickly and assertively when presented with 
challenges. They do not have to spend time and energy consulting various 
SOPs and offices. What makes both joint operations and flexibility possible in 
Kosovo is above all a strong mandate in terms of enforcement. There is no 
question about the legitimacy of the use of force, and there is no question 
about the law enforcement competencies of the civilian and military agencies. 
This precludes the creation of a wide enforcement gap, endless discussions 
about mission creep, and ultimately non-action. Civil-military cooperation is an 
obligation. The international presence enjoys a strong enforcement mandate. 
Few detailed instructions are given. All of this facilitates flexible, functional 
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cooperation on an operational level, which in turn has produced tangible 
results on the ground.  
Whether flexibility or economy offers greater advantages, is a question 
that demands further research to answer. Hence, the potential of common 
success criteria to promote and enhance civil-military security cooperation in 
Kosovo can not be absolutely determined on the background of this 
dissertation. 
There is one factor upon which success depends that this dissertation 
has not dealt with, simply because it falls outside of the selected parameters. 
The fact that no end state is stipulated, and that the international community 
firmly asserts Kosovo’s status as a province in Yugoslavia, is fundamentally 
out of sync with the aspirations of the majority of Kosovo’s population. 
Segments of the Kosovo population boycott the international efforts in protest 
against the mandate; Serbs because they think the entire operation is biased 
against their interests, and Albanians because they think the operation is 
biased against their perceived right to independence. This suggests that the 
chief obstacle to mandate fulfillment  - success - is non-compliance. The 
possible implication of such a conclusion is of course that this whole 
dissertation is worthless. UNMIK and KFOR could have a perfect, optimally 
efficient cooperation and produce absolute security for all Kosovars, and still 
not be successful because non-compliance would rule out mandate fulfillment. 
Such a dramatic assertion calls for moderation. While compliance undoubtedly 
is a prerequisite for a lasting solution along the guidelines of the UN, there is 
ample evidence that compliance increases with improved personal security. In 
the absence of fear, moving on becomes possible if not right out easy. 
Therefore, a comprehensive security regime is crucial for mandate fulfillment 
in any analytical paradigm. For Kosovo it is true that KFOR and UNMIK need 
each other to provide different elements of that regime; neither can go it alone.    
The big, important question regarding peace support operations is 
whether international intervention can ever create trust and love where lack 
thereof caused a violent conflict. So far, nothing suggests that it can. The 
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follow-up question must be if people in conflict at a minimum can be helped to 
reach a tolerance to each other, and if that may be enough to at least end the 
acute conflict. Perhaps so – some peace operations can show cautiously 
optimistic signs that accept, however grudging, in many ways has suppressed 
violence. Also in Kosovo interethnic violence has decreased. 
The last 10-15 years the world has been plagued by small and medium 
scale conflicts that have caused tremendous human suffering and material 
losses. The developments in the international arena do not indicate that 
intervention for conflict resolution is on the return, quite the contrary. There are 
plenty of solid, moral arguments for trying to take concerted international 
action in the face of conflict, minimizing human suffering being perhaps the 
most prominent one. In the much more cynical dimension of realpolitik there 
can also be found good reasons for intervention, for example prevention of 
spillover effects and refugee flows out of a conflict territory. At the end of the 
day, however, the only actors empowered to really put an end to violent 
conflict are the belligerents themselves. In want of their will and determination 
to move on, conflict will prevail. 
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ANNEX 1: UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1244 
Resolution 1244 (1999)  
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting, on 10 June 1999  
 
The Security Council, 
Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and the primary 
responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, 
Recalling its resolutions 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998, 1199 (1998) of 23 September 1998, 1203 
(1998) of 24 October 1998 and 1239 (1999) of 14 May 1999, 
Regretting that there has not been full compliance with the requirements of these resolutions, 
Determined to resolve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and 
to provide for the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes, 
Condemning all acts of violence against the Kosovo population as well as all terrorist acts by any party, 
Recalling the statement made by the Secretary-General on 9 April 1999, expressing concern at the 
humanitarian tragedy taking place in Kosovo, 
Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety, 
Recalling the jurisdiction and the mandate of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
Welcoming the general principles on a political solution to the Kosovo crisis adopted on 6 May 1999 
(S/1999/516, annex 1 to this resolution) and welcoming also the acceptance by the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia of the principles set forth in points 1 to 9 of the paper presented in Belgrade on 2 June 1999 
(S/1999/649, annex 2 to this resolution), and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's agreement to that 
paper, 
Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act 
and annex 2, 
Reaffirming the call in previous resolutions for substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration 
for Kosovo, 
Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to international peace and 
security, 
Determined to ensure the safety and security of international personnel and the implementation by all 
concerned of their responsibilities under the present resolution, and acting for these purposes under 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
1. Decides that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be based on the general principles in 
annex 1 and as further elaborated in the principles and other required elements in annex 2;  
2. Welcomes the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles and other 
required elements referred to in paragraph 1 above, and demands the full cooperation of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in their rapid implementation;  
3. Demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an immediate and verifiable 
end to violence and repression in Kosovo, and begin and complete verifiable phased withdrawal 
from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable, with 
which the deployment of the international security presence in Kosovo will be synchronized;  
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4. Confirms that after the withdrawal an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serb military and police 
personnel will be permitted to return to Kosovo to perform the functions in accordance with 
annex 2;  
5. Decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of international civil and 
security presences, with appropriate equipment and personnel as required, and welcomes the 
agreement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to such presences;  
6. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, in consultation with the Security Council, a Special 
Representative to control the implementation of the international civil presence, and further 
requests the Secretary-General to instruct his Special Representative to coordinate closely with 
the international security presence to ensure that both presences operate towards the same 
goals and in a mutually supportive manner;  
7. Authorizes Member States and relevant international organizations to establish the international 
security presence in Kosovo as set out in point 4 of annex 2 with all necessary means to fulfil its 
responsibilities under paragraph 9 below;  
8. Affirms the need for the rapid early deployment of effective international civil and security 
presences to Kosovo, and demands that the parties cooperate fully in their deployment;  
9. Decides that the responsibilities of the international security presence to be deployed and acting 
in Kosovo will include:  
a. Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary enforcing a ceasefire, 
and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return into Kosovo of Federal and 
Republic military, police and paramilitary forces, except as provided in point 6 of annex 
2;  
b. Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovo Albanian 
groups as required in paragraph 15 below;  
c. Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return 
home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a transitional administration 
can be established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered;  
d. Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can take 
responsibility for this task;  
e. Supervising demining until the international civil presence can, as appropriate, take over 
responsibility for this task;  
f. Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work of the international 
civil presence;  
g. Conducting border monitoring duties as required;  
h. Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the international civil 
presence, and other international organizations;  
10. Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international organizations, to 
establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration 
for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and 
overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure 
conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo;  
11. Decides that the main responsibilities of the international civil presence will include:  
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a. Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and 
self-government in Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2 and of the Rambouillet 
accords (S/1999/648);  
b. Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as required;  
c. Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic 
and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, including the holding of 
elections;  
d. Transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative responsibilities 
while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of Kosovo's local provisional 
institutions and other peace-building activities;  
e. Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status, taking into 
account the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);  
f. In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo's provisional 
institutions to institutions established under a political settlement;  
g. Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic reconstruction;  
h. Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian organizations, humanitarian 
and disaster relief aid;  
i. Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and meanwhile 
through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo;  
j. Protecting and promoting human rights;  
k. Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their 
homes in Kosovo;  
12. Emphasizes the need for coordinated humanitarian relief operations, and for the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia to allow unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations 
and to cooperate with such organizations so as to ensure the fast and effective delivery of 
international aid;  
13. Encourages all Member States and international organizations to contribute to economic and 
social reconstruction as well as to the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, and 
emphasizes in this context the importance of convening an international donors' conference, 
particularly for the purposes set out in paragraph 11 (g) above, at the earliest possible date;  
14. Demands full cooperation by all concerned, including the international security presence, with 
the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia;  
15. Demands that the KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups end immediately all offensive 
actions and comply with the requirements for demilitarization as laid down by the head of the 
international security presence in consultation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General;  
16. Decides that the prohibitions imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1160 (1998) shall not apply 
to arms and related matériel for the use of the international civil and security presences;  
17. Welcomes the work in hand in the European Union and other international organizations to 
develop a comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the region 
affected by the Kosovo crisis, including the implementation of a Stability Pact for South Eastern 
Europe with broad international participation in order to further the promotion of democracy, 
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economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation;  
18. Demands that all States in the region cooperate fully in the implementation of all aspects of this 
resolution;  
19. Decides that the international civil and security presences are established for an initial period of 
12 months, to continue thereafter unless the Security Council decides otherwise;  
20. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular intervals on the 
implementation of this resolution, including reports from the leaderships of the international civil 
and security presences, the first reports to be submitted within 30 days of the adoption of this 
resolution;  
21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.  
Annex 1 
Statement by the Chairman 
on the conclusion of the meeting of the G-8 Foreign Ministers 
held at the Petersberg Centre on 6 May 1999  
The G-8 Foreign Ministers adopted the following general principles on the political solution to the Kosovo 
crisis: 
• Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo;  
• Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and paramilitary forces;  
• Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and 
adopted by the United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of the common 
objectives;  
• Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by the Security Council of 
the United Nations to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in 
Kosovo;  
• The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and unimpeded access to 
Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations;  
• A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement 
providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet 
accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the KLA;  
• Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region.  
Annex 2  
Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move towards a resolution of the Kosovo 
crisis: 
1. An immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.  
2. Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a 
rapid timetable.  
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3. Deployment in Kosovo under United Nations auspices of effective international civil and security 
presences, acting as may be decided under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of guaranteeing 
the achievement of common objectives.  
4. The international security presence with substantial North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
participation must be deployed under unified command and control and authorized to establish a 
safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all 
displaced persons and refugees.  
5. Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil presence 
under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia, to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. The interim 
administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the 
development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a 
peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.  
6. After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be permitted to 
return to perform the following functions:  
• Liaison with the international civil mission and the international security 
presence;  
• Marking/clearing minefields;  
• Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites;  
• Maintaining a presence at key border crossings.  
7. Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision of the Office of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and unimpeded access to Kosovo by 
humanitarian aid organizations.  
8. A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement 
providing for substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet 
accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of UCK. Negotiations 
between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic 
self-governing institutions.  
9. A comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region. 
This will include the implementation of a stability pact for South-Eastern Europe with broad 
international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, 
stability and regional cooperation.  
10. Suspension of military activity will require acceptance of the principles set forth above in addition 
to agreement to other, previously identified, required elements, which are specified in the 
footnote below.(1) A military-technical agreement will then be rapidly concluded that would, 
among other things, specify additional modalities, including the roles and functions of 
Yugoslav/Serb personnel in Kosovo:  
Withdrawal  
• Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule and 
delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be withdrawn;  
Returning Personnel  
• Equipment associated with returning personnel;  
• Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities;  
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• Timetable for their return;  
• Delineation of their geographical areas of operation;  
• Rules governing their relationship to the international security presence and the 
international civil mission.  
Notes 
1. Other required elements:  
• A rapid and precise timetable for withdrawals, meaning, e.g., seven days to complete withdrawal 
and air defence weapons withdrawn outside a 25 kilometre mutual safety zone within 48 hours;  
• Return of personnel for the four functions specified above will be under the supervision of the 
international security presence and will be limited to a small agreed number (hundreds, not 
thousands);  
• Suspension of military activity will occur after the beginning of verifiable withdrawals;  
• The discussion and achievement of a military-technical agreement shall not extend the 
previously determined time for completion of withdrawals.  
 
 
(KFOR Online Homepage [online]: http://www.nato.int/kfor/welcome.html) 
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ANNEX 2: MAP OVER KOSOVO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNMIK Homepage [online]: http://www.unmikonline.org/ 
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ANNEX 3: KFOR DETAILS. 
MNB (C): 
 
The United Kingdom contributes the following units: HQ 7th Armoured 
Brigade, Royal Scots Dragoon Guards (SCOTS DG), 2nd Battalion Royal 
Regiment of Fusiliers, 19 Field Regiment Royal Artillery, 32 Engineer 
Regiment, 5 General Support Medical Regiment, 207 Signal Squadron, 111 
Provost Company Royal Military Police  - a total of 3900 personnel. They are 
stationed in the provinces of Pristina and Podijevo, center and north of the 
AOR.  
Other participating nations: The Czech republic, with1 Reconnaissance 
Company of 175 personnel. They are stationed in Shaykofc (Shajkovac), in the 
north. Tasks include border control together with a UK company and 
responsibility for the Area of Operation (AO) centred around Orlane. Finland 
contributes FINBAT of 820 personnel, created specifically for OJG. They are 
stationed in Lipljan and are responsible for Area of Operation (AO) centered 
around Lipljan, for providing a secure environment and humanitarian 
assistance. Latvia participates with one unit of police to the Multinational 
Police Company (see below). Norway sends NORBN II of 980 personnel, 
created specifically for KFOR. They are stationed in Kosovo Polje and 
responsible for the Area of Operation (AO) centered around Kosovo Polje and 
Obilic. Russia has 200 troops in a very small territory near Kosovo Polje.  
Slovakia with an engineer platoon of 40 personnel sorts under the Austrian 
contingent. They are stationed in Suva Reka and perform demining and road 
construction.  Sweden contributes the Battalion KS 05 from the Norrbotten 
regiment of 750 personnel, s stationed in Hajvali/Ajvalija just south of Pristina. 
They are responsible for the Area of Operation centered on Gracanica, for 
maintaining public order and safety of all inhabitants throughout the AOR, and 
provide a secure environment and support humanitarian assistance. The MNB 
(C) runs a Multinational Police Company (MNP) which includes 104 officers 
from the (UK) Royal Military Police, (UK) Royal Air Force Police, and 
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Norwegian, Finnish, Swedish and Latvian Police. Services provided by them 
include a special investigation group, weapons and intelligence section, a 
general policing platoon, a traffic section, an escort section and an operations 
platoon. It has not been possible to identify practical contributions by this 
specific unit in actual operations. 
 
MNB (N): 
The French contribution consist of 6 battalions of a total of around 4500 
soldiers, and a unit of the French Gendarmerie (around 130 gendarmes). They 
are divided into the command and support battalion (BCT), the motorized rifle 
battalion (BIMOTO), including an armoured squadron (GTB), the mechanized 
infantry battalion (BIMECA), the army helicopters battalion (BATALAT), the 
engineer battalion (BATGEN), and the logistic battalion (BATLOG).  
Other participating nations: Belgium, with1 battalion of approximately 
800 personnel, stationed in Leposavic. Responsibilities include peace 
agreement implementation, border control, law and order, maintaining the 
freedom of movement for KFOR and civilians, establishing a stable and secure 
environment, explosive ordnance division (EOD) operations, assistance to 
reconstruction, and humanitarian assistance. Denmark with1 mechanized 
infantry battalion of app. 700 personnel stationed near Mitrovica. 
Responsibilities are peace agreement implementation, border control, law and 
order, maintaining the freedom of movement for KFOR and civilians, 
establishing a stable and secure environment, EOD operations, medical 
assistance to local population, assistance to UNMIK in a winterization 
program, and conducting safety and health assessments to municipal 
buildings. Luxemburg, with 30 personnel who operate under the command of 
the Belgian battalion and share its specifications. Morocco contributes 400 
medical personnel and soldiers, running a hospital for the benefit of the local 
population in south Vucitrn/Vushtri. Services include a dental office, 
radiography, an ultrasound scanner, and heavy surgery equipment. ......Russia 
sends1 company, the 14th Company Team of the 14th Battle Group of the 
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331st Airborne Regiment, 492 personnel which is stationed in Srbica. Their 
responsibilities are peace agreement implementation, border control, law and 
order, maintain the freedom of movement for KFOR and civilians, establish a 
stable and secure environment, EOD operations, medical assistance to local 
population, assistance to UNMIK in winterization program, conducting safety 
and health assessments to municipal buildings. United Arab Emirates has 1 
battalion of 1240 personnel, including 60 Jordanian soldiers. In addition they 
send around 400 medical personnel running a hospital for the local population 
of the Vucitrn area. They are all stationed in Vucitrn. 
 
MNB (E): 
The United States contributes these units: 131st Mobile Public Affairs 
Detachment, 1-30th Infantry Battalion (Mechanized), 1-32nd Infantry Battalion, 
2-14th Infantry Battalion, 10th Logistical Task Force, 10th Signal, 10th Soldier 
Support Battalion, 1-10th Aviation, 110th Military Intelligence, 27th Engineer 
Battalion, 3-6 Field Artillery, 229th AHR, 490th Civil Affairs, 504th Military 
Police, 9th Psychological Operations, Task Force Med Falcon.  
Other participating states in MNB (E) are: Greece, with one Mechanics 
Battalion. Lithuania, with one task force. Poland contributes its 5th 
Mountainous Infantry Battalion.  Russia sends one battalion, its 13th Tactical 
Group. Ukraine forms a part of the Polish battalion but has a national 
commander. It contributes a helicopter unit as well as a Staff Operational 
Group and a National Support Element. That includes engineering, medical, 
communications and technical support services. Ukraine also sends one unit 
of military police. The contingent totals 267 personnel. 
The nations in MNB (E) do not supply detailed information as to their 
personnel composition and number, deployment locations within the AOR, and 
specific responsibilities within the Brigade Mission Statement on the KFOR 
web site. 
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MNB (W): 
The Italian contingent counts 4114 personnel organized into the 
following units: HQ "FOLGORE" Brigade, Brigade Combat Support, Brigade 
Logistic Battalion "FOLGORE", 2 Battle Groups: Lagunari "SERENISSIMA" 
Regiment Task Force "FALCO" and 183rd Parachutist "NEMBO", Regiment 
Task Force "AQUILA", 132nd Tank Regiment Task Force "SAURO", 4th 
"Genova" Cavalry Group Task Force "SAURO", 132nd Artillery Regiment, 
Group "ARIETE" Task Force "ISTRICE",1st Signal Regiment, 21th Combat 
Engineering Regiment - Btn "TIMAVO", Task Force "ASTRO", 21th Air Cavalry 
Battalion - Btn "ORSA MAGGIORE", Italian Military Field Hospital Unit, 9th 
Parachutist Assault Regiment Special Forces Detachment,  and 1st Air Force 
Detachment (Manning Djakovica Airport).  
Other nations are Argentina, which contributes one field hospital 
catering to KFOR members and locals, and one Engineering Company 
working with reconstruction. They total 60 personnel. Portugal has withdrawn 
the military unit they initially supplied and now contributes a group of 20 
Theatre Staff personnel. Spain sends one task force ”Tizona”, created for the 
KFOR, consisting of one infantry, one cavalry and one support unit 
(medical/engineering staff) of a total of about 900 personnel. MNB(W) also has 
an EOD.   
 
MNB (S): 
The German contribution is the 13th Armoured Division, which breaks down to 
at least two combat units (one is German/Turkish), a medical regiment, the 
entire CIMIC unit of the brigade, an engineering company, one reconstruction 
group (German/Bulgarian) and a military police unit – a total of 5045 
personnel.  
Other participating nations are: Austria with one armoured infantry 
battalion created just for the KFOR, of 480 troops. They are stationed in Suva 
Reka and perform checkpoints and patrols, as well as peace agreement 
implementation, freedom of movement for KFOR and civilians, and law and 
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order tasks. Other tasks include EOD services, reconstruction and 
humanitarian assistance. Azerbaijan contributes one motorized platoon of 34 
men who serve within the Turkish group, although with a national commander. 
Bulgaria sends one Engineer platoon of 34 men who serve within the German 
engineer battalion. They are stationed at Suva Reka. Its tasks are 
development and construction of military camps, reconstruction and 
maintenance of destroyed buildings, and protection of camps including 
surveillance measures. Georgia sends one motorized platoon of 34 personnel 
who serve within the Turkish Mechanized Battalion, although with a national 
commander. Slovakia contributes one Engineer Battalion of 40 personnel who 
serve within the Austrian contingent, although with a national commander. 
They are stationed at Suva Reka and perform demining and road construction. 
Switzerland has sent one Specialized Army Company of 160 personnel which 
serves within AUCOM (Austria). They are stationed in Suva Reka. Theirs is a 
support unit that is responsible for water supply, CIMIC, military police, 
transport, and medical services. Turkey contributes one Mechanized Battalion 
of 940 personnel. They are stationed in Prizren and perform border control, 
patrols and checkpoints, search operations, and monitoring of two quarters of 
Prizren. In addition they assist with limited building of schools, assistance to 
the UNICEF, and some medical services to locals. Russia is also on the list of 
contributing nations, but with no further details. 
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ANNEX 4: UNMIK DETAILS. 
The SRSG, the PDSRSG and the DSRSGs together form the Executive 
Committee that meets on a daily basis and functions as a valuable 
coordination mechanism. It is in turn assisted by the Joint Planning Group 
(JPG). The JPG has promoted and enhanced cross-component coordination in 
a wide range of policy and operational issues. It has established a working 
group to develop a strategic plan for UNMIK, consisting of planners from all 
four pillars, from UNMIK Police, KFOR and the Office of the SRSG. 
(S/1999/1250 II D) 
Administrative Departments, of which there were 20, run the different 
public services according to their respective competencies. Note that the 
Interim Administration through these departments assumed every single task 
within public services, from emergency rebuilding of infrastructure to 
environmental protection programs. Listing every effort would be as 
overwhelming as it would be pointless. The ADs are headed by one UNMIK 
representative and one local, positions being allocated to reflect the ethnic 
composition of Kosovo. (UNMIK DPI 2000; 4)  
 
Regions: 
Pristina is the capital of Kosovo and UNMIK Police here has functioned 
as the model for the other regional police centers. It also functions as the 
control center for all police stations throughout Kosovo, handling all incoming 
calls for police services and coordinating the police response over radio. The 
Pristina Station introduced special units such as Murder Squad, Serious Crime 
Squad and Regional Intelligence Unit, which are now integral parts of every 
regional HQ. The main challenges of HQ Pristina are organized crime, ethnic 
intimidation including house evictions and occupations, and overcrowding due 
to the huge influx of people from the rural districts after the conflict of ‘98-’99. 
(UNMIK Police Annual Report 2000; 14) 
Mitrovica is the most troubled region of Kosovo. Problems include 
clashes, riots, ordinary crimes, and attacks on UNMIK, KFOR and the local 
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Kosovo Police Service (KPS) personnel. Over 1000 UNMIK police officers are 
stationed here in 6 stations and substations. Due to the security situation, 
UNMIK Police has not yet taken over policing primacy here32. Investigations 
are entirely UNMIK’s responsibility, while overall security remains KFOR 
responsibility. (UNMIK Police Annual Report 2000; 15-16; S/2002/436 III B) 
See section 5.3.4 for a comprehensive account of Mitrovica. 
Pec borders with Albania and was a hotspot during the war. The main 
security challenge is now smuggling of everything from weapons to consumer 
goods from Albania and Montenegro. A stronger cooperation between KFOR 
and UNMIK Police introduced in November 2000 regarding the Kulina pass 
has improved records of smuggling and tax evasion here. Pec hosts two 
Serbian Orthodox monasteries, which require 24 hours protection by KFOR 
troops and mobile UNMIK Police patrols. Due to its proximity to Albania, Pec 
was a center for UCK in the days of conflict and remains a region of stronger-
than-usual political activism. Demonstrations and politically motivated crime 
occur with regularity and pose region-specific problems in the general security 
situation. Pec region has 5 main police stations. (UNMIK Police Annual Report 
2000; 16-17) 
Prizren initially suffered primarily from ethnic violence. While this 
problem has been alleviated, though not eradicated, the presently biggest 
security/criminality problem is illegal prostitution and trafficking of women. 
Special investigation units targeting this problem were formed and have been 
effective. Prizren has 4 police stations. (UNMIK Police Annual Report 2000; 
17-18) 
Gnjilane, bordering on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), was the calmest part of 
Kosovo during the conflict, and remains the wealthiest. Minority protection has 
been a central task for UNMIK Police in this region, and some success in this 
respect can be seen in the gradual acceptance and trust of the Serb minority. 
Kidnapping for ransom has also been a region-specific problem here. 
                                                 
32 Autumn 2002 
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Significant challenges in organized crime has prompted the establishment of 
special units such as Regional Special Operations (targets smuggling), Drug 
Squad, Homicide Squad, Forensic Unit, and a Trafficking and Prostitution 
Investigation Unit. (UNMIK Police Annual Report 2000; 19-20) 
 
Specialized investigative units: 
The Central Criminal Investigation Unit (CCIU) was established already in 
June1999 and is a homicide investigation unit. In addition to homicides 
committed inside Kosovo, it investigates homicides (and other serious crimes) 
committed prior to the deployment of UNMIK, war crimes committed in 1998 
and 1999, and any case assigned to it by the Police Commissioner. Their job 
includes opening and investigating mass graves, and a close working 
relationship exists with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY). In the years 1999 and 2000 the CCIU opened 199 and 376 
cases respectively, making war crimes and mass murder the priority. However, 
the CCIU has found that many accusations against individuals of this type of 
crimes are based on rumors or guilt by association. The CCIU consists of 5 
investigation teams of 5 members each, two officers assigned to trafficking 
and prostitution cases, and administrative support functions, totaling 32 
international officers and 12 language assistants. (UNMIK Police Annual 
Report 2000; 21-22) 
Missing Persons Unit (MPU) was formed in November 1999 and 
investigates all missing person cases in Kosovo that started prior to, during or 
after the conflict. In addition it keeps statistical records, keeps families of 
missing persons updated on their cases, and performs other related duties. It 
consists of 7 international and 2 KPS officers, and 8 local staff members and 
has offices in Pristina and the Serb village of Gracanica. (UNMIK Police 
Annual Report 2000; 22) 
Trafficking and Prostitution Investigation Unit (TPIU) was formed in 
the autumn of 2000 to meet a major and growing problem of trafficking in 
women mainly from different Eastern European countries to Kosovo. It has 22 
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members and teams in each of the 5 provinces. In January 2001 an UNMIK 
regulation was issued which defines trafficking as a crime and stipulates 
penalties ranging from 2 to 12 years upon conviction. This has greatly helped 
the TPIU’s work, as no law against human trafficking existed prior to this 
regulation. (UNMIK Police Annual Report 2000; 23) 
The Forensic Unit secures and analyzes physical proof in the following 
sections: Crime Scene Section, Crime Laboratory, Document Examination 
Section, Fingerprint Section, and Ballistic Section. 19 experienced 
international and 7 KPS officers (especially selected and trained for this unit) 
work for this unit. (UNMIK Police Annual Report 2000; 24) 
Internal Investigations Unit (IIU) investigates complaints against 
UNMIK police officers. It consists of 11 UNMIK police officers and sorts under 
the Administrative department, not Operations. (UNMIK Police Annual Report 
2000; 25) 
 
Special Operational Units: 
The Special Police Units (SPU) is a police force that consists of 6 national 
contingents of self-sufficient police officers with military status and capabilities.  
In his report to the Security Council issued on the same day as UNSCR 1244 
was adopted, the UN Secretary General stated that Special Police Units (SPU) 
will be part of the international police presence in Kosovo and take care of 
crowd control and “other special police functions”. (S/1999/672; III 9) The role 
of a public order agency is affirmed in report S/1999/779 (VI 2 62), and 
elaborated to include area security and support and protection for UNMIK 
Police.  
It proved difficult to mobilize SPUs. Part of the reason was that it was 
the first time the UN authorized such an element. It was done to prevent 
problems connected with an enforcement gap as described in section 4.4. 
Instead of requesting a certain type of personnel more generally, a specific 
concept was developed by the UN bureaucracy, which states then were 
requested to fill. The SPUs would be self-sufficient, national entities with 
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qualifications suited for the tasks envisaged for them in Kosovo. They would 
not be expected to deploy below unit level but always work en force, so the 
usual mission language proficiency requirement was waived for individual 
officers in the SPUs. Only commanders were required to master English. 
(Perito 2002; 3-6) Despite repeated calls by the UN Secretary General to 
potential contributing states, emphasizing the dire need for the services of 
SPUs in theatre, the first SPU, from Pakistan, was deployed only in April 2001. 
The last one, the Romanian, arrived in February 2002. They are capable of 
rapid deployment to high-risk situations. In Kosovo they deal with, inter alia, 
public disorder/riot control and protection of UNMIK Police and Border Police 
and facilities. The Spanish unit is based in Pec and counts 112 officers taken 
from the Guardia Civil, a police force with a military structure. The Pakistani 
unit consists of 114 men. The Jordanian unit are 240 men33. The Indian SPU 
contingent has two units and 240 officers, all from India’s elite Rapid Action 
Force. The Polish unit is based in Pristina and counts 115 officers. The 
Ukrainian contingent consists of one dog unit of 35 men and 25 dogs, and 
one SPU unit of 115 men divided into 3 platoons. (UNMIK Police Annual 
Report 2000; 26) The SPUs are formally subordinated the UNMIK Police 
Commissioner and bound by UNMIK Police rules and codes of conduct, while 
daily command is executed within the national units. 
The Border Police are in charge of law enforcement at the borders of 
Kosovo and ensuring compliance with immigration laws. Only the borders with 
Albania, the Former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia and Montenegro, and 
Pristina airport, are international borders.34 Among the most important 
challenges facing the 223 Border Police officers at the currently 5 border 
crossing points are seizure of false documents, illegal immigrants, trafficking in 
women, smuggling of weapons and other illegal goods as well as goods that 
have not been properly registered and taxed. KFOR patrols the borderline 
between checkpoints. (UNMIK Police Annual Report 2000; 12-13) 
                                                 
33 No further details have been found on the Pakistani and Jordanian SPUs 
34 As Kosovo is formally a legitimate part of the Federal republic of Yugoslavia, the line separating the 
provinces of Kosovo and Serbia today is an administrative boundary 
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Protection Units were established in recognition of a need for special 
protection, “body guarding” services of VIP persons as well as persons in 
certain positions, such as international judges and prosecutors and visiting 
foreign dignitaries. This unit now counts 80 international officers selected and 
trained for this duty in Kosovo, and has been enforced by a High Risk Escort 
Unit and Regional Escort Units. The first one provides protection for money 
escorts, high escape risk prisoner escorts and high risk VIPs. The second has 
platoons in each region and escort regional staff, government officials, and 
prisoners. (UNMIK Police Annual Report 2000; 27) 
 
Miscellaneous: 
Traffic services more or less had to rebuild a traffic regime from 
nothing. In the wake of the conflict Kosovo had a broken infrastructure, no 
vehicle registration system, no driving licensing system, no insurance 
schemes, and a huge influx of returning refugees in every number and kind of 
vehicle. By now most of these problems are at least addressed and programs 
have been started to fill the voids. As work has progressed, an increasing 
number of responsibilities in this sector has been transferred to KPS officers 
who now perform many traffic duties independently of international officers. 
(UNMIK Police Annual Report 2000; 28) 
Induction Training Centre is the reception and training facility for all 
new arrivals to the UNMIK Police. The ITC course includes tests in English 
proficiency and weapons handling, as well as classes in UNMIK Police Code 
of Conduct, human rights, sexual harassment, HIV/AIDS awareness, cultural 
awareness, survival, mine awareness, use of force, local laws, and mission 
procedures and routines. Only successful candidates are assigned duty upon 
completion of the program. The ITC is part of the Planning & Development 
Department, not Operations. (UNMIK Police Annual Report 2000; 30) 
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